How do host states with a refugee regime relying on a patchwork of competing and informal responses negotiate refugee return? Amid a stalemate, Lebanon has taken in more than one million Syrian refugees. As soon as conflict dynamics shifted in favour of the Syrian regime, politicians started calling for their repatriation. In this context, although conditions are not propitious for return, various state and non-state actors have rushed to devise return initiatives. The article discusses shifts in governing returns from the Lebanese state as the sole decision-maker to the dispersion of authority within competing structures. It shows how various actors have drawn on return as bargaining leverage. Their divergent agendas have enshrined disputed preferences over repatriation, obscuring accountability over refugee rights. Competing logics are to be contextualised in a historically informed analysis of the state and its refugee regime. They are further to be embedded in a geopolitical reading of the ways Syria’s war has cut across Lebanese borders. The Lebanese case conveys broader insights. Host states may draw on fragmentation and informality to blur responsibility over safe and dignified return. Additionally, fragmentation and informality within a state make it harder for international actors to rally support for principles governing repatriation.