Fletcher experts analyze the 2026 conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched major new military operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran, striking facilities across the country and killing figures including Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran's retaliation targeted military sites and civilian infrastructure from the Arab gulf states to the Eastern Mediterranean. The outbreak of conflict caused significant loss of life and disruption to the global economy.
As deep uncertainty grips the world, this collection gathers insight from Fletcher faculty on the implications for security, energy, diplomacy, and law. For additional perspective, read our long-form interview with alumnus Vali Nasr, F83.
For interview opportunities with Fletcher faculty, please contact Katie Coleman at katie.coleman@tufts.edu.
Article 51 of the UN Charter Invoked
By John Cerone, Visiting Professor of International Law
(March 20) In a significant development, the United States has invoked the rights of individual and collective self-defense “in accordance with Article 51” of the United Nations Charter, in a formal notification to the UN Security Council.
Prior to this notification, the U.S. had not proffered any clear legal argument under the jus ad bellum (i.e., the rules of international law governing recourse to the use of armed force against other states). While historically it was not unlawful for states to use military action to enforce their legal rights, the 20th century witnessed a tightening of the rules. In particular, the drafters of the UN Charter, the primary purpose of which was “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” included a comprehensive prohibition on the threat or use of force in international relations. This rule provides the core of the modern jus ad bellum.
The right of self-defense, set forth in Article 51 of the Charter, is an explicit exception to this prohibition. The right of “individual or collective” self-defense arises in the event of an “armed attack” against a state. In this context, collective self-defense extends the right to use force to assisting states responding to a request from a victim state. As such, an armed attack against either the U.S. or Israel suffices to justify action in self-defense. (It is also arguable that an imminent threat of armed attack would justify anticipatory action against the would-be aggressor.) States availing themselves of the right of self-defense must notify the UN Security Council.
In its Article 51 notification, the U.S. invokes both individual and collective self-defense. This notification also sets forth an expansive notion of “armed attack,” encompassing a pattern of attacks going back decades. This is a departure from the notion of “armed attack” as that term has been understood by the International Court of Justice, which conceives of an armed attack as a discrete instance repelled by a discrete response. Significantly, the U.S. also claims that its response is both “necessary and proportionate,” giving a nod to the legal limits circumscribing defensive uses of armed force.
While it remains to be seen whether the international community acquiesces in this expansive view of the right of self-defense, the significance of the notification itself cannot be gainsaid. The mere fact that the U.S. has invoked a legal basis, acknowledged legal limits on its use of force, and complied with the notification requirement in the Charter, returns the U.S. to its normal practice of attempting to justify its conduct under international law, thereby acknowledging its constraints.
A Changing War
By Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics
(March 19) The war in Iran is now in its third week. What began as targeted U.S.-Israeli strikes has disrupted global energy flows, activated Hezbollah, destabilized Gulf alliances, and forced the Federal Reserve to factor armed conflict into its interest rate decisions.
Leaders sense that something has changed. Markets sense it. But the vocabulary to describe it, and therefore to act on it, has not yet caught up with reality.
That vocabulary begins with a single distinction, between quantitative and qualitative risk. Much of what we observe today is familiar: great power rivalry, regional conflict, economic coercion. These are intensified versions of long-standing dynamics. More of the same, moving faster. The change is quantitative.
But some of today's risks are qualitatively different. The interaction of geopolitical conflict, geoeconomic fragmentation, and geotechnological disruption is producing a risk environment that is not just more intense, but structurally different. Multiple actors, opaque redlines, cascading cross-domain effects. No single framework yet captures it.
The failed attempt by the U.S. to bully Iran illustrates this precisely. All our instincts are wrong, and the power to effect outcomes appears to shift from moment to moment. We are where strategists were in 1946, as the world divided into two nuclear-armed superpowers and their allies or clients. The danger is palpable. But the doctrine has yet to be written.
Shipping and Oil
By Michael Klein, Professor of International Economic Affairs
(March 18) President Trump has announced a 60-day suspension of the Jones Act (formerly known as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920) that restricts shipping between U.S. ports to vessels that carry the U.S. flag, are built in the United States, are owned by U.S. citizens, and whose crews include at least three-fourths U.S. citizens or permanent residents. This restrictive act decreases the supply of available ships and therefore raises the price of shipping – for example, a 2014 study by the Congressional Research Service showed it was much more expensive to ship crude oil from Texas to refineries on the East Cost than shipping crude to much more distant locations outside the United States. This is not the first time this act was suspended – President Trump suspended it to help relief efforts in Puerto Rico in 2017 and other suspensions occurred in the wake of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Sandy, Katrina, and Rita. This current suspension could lower gas prices somewhat, estimates are about 10 cents per gallon, but due to the war in Iran prices are about 80 cents per gallon higher than one month ago.
