Fletcher experts analyze the 2026 conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched major new military operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran, striking facilities across the country and killing figures including Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran's retaliation targeted military sites and civilian infrastructure from the Arab gulf states to the Eastern Mediterranean. The outbreak of conflict caused significant loss of life and disruption to the global economy.
As deep uncertainty grips the world, this collection gathers insight from Fletcher faculty on the implications for security, energy, diplomacy, and law.
For interview opportunities with Fletcher faculty, please contact Katie Coleman at katie.coleman@tufts.edu.
Will Oil Prices Rise?
By Kelly Sims Gallagher, Dean and Professor of Energy & Environmental Policy
(March 1) The impact of the conflict in Iran on global oil prices will be determined by both the magnitude and length of the disruption. In the near term, oil and LNG tankers will avoid the Strait of Hormuz, a notorious chokepoint, even if it is not closed by the Iranians. As of March 1, multiple tankers have already been hit in the Persian Gulf. If the Strait of Hormuz is temporarily closed, 20 percent of the world’s oil supply will be cut off.
In the near term, OPEC has already announced that its member states will increase production by 206,000 barrels a day, which is not enough to compensate for the loss of Iranian exports alone. As of 2025, Iran was exporting approximately 1.5 million barrels per day. Most of Iran’s oil flows to China, which imports most of Iran’s crude oil exports. China will need to purchase alternative supplies of oil on the global market, which will increase demand and increase pressure on global oil prices.
There is little spare capacity for increasing oil production in the short-term outside the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is the country that maintains the world’s largest spare capacity at approximately 1.8 million barrels per day, but its exports will now be constrained. Compounding the supply problem, Venezuelan oil production contracted by 210,000 barrels per day between December 2025 and February 2026 in the wake of the U.S. intervention there according to the IEA. The longer-term impacts depend entirely on the duration of the conflict, how long the Strait of Hormuz is affected, and the extent to which oil infrastructure is damaged or destroyed all the Persian Gulf countries.
The Global Response
By Tamirace Fakhoury, Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict
(March 1) The U.S. Operation Epic Fury on Iran has unleashed a cascade of regional and international reactions, revealing deep anxieties about escalation. French President Emmanuel Macron has urged an emergency UN Security Council meeting to contain the fallout. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has emphasized that Britain was not implicated in the strike. The EU’s leadership has appealed for “maximum restraint,” warning of the dangers of a wider confrontation.
In response to the strikes, Iran had already attacked US targets in several Arab gulf states. It framed its actions as an exercise of its right to self‑defense and as necessary to protect the integrity of the state. This time, it appeared more prepared to react.
The U.S operation has fueled debates about its legal justification and about whether credible evidence existed that Iran’s enrichment program had accelerated following last year’s attack. Across the region, states are bracing for spillover. Arab governments are carefully weighing their reactions. They are mindful of the risks of entanglement. Under the fear that Hezbollah might join the fray, Lebanon has announced a stance of neutrality, reflecting a broader aversion to being dragged into a war that its population is neither ready for nor willing to absorb. People are on edge, fearing that what the U.S. announced as a multi-day operation could spiral into a broader conflagration. Meanwhile, reports that Iran’s underground shelters remain underdeveloped have raised questions about civilian protection and the population’s own sense of security.
Amid this uncertainty, a central question looms: can the Iranian regime withstand the mounting pressure? And if it does, will its survival paradoxically consolidate its power at home and reshape its posture in the region?
War Powers
By Michael J. Glennon, Professor of Constitutional and International Law
(March 1) The murkiness of the rationale for attacking Iran ought not obscure the clarity of the law governing it, in three respects:
First, the attack was unconstitutional. If the President may initiate what President Trump has called “massive and ongoing” military operations against Iran without congressional approval, Congress’s war power is set to naught, and Presidents for all intents and purposes are vested with the same war powers as George III.
Second, President Trump will be required under section 5(b) of the 1973 War Powers Resolution to terminate the armed forces involvement in hostilities in Iran 60 days after the attack, unless Congress declares war, enacts specific statutory authorization, or extends that time period. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has advised that the time period is constitutional. I think they were right.
Third, President Trump may be required, under section 5(c) of the Resolution, to remove the armed forces from hostilities in Iran earlier if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution—i.e., by a resolution adopted by a majority of both Houses of Congress not submitted for presidential signature or veto. Some view this procedure as invalid after the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, but the case is poorly reasoned, doctrinally incoherent, and eroded by subsequent decisions. I think it should be either overruled or limited to its facts, which concerned statutorily delegated authority rather than non-delegated constitutional power such as Congress’s war power.
