Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine

Oct 1, 1989
By: Glennon MJ American Journal of International Law Cambridge University Press (CUP) 814 - 821
Abstract
<jats:p>The unevenness of congressional oversight, the proclivity of executive foreign affairs agencies for violating the law and the traditional responsibility of the courts as the last guardians of the Constitution—all point to the propriety of an active role for the judiciary in ensuring governmental compliance with the law. Specifically, courts should not decline to resolve foreign affairs disputes between Congress and the President because they present “political questions.” The recent case of <jats:italic>Lowry v. Reagan</jats:italic> illustrates the serious systemic damage wrought by judicial abstention in such disputes.</jats:p>
Copy Citation Glennon, M. J. (1989). Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine. American Journal of International Law, 83(4), 814-821. doi:10.2307/2203370 Copied to clipboard.
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