Regime Survival
By Ryan Kroells, PhD Student
(March 14) Iran’s enduring leadership appears to be executing a coherent strategy aimed not at decisive victory, but long‑term strategic survival.
First, Tehran prioritizes regime preservation above all other objectives. This requires maintaining robust internal security capabilities, actively suppressing potential rival powers and protests, and ensuring continued loyalty of key institutions such as the IRGC and internal security forces. Domestic stability is the foundation upon which all other elements of Iranian strategy rest.
Second, Iran seeks to impose high costs on the U.S., Israel, and Gulf states that are actively or tacitly aligned against it. This relies on a combination of missile and drone strikes, frustrating global supply lines, targeted information operations, and the use of proxy forces, including organizations like Hezbollah and the Houthis, but also loosely affiliated militant groups. The strategic purpose is not solely escalation, but to raise political, military, and economic costs of sustained cooperation to a level that discourages continued participation and deters future offensive actions.
Third, Iran maintains a defensive posture designed to deter any consideration of a ground invasion. Given Iran’s population size, geography, and military capacity, such a conflict would likely become protracted, induce high casualties, and carry significant risks of regional escalation.
Taken together, these elements underscore that Iran is not pursuing military victory but strategic endurance. Tehran seeks to survive the conflict and shape its eventual political outcome. Prolonged confrontation, however, also historically carries the risk of ideological radicals, opportunists, and sleepers well beyond the immediate battlefield to the U.S. and others.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Government.
The Strategic Landscape
By Arash Reisinezhad, Visiting Assistant Professor
(March 13) The initial expectation in Washington and Tel Aviv appears to have been that a decapitation strike, targeting Iran’s Supreme Leader alongside senior military commanders, combined with two to four days of intense bombardment, would trigger the rapid collapse of the Iranian political system. The underlying assumption was that the Islamic Republic was structurally brittle and incapable of absorbing a shock of this magnitude.
That expectation has not materialized. Despite sustaining significant losses, Iran appears to have been prepared for this scenario. Rather than responding with a narrow, bilateral retaliation, Tehran immediately widened the theater of confrontation. Missile strikes were directed not only at Israeli targets but at multiple U.S. military facilities, transforming the conflict into a broader regional war.
Oil prices are rising, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are intensifying, and the risk of disruption to global energy flows is increasing. At the same time, some of Washington’s regional partners in the Persian Gulf are questioning the strategic costs of the war, testing their confidence in the sustainability of America’s regional strategy.
Furthermore, the Iran war demonstrates power alone does not decide wars; endurance matters just as much. The side capable of absorbing sustained pressure while continuing to impose costs over time can alter the trajectory of the conflict. Time itself is the strategic weapon.
More significantly, the Iran War once again shows that technology cannot tame geopolitics. The battlefield is not determined only by modern weapons, but also by geography. Therefore, the fate of this war may be ultimately determined at two critical geopolitical chokepoints: the Straits of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb.
The World Order
By John Cerone, Visiting Professor of International Law
(March 8) The UN Charter’s grand bargain, in which member states gave up their unilateral right to go to war in exchange for a collective security system, has depended for its efficacy on U.S. buy-in. The most explicit nod to this dependence is the veto power, which is held by the five permanent members of the Security Council.
However, as intimated by Canada’s Mark Carney in his already infamous Davos speech, there is another, implicit, quid pro quo. In the past, the U.S. would proffer legal arguments to justify its uses of armed force as consistent with the Charter rules. In return, the system would provide a degree of interpretive flex to accommodate the most significant security interests of a “Great Power.”
This time, the U.S. may decline to offer a justification, choosing instead to telegraph the position that it does not regard itself as bound by the Charter rules, or indeed any rules of international law. This would deal a crippling blow to a collective security system for which the U.S. was a chief architect and from which it has benefited enormously. The recent speeches by Carney and by Germany’s Friedrich Merz spoke of the existential peril currently facing this system. The UN Charter is young, and still relatively fragile. The ‘new world order’ it introduced requires cultivation and vigilant observance. I disagree with those who say the system has already been swept away, but the danger is there if the present course remains unaltered.