International Law
By Ian Johnstone, Professor of International Law
(March 1) The US attack on Iran is a clear violation of international law. The UN Security Council did not authorize it and no plausible interpretation of “self-defense against an armed attack” (Article 51 of the UN Charter) can be stretched that far. Moreover, the notion of a “responsibility to protect”, whatever its moral appeal, does not countenance military intervention on behalf of a besieged population without Security Council authorization.
President Trump, unsurprisingly, has not sought to justify the attacks in those terms - he has said he doesn’t need international law. This could be seen as a victory for honesty and an end to double standards, but be careful what you wish for. As François de La Rochefoucauld famously wrote in the 1600s “hypocrisy in the homage vice pays to virtue.” When powerful states seek to provide legal justifications for their actions – as the US did when it invaded Iraq in 2003 – they are at least signaling that the rules matter, even if it is mere lip service. If those justifications are widely rejected, they pay a reputational price, as the US did in 2003 and Russia did when it invaded Ukraine in 2022 in an even more blatant violation of international law. The reputational price may not be much of a constraint, but it creates some pressure to match deeds with words. If powerful states don’t even bother trying, the very idea that the law matters will fade away and there will be nothing left for weaker states (or domestic publics) to latch onto to bring that pressure to bear. We will be in a world not simply of “might makes right,” but one in which there is no “right,” only “might.”
Transatlantic Relations
(March 1) Transatlantic relations, already strained, are in for another test after the large-scale U.S.-Israeli attack against Iran and the subsequent, anticipated Iranian counterstrikes. It is plainly obvious that there has been no cooperation between the U.S. and the EU or any European country regarding this initiative, not even on a state-by-state basis; the remarks of the British Prime Minister were pretty clear on that.
After the first shock, the EU’s initial reaction has been a mere call for restraint, while individual countries have adopted a variety of reactions, ranging from a straight forward condemnation of the U.S.-Israeli attack (Spain), to mild calls for a return the diplomatic table (Ireland, Croatia) or expressing concerns about the overall peace in the region (Italy, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary), to various forms of accusing Iran that it actually caused the attack in one way or the other and that it should stop its counterattacks (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden), while some referred to the US arguments about freeing the Iranian people (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Romania). The EU institutions seem to have adopted the overall US approach for a regime change in Iran.
Such cautious and variable reactions are indicative of the fact that on issues such as security and defense, Europe still has a long way to go to form a single voice. Individual states remain guided by their own national interests. Therefore, expecting the US to seek European support or even cooperation in its actions in the defense and security fields seems, at the moment, a utopian idea.
Mediation
By Alex de Waal, Research Professor
(March 1) Respect for good faith mediation is a basic norm of state conduct. Without it, averting or ending wars through agreement is all-but-impossible.
Israeli violated this long-held precept last year when it attacked Iran while negotiations, under the auspices of the state of Oman, were ongoing. The U.S. didn’t start the 12-day war but joined Israel when it was underway.
Aborting peace talks with military action is unwise. In 2011, NATO began bombing Libya on the day that African leaders were scheduled to fly to Tripoli to negotiate a soft landing for Muammar Gaddafi and avert what they feared would be a calamitous war. Fifteen years on, that decision to short-circuit negotiation looks like armor-plated naivete.
With this weekend’s attack on Iran, the Trump Administration showed contempt for the norm of respecting mediation. The Omanis reported that Iran had made important concessions and that talks would resume this week.
Realists like to cite Thucydides’ line “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” as the iron law of international relations. This was the ultimatum that Athens gave when it demanded that the Melians surrender. But Thucydides goes on to recount how Athens itself went on to suffer the devastating consequences of its hubristic lawlessness.
Professor Rockford Weitz joins NBC's Boston affiliate to discuss the death of Ali Khameini. (March 1)
Donald Heflin, executive director of Fletcher's Murrow Center, discusses the history of U.S.-Iran relations in an interview for San Francisco radio. (March 1)
Donald Heflin, executive director of Fletcher's Murrow Center, speaks to The Conversation about the likely outcomes of U.S. intervention. (February 28)
Professor Rockford Weitz tells Forbes Middle East how the conflict may affect the global oil market. (February 28)
Academic Dean Daniel Drezner discusses President Donald Trump's approach to interstate conflicts in a podcast interview. (February 27)
Visiting Professor Arash Reisinezhad speaks to The Christian Science Monitor about the possible consequences of U.S. strikes. (February 25)
Visiting Professor Arash Reisinezhad writes a piece for Foreign Policy with analysis on Iran's leadership. (February 24)