Mass atrocities in Sudan have no clear endings. The country’s protracted civil wars have been punctuated by major military campaigns that involve large-scale killings and war crimes perpetrated by regular and irregular forces. Four times over the last thirty years, operations of this kind have killed tens of thousands of civilians, and caused hundreds of thousands to die from displacement, hunger, and disease. Each episode of mass atrocity occurs for different reasons, including fear-driven counterinsurgency, ideological ambition, and clearing areas to seize their resources, but they resemble one another in their pattern of ethnically targeted destruction of civilian communities. These episodes do not end clearly or decisively. Rather, killings diminish as the pattern of violence changes from a bipolar confrontation to fragmented or anarchic conflict. This is related to the way in which Sudan’s wars end neither in outright victories nor durable peace settlements, but rather in political realignments that reconfigure and may reduce violence. Sudanese live under the constant threat that war and mass atrocity may flare up again. Even the separation of South Sudan was not a decisive break: a new episode of mass atrocities is unfolding in South Sudan during the writing of this chapter. This chapter examines the pattern of mass atrocity in Sudan between the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983 and the independence of South Sudan in 2011 with a focus on how the episodes ended. The background section examines some patterns that emerge from the data on atrocities in Sudan, in particular its recurrent nature and the link between violent killing and death through hunger and disease. I digress briefly into identity politics as a framework for narrating Sudan’s conflicts. Then I turn to four episodes or patterns of mass atrocity, and to their endings, sequelae, and comparative null cases. The first case is the militia war of the north-south borderlands during the late 1980s. This established the pattern of irregular counter-population warfare that has been the framework for the conduct of wars ever since. This way of conducting hostilities has a particular logic, which determines escalation and de-escalation. The second case is the jihad in the Nuba Mountains in 1992: an important, under-documented case, which illustrates a related set of political dynamics that influence how mass atrocities end. Third is the case of Darfur: a richly documented episode that reprises themes from both the prior cases.