Maritime Risk
By Rockford Weitz, Professor of Practice & Director of the Maritime Studies Program
(March 7) Global shipping will return to the Strait of Hormuz in a few days after marine war risk insurance markets are reestablished.
Marine war risk insurance will become available again to global shipping firms after the U.S. Development Finance Corp (DFC)’s $20B commitment supporting marine reinsurance filters through Lloyds of London, the world’s largest marine insurance market. This is happening now.
Once marine war risk insurance becomes widely available again, crude oil tankers and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers will start transiting the Strait of Hormuz from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, and perhaps even Iran to consuming countries in the Indo-Pacific, including China, Japan, South Korea, India, and Singapore.
This will trigger major price drops in Brent and WTI crude oil futures prices, LNG spot market prices, as well as gasoline and diesel prices in the U.S. Food prices in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will also stabilize and then start falling as container ships begin transiting the Strait of Hormuz to Dubai and other Gulf ports.
Naval escorts through the Strait of Hormuz by the U.S. Navy, European navies, GCC navies, and the Indian Navy will help keep marine insurance premiums low and global shipping flowing both in and out of the Gulf.
Iran's Future
(March 5) The U.S. and Israeli leaderships have not presented a cogent end goal for the war on Iran. Although Trump has spoken of “regime change,” this remains undefined and so far unrealistic. Lacking a realistic objective, there is danger of the war sliding into the adoption of maximalist ends, specifically, state collapse. State collapse in Iran would likely entail some or all of the following:
- Breakdown of overall security, food and water insecurity
- Outflow of refugees, asylum seekers, in massive numbers
- Bloody civil conflict along political lines
- Secessionism, which would itself drawn international concern (e.g. the Kurdish areas, and Turkiye), or footholds for groups like Daesh in areas of Iran
- Continued regional instability involving Israel and the Gulf monarchies
The worst effects of these outcomes would be borne by average Iranians, who already suffer under a deeply repressive autocracy, crushing international sanctions, and who would then have to face a long period of conflict and instability (a model for which might be Syria or Libya).
State collapse would be an unprecedented catastrophe for Iranians among others. “Regime change” appears less and less realistic and may never have been a considered goal for the U.S. or Israel. The likely remaining option would be the survival of a weakened and internally more repressive Islamic Republic system.
Economic Fog of War
By Michael Klein, Professor of International Economic Affairs
(March 4) The “fog of war” extends to opacity about its economic consequences, especially when conflict occurs at a chokepoint for the production and shipment of oil and natural gas and economic policy uncertainty predates the conflagration.
Disruptions to the supply of oil and liquified natural gas and reduced shipping through the Strait of Hormuz represent hard-to-manage supply shocks.
The oil price shock after the 1979 Iranian revolution offers a distant, but imperfect, mirror. The amount of oil and natural gas per dollar of GDP is lower now than in the late 1970s and we are not now coming out of a decade of high inflation.
Nonetheless, there are concerns. Attacks on the Fed’s independence can raise inflation expectations which can drive actual inflation. There are already economic vulnerabilities from tariff policy, cuts to government employment, rising federal debt, and the possibility of financial fragility. A spike in the price of oil, and ongoing uncertainty, could very well set off a recession as consumers pull back from spending and businesses stall hiring.
The economic fog from the war will spread far wider than the battlefields in the Middle East. The ultimate consequences will not be known for some time.
Energy Security
By Barbara Kates-Garnick, Professor of Practice in Energy Policy
(March 4) Let’s stipulate that we are at the early stages of a crisis and that there are “perils to energy prophecy.” However, we have experienced scenes from this movie before: reliance on fossil fuels from an unstable part of the globe now in armed conflict.
In 1979, because of turbulence in Iran, we experienced long lines at gas pumps and energy price spikes that dragged down the U.S. economy. The newly formed Department of Energy used its available policy tools to address the crisis: gradual deregulation of oil prices, spurs to production, introduction of energy efficiency, the buildup of stockpiles domestically, and international plans for strategic emergency drawdowns of oil reserves. The Three Mile Island nuclear catastrophe occurred during this time. The origin of many of our current energy policies and problems can be traced to decisions made in the immediate post-1979 period.
Fast forward to today. Prior to the Trump administration’s return to fossil energy dominance, we were on a trajectory to an energy transition that was both clean and secure. Renewable resources are domestic energy —on and offshore wind and solar. Technology involves battery storage and electric vehicles. Much of this effort and growth opportunities have been stopped in their tracks. Yes, we have domestic oil and gas, but LNG and oil trades on world markets, subjecting U.S. consumers to global prices and insecure supply chains.
