Fletcher experts assess global implications of Nicolás Maduro's capture
After Maduro
By Katrina Burgess, Professor of Political Economy
(January 13) A former bus driver with a middle school education, Nicolás Maduro had no idea how to manage Venezuela’s economy when the bottom fell out of the oil market. But he proved remarkably savvy at consolidating power. He sustained the regime’s patronage networks, particularly within the security forces, by tolerating – if not outright engaging in – illicit activities such as drug trafficking and illegal mining. He kept the rest of the population in line through repression, selective rationing, and electoral fraud.
Maduro is gone, but his regime stands. The military retains control of vast sectors of the economy, and non-state paramilitaries known as colectivos patrol the streets, inspecting people’s phones for anti-regime posts. The oil industry is in shambles, and hospitals and schools remain desperate for personnel and equipment. An Exxon oil executive went so far as to call Venezuela “uninvestable”.
So far, the Trump administration seems satisfied supporting Maduro’s vice president, Delcy Rodriguez. Though she is credited with bringing Venezuela’s economy back from the brink, she is a key player within the regime – as is her brother Jorge Rodriguez, who leads the National Assembly.
The euphoria many Venezuelans experienced on January 3rd has given way to nervous waiting. Even under the best scenario, Venezuela’s transition to a stable, prosperous democracy will be long and difficult. It is just as likely, however, that the regime will outlast Maduro or, even worse, that the country will descend into violence and fragmentation – especially if the United States fails to provide moral and economic support to the democratic opposition.
Hard Power
By Marcia Moreno-Báez, Research Professor
(January 12) Political discourse has become increasingly militarized, even in the absence of formally declared wars. Negotiation is slowly being replaced by deterrence, pressure, and coercion. The conflict surrounding Venezuela illustrates this shift. Rather than being managed through multilateral diplomacy or negotiated frameworks, it has become embedded in broader geopolitical rivalries, sanctions regimes, and demonstrations of power that extend well beyond the country itself.
For many emerging and middle-income states, situations like Venezuela reinforce a hard lesson: when crises escalate, protection from major powers is uncertain and often conditional. As a result, states are reassessing long-term strategies, diversifying alliances, reducing critical dependencies, and strengthening autonomy in key economic, technological, and energy sectors.
These dynamics are accelerating the transition toward a disorderly form of multipolarity without a shared framework of rules regulating competition. Institutions designed to mediate conflict and uphold international norms are weakened, sidelined, or ignored. With fewer negotiations, countries increasingly act alone, use economic pressure, and engage in arms races, competing not only militarily but also over technology, data, resources, and economic strength.
Understanding these processes also requires paying attention to geography, not as background but as structure, since power is exercised through territory, infrastructure, resource flows, and regional connectivity. The situation in Venezuela should therefore not be read as an isolated case, but as a symptom of a deeper crisis in global governance that is structural rather than temporary and that will require a redefinition of international relations.
Global Reactions
By Professor Tamirace Fakhoury, Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict
(January 9) After the U.S. military operation in Venezuela, states reacted in many ways: outright condemnation, approval or cautious approval of its stated aims, and ambiguity. This spectrum of responses reveals how divided global actors are in an increasingly fragmented, unpredictable world order.
Many Latin American countries, including Mexico, Chile, and Colombia, hurried to condemn the military action, as did Russia and China. Some European leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron avoided a clear stance on the intervention, while focusing on the need for a peaceful and democratic transition in its aftermath. German Chancellor Frederich Merz highlighted the complexity of the situation. Arab governments remained largely silent, while certain Arab non-state actors such as Hezbollah condemned U.S. actions.
What do these reactions signal? On the one hand, some states have emphasized their preoccupation with the norms of international law, national sovereignty, and the ripple effects that the intervention may generate in other contexts and regions, recalling the troubled state building projects in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. At the same time, other state reactions are shaped by more immediate security and diplomatic interests.
It is important to highlight the politics of uncertainty. In the wake of the intervention, many states, including members of the European Union, feel uneasy about how to define their relationship with the U.S., a hegemon that has shaped not only global politics but the international peace architecture for decades.
The Day After
By Rockford Weitz, Professor of the Practice in Maritime Studies
(January 5) We have entered the "Day After” challenge in Venezuela. The United States has faced this situation before: in Japan and Germany in 1945, in South Korea in the 1950s, in Grenada in 1983, in Panama in 1990, in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003, and in Libya in 2011. The Trump administration's fundamental challenge is to put in place a transition plan that increases the chances of Venezuela ending up like Panama or Grenada, rather than like Libya.
This raises many hard geopolitical questions, such as how to empower the Venezuelan opposition after 25 years of political dysfunction and dictatorship, whether to put an elite but small U.S. military force in the Presidential