Research and Publications

The global commitment to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions requires reform of existing policies, the formulation of new policies, and concrete policy implementation in every country. This paper provides an early effort to examine the overall readiness of China’s 1+N climate policy package to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060 and to explore policy gaps. We use a mixed methods approach, combining a comprehensive policy inventory, an expert survey, and a system dynamics model to analyze the adequacy of China’s climate policies. Our findings reveal that China’s 1+N policy package will enable near-term carbon dioxide peaking and ultimately shift China toward full greenhouse gas (GHG) neutrality. However, the 1+N policies fall short of achieving full GHG neutrality across the whole economy due to a lack of stringency in some existing policies (i.e., stringency gaps) and some neglected sectors and areas in which policies are missing (i.e., coverage policy gaps). Meanwhile, the expert survey reveals concerns about implementation that exist for almost all policies (i.e., implementation gaps). We further discuss implications for how China could improve its 1+N policy package.

US foreign policy observers have noted a decline in the frequency of expert witnesses appearing before congressional committees, while congressional scholars have documented changes in committee practices that have led to fewer and shorter hearings. These trends interact in systematic ways, although their relationship has never been tested empirically. Using original data and micro-level measures of individual hearings by the national security committees of the House and Senate, we demonstrate how time constraints and routine responsibilities limit the number of opportunities for ex- pert witnesses from 1995 to 2020. We find some influence for chamber polarization on witness totals but less impact on the type of experts. We uncover significant differences among individual committees in their use of academics and think tank representatives. Our study is unique in its focus on both chambers, inclusion of closed hearings, differentia- tion between academics and think tank representatives, and attention to the public salience of foreign affairs. Shrinkage in the official marketplace of foreign policy ideas warrants concern, highlighting the executive branch's increasing domi- nance over military and diplomatic decisions, diminished legislative capacity, and public disinterest in international affairs.

How do semi-authoritarian regimes manage dissent and how does their protest management repertoire deter and spark contention? This paper looks at Lebanon’s post-war system as an instance of authoritarian rule that relies on various techniques of power, including political performances, to manage contention. Building on a dramaturgical approach, I focus on three performances that government players have deployed to govern dissent during the 2019 uprising: Enacting unresponsiveness, staging ‘spectral dangers’, and scripting alternative crises. Research on how these performances shape contention is crucial to exploring how the regime re-engineers its resilience while activists wrestle with the politics of sectarian power-sharing.

All armed groups have internal regulations, and these regulations frequently involve the governance of affect, intimacy, and reproduction. Drawing upon my ethnographic research with female former combatants from Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), I explore the gendered aspects of these governance regimes. How was intimacy dictated and policed by commanders and peers? What are the tropes regarding women and violence, and how are these frequently eroticized? What forms of reproductive governance were exercised within the ranks? For women who chose to leave the FARC, either informally or via official Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration programs, to what extent does reintegration involve the redomestication of “transgressive” women?

Recent use of least-cost diets as a measure of global food security revealed that over 3 billion people are unable to afford sufficient nutritious food for an active and healthy life, driving demand for policy changes to improve access and affordability. This study quantifies the role of imports in consumer prices, matching retail prices in 144 countries to imports by origin of the item or its main ingredient, resulting in a total of 13,846 pairs of a retail price and its import cost in 2017. We find that 55% of retail items had some active imports supplementing domestic production, and of those around 48% have nonzero tariffs whose average effective rate is around 6.7% of the imported commodity price. Over all countries for which data are available, the share of consumer prices for least-cost healthy diets that is attributable to tariffs and non-tariff measures averages 0.67% and 2.45% globally. The highest restrictions are on nutrient-rich vegetables, fruits and animal-sourced foods. Access to bulk commodities from diverse origins is essential for food and nutrition security, providing a greater diversity of foods and food ingredients at lower and more stable prices than can be grown at any one location. On average over all food products that are imported, 83% of the retail price is domestic value added after arrival. We conclude that food imports are best understood as inputs to the domestic production and distribution of retail items, with consumer prices and growth of the food sector dependent on the cost levels, infrastructure and institutions underlying each product's entire value chain.

The collective security system embodied in the UN Charter has never functioned as intended. Article 43 “special agreements” were never concluded, and so when military forces are deployed by the United Nations, they do so on a voluntary basis. As far back as 1948, Secretary-General Trygvie Lie proposed a UN Guard of 5,000 to perform limited functions. Other proposals since then range from a large International Peace Force of 800,000 to a more modest UN Emergency Peace Service of 13,500. This chapter argues that the time is right to begin discussing the creation of an International Standing Civilian Protection Service of 2,400 personnel, deployable in small modular Joint Protection Teams. Such a service would meet an immediate need of providing a rapidly deployable, multidimensional capacity for civilian protection that is tailored to a particular conflict. Equally important, it could lay the foundation for more far-reaching reforms, such as revitalisation of Article 43 agreements. Even these more ambitious proposals are not a full response to the challenges posed by rising geopolitical tensions and conflict. But if addressed with a sense of urgency, incremental steps of the sort proposed here can change the normative and political climate, thereby opening the door to deeper reforms that currently seem out of reach.

This article explores major findings and evolutions in understandings of transboundary water conflict and cooperation over the last three decades, focusing on the trends emerging from the Transboundary Freshwater Diplomacy Database. It is found that since the 1940s, countries tend to cooperate over shared water resources, in contrast to media portrayals of ‘water wars’. Water conflicts, which have increased slightly since 2000, are mostly fuelled by water quantity disputes or unilateral infrastructure developments. Institutions play a role in facilitating cooperation and reducing conflict over shared waters, but their growth and adoption have slowed over the last few decades.