In 2026, we cannot ignore the consequences of our energy choices and their connection to unstable global politics. But this time, we have the opportunity achieve an energy future that is cleaner and secure, based on the U.S. strengths of innovation, technology, and clean resource energy independence.
Kinetic Diplomacy
By Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics
(March 3) The war now engulfing the Middle East is the result of kinetic diplomacy — the substitution of immediate military force for the harder work of diplomacy, trade, and political strategy. Force was used to generate bargaining leverage even as negotiations were still underway. The historical record from U.S. interventions — and the patterns I trace in Dying by the Sword and the Military Intervention Project — suggests a sobering reality: force can change the balance of capabilities, but it widens the conflict landscape by multiplying grievances, hardening positions, and creating new actors with the power to block any eventual settlement.
Within four days, the conflict has spread well beyond its original targets. Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader and the dominant figure in its political system for over three decades, is dead. Iran has declared the Strait of Hormuz closed, and commercial shipping through one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints has already been effectively halted. Iranian strikes have hit U.S. allies across the Gulf, and the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh has been struck. The Lebanon front is again reopening. Six American service members have already been killed, according to CENTCOM, and Washington is promising harder hits still to come.
This is not a sudden escalation. It is the predictable result of a campaign with a military objective but no political plan for what comes next. The United States went in wanting regime change without any clear picture of who would govern Iran next, how a successor would emerge, or how the war would end.
Trump's Decisions
By Daniel Drezner, Academic Dean and Distinguished Professor of International Politics
(March 3) Donald Trump decided to join Israel in launching a decapitation strike on Iran. The decapitation part has been successful, in a manner that echoes what happened before the attack on Venezuela — with superior intelligence and tactics on display in the initial wave of airstrikes.
But Iran is not Venezuela in a variety of ways. Iran has more potent military capabilities, allowing the regime to strike back and kill U.S. soldiers. Trump might claim that the U.S. and Israel can maintain an air assault for 4-5 weeks, but reporting suggests that both countries have limited stockpiles of missile interceptors, and Iran has a stockpile of missiles and drones to fire.
Furthermore, the more we learn about Trump’s decision-making process to bomb Iran, the clearer it becomes that there is no coherent strategy or end goal. At times the administration has contradicted itself on the goals. In their talking points the U.S. has espoused maximalist goals like annihilating Iran’s navy or ensure that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon. I do not know how this conflict plays out over the next few weeks. It would appear, however, that the Trump administration does not know either.
The Global Response
By Tamirace Fakhoury, Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict
(March 1) The U.S. Operation Epic Fury on Iran has unleashed a cascade of regional and international reactions, revealing deep anxieties about escalation. French President Emmanuel Macron has urged an emergency UN Security Council meeting to contain the fallout. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has emphasized that Britain was not implicated in the strike. The EU’s leadership has appealed for “maximum restraint,” warning of the dangers of a wider confrontation.
In response to the strikes, Iran had already attacked US targets in several Arab gulf states. It framed its actions as an exercise of its right to self‑defense and as necessary to protect the integrity of the state. This time, it appeared more prepared to react.
The U.S operation has fueled debates about its legal justification and about whether credible evidence existed that Iran’s enrichment program had accelerated following last year’s attack. Across the region, states are bracing for spillover. Arab governments are carefully weighing their reactions. They are mindful of the risks of entanglement. Under the fear that Hezbollah might join the fray, Lebanon has announced a stance of neutrality, reflecting a broader aversion to being dragged into a war that its population is neither ready for nor willing to absorb. People are on edge, fearing that what the U.S. announced as a multi-day operation could spiral into a broader conflagration. Meanwhile, reports that Iran’s underground shelters remain underdeveloped have raised questions about civilian protection and the population’s own sense of security.
Amid this uncertainty, a central question looms: can the Iranian regime withstand the mounting pressure? And if it does, will its survival paradoxically consolidate its power at home and reshape its posture in the region?
War Powers
By Michael J. Glennon, Professor of Constitutional and International Law
(March 1) The murkiness of the rationale for attacking Iran ought not obscure the clarity of the law governing it, in three respects:
First, the attack was unconstitutional. If the President may initiate what President Trump has called “massive and ongoing” military operations against Iran without congressional approval, Congress’s war power is set to naught, and Presidents for all intents and purposes are vested with the same war powers as George III.
Second, President Trump will be required under section 5(b) of the 1973 War Powers Resolution to terminate the armed forces involvement in hostilities in Iran 60 days after the attack, unless Congress declares war, enacts specific statutory authorization, or extends that time period. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has advised that the time period is constitutional. I think they were right.
Third, President Trump may be required, under section 5(c) of the Resolution, to remove the armed forces from hostilities in Iran earlier if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution—i.e., by a resolution adopted by a majority of both Houses of Congress not submitted for presidential signature or veto. Some view this procedure as invalid after the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, but the case is poorly reasoned, doctrinally incoherent, and eroded by subsequent decisions. I think it should be either overruled or limited to its facts, which concerned statutorily delegated authority rather than non-delegated constitutional power such as Congress’s war power.
International Law
By Ian Johnstone, Professor of International Law
(March 1) The US attack on Iran is a clear violation of international law. The UN Security Council did not authorize it and no plausible interpretation of “self-defense against an armed attack” (Article 51 of the UN Charter) can be stretched that far. Moreover, the notion of a “responsibility to protect”, whatever its moral appeal, does not countenance military intervention on behalf of a besieged population without Security Council authorization.
President Trump, unsurprisingly, has not sought to justify the attacks in those terms - he has said he doesn’t need international law. This could be seen as a victory for honesty and an end to double standards, but be careful what you wish for. As François de La Rochefoucauld famously wrote in the 1600s “hypocrisy in the homage vice pays to virtue.” When powerful states seek to provide legal justifications for their actions – as the US did when it invaded Iraq in 2003 – they are at least signaling that the rules matter, even if it is mere lip service. If those justifications are widely rejected, they pay a reputational price, as the US did in 2003 and Russia did when it invaded Ukraine in 2022 in an even more blatant violation of international law. The reputational price may not be much of a constraint, but it creates some pressure to match deeds with words. If powerful states don’t even bother trying, the very idea that the law matters will fade away and there will be nothing left for weaker states (or domestic publics) to latch onto to bring that pressure to bear. We will be in a world not simply of “might makes right,” but one in which there is no “right,” only “might.”
Will Oil Prices Rise?
By Kelly Sims Gallagher, Dean and Professor of Energy & Environmental Policy
(March 1) The impact of the conflict in Iran on global oil prices will be determined by both the magnitude and length of the disruption. In the near term, oil and LNG tankers will avoid the Strait of Hormuz, a notorious chokepoint, even if it is not closed by the Iranians. As of March 1, multiple tankers have already been hit in the Persian Gulf. If the Strait of Hormuz is temporarily closed, 20 percent of the world’s oil supply will be cut off.
In the near term, OPEC has already announced that its member states will increase production by 206,000 barrels a day, which is not enough to compensate for the loss of Iranian exports alone. As of 2025, Iran was exporting approximately 1.5 million barrels per day. Most of Iran’s oil flows to China, which imports most of Iran’s crude oil exports. China will need to purchase alternative supplies of oil on the global market, which will increase demand and increase pressure on global oil prices.
There is little spare capacity for increasing oil production in the short-term outside the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is the country that maintains the world’s largest spare capacity at approximately 1.8 million barrels per day, but its exports will now be constrained. Compounding the supply problem, Venezuelan oil production contracted by 210,000 barrels per day between December 2025 and February 2026 in the wake of the U.S. intervention there according to the IEA. The longer-term impacts depend entirely on the duration of the conflict, how long the Strait of Hormuz is affected, and the extent to which oil infrastructure is damaged or destroyed all the Persian Gulf countries.
Transatlantic Relations
(March 1) Transatlantic relations, already strained, are in for another test after the large-scale U.S.-Israeli attack against Iran and the subsequent, anticipated Iranian counterstrikes. It is plainly obvious that there has been no cooperation between the U.S. and the EU or any European country regarding this initiative, not even on a state-by-state basis; the remarks of the British Prime Minister were pretty clear on that.
After the first shock, the EU’s initial reaction has been a mere call for restraint, while individual countries have adopted a variety of reactions, ranging from a straight forward condemnation of the U.S.-Israeli attack (Spain), to mild calls for a return the diplomatic table (Ireland, Croatia) or expressing concerns about the overall peace in the region (Italy, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary), to various forms of accusing Iran that it actually caused the attack in one way or the other and that it should stop its counterattacks (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden), while some referred to the US arguments about freeing the Iranian people (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Romania). The EU institutions seem to have adopted the overall US approach for a regime change in Iran.
Such cautious and variable reactions are indicative of the fact that on issues such as security and defense, Europe still has a long way to go to form a single voice. Individual states remain guided by their own national interests. Therefore, expecting the US to seek European support or even cooperation in its actions in the defense and security fields seems, at the moment, a utopian idea.
Mediation
By Alex de Waal, Research Professor
(March 1) Respect for good faith mediation is a basic norm of state conduct. Without it, averting or ending wars through agreement is all-but-impossible.
Israeli violated this long-held precept last year when it attacked Iran while negotiations, under the auspices of the state of Oman, were ongoing. The U.S. didn’t start the 12-day war but joined Israel when it was underway.
Aborting peace talks with military action is unwise. In 2011, NATO began bombing Libya on the day that African leaders were scheduled to fly to Tripoli to negotiate a soft landing for Muammar Gaddafi and avert what they feared would be a calamitous war. Fifteen years on, that decision to short-circuit negotiation looks like armor-plated naivete.
With this weekend’s attack on Iran, the Trump Administration showed contempt for the norm of respecting mediation. The Omanis reported that Iran had made important concessions and that talks would resume this week.
Realists like to cite Thucydides’ line “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” as the iron law of international relations. This was the ultimatum that Athens gave when it demanded that the Melians surrender. But Thucydides goes on to recount how Athens itself went on to suffer the devastating consequences of its hubristic lawlessness.
Professor Michael Klein tells CNBC how the war may affect the U.S. economy. (March 17)
Professor Rockford Weitz speaks to Live Now from Fox about the economic impact of the war with Iran. (March 15)
Professor Alex de Waal appears on U.K. radio station LBC to discuss the Trump administration's arguments for war. (March 14)
Professor Rockford Weitz provides analysis for Al Jazeera on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. (March 14)
Professor Rockford Weitz speaks to Forbes Middle East about how oil prices are affected by geopolitical risk. (March 13)
Professor Rockford Weitz speaks to Bloomberg for a video and radio interview about U.S. policies addressing risks in the Strait of Hormuz. (March 12)
Professor Michael Klein analyzes the energy supply crisis for The Guardian, comparing it to previous price shocks. (March 12)
Dean Kelly Sims Gallagher tells The New York Times about how the global market for natural gas will be affected by security disruption. (March 11)
In a piece for Foreign Policy, Visiting Professor Arash Reisinezhad characterizes the conflict as a test of endurance. (March 10).
Dean Kelly Sims Gallagher speaks to The New York Times about how countries will navigate energy security during the supply shock caused by the Iran war. (March 9)
As UAE data centers come under attack from Iran, Professor Chris Miller tells The Dispatch about the country's approach to technology. (March 9)
Professor Rockford Weitz speaks to Live Now from Fox about the war's impact on global energy markets. (March 9)
In a piece for The Conversation, Professor Michael Klein describes the economic consequences of a regional war. (March 6)
The Conversation interviews Donald Heflin, executive director of Fletcher's Murrow Center, on U.S. efforts to evacuate citizens from the Middle East. (March 5)
Professor Michael Glennon speaks to The Christian Science Monitor about congressional war powers. (March 4)
Professor Rockford Weitz speaks to Al Jazeera about the war's impact on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. (March 3)
Professor Dimitrios Skiadas speaks to Greek television channel ERT about the outbreak of war in the Middle East. (March 3)
Academic Dean Daniel Drezner joins GBH News for a discussion on U.S. strategy in the war. (March 2)
Professor Rockford Weitz joins NBC's Boston affiliate to discuss the death of Ali Khameini. (March 1)
Donald Heflin, executive director of Fletcher's Murrow Center, discusses the history of U.S.-Iran relations in an interview for San Francisco radio. (March 1)
Donald Heflin, executive director of Fletcher's Murrow Center, speaks to The Conversation about the likely outcomes of U.S. intervention. (February 28)
Professor Rockford Weitz tells Forbes Middle East how the conflict may affect the global oil market. (February 28)
Academic Dean Daniel Drezner discusses President Donald Trump's approach to interstate conflicts in a podcast interview. (February 27)
Visiting Professor Arash Reisinezhad speaks to The Christian Science Monitor about the possible consequences of U.S. strikes. (February 25)
Visiting Professor Arash Reisinezhad writes a piece for Foreign Policy with analysis on Iran's leadership. (February 24)
Visiting Professor Arash Reisinezhad co-authors a piece for Foreign Policy with predictions on how a U.S.-Iran war might unfold. (February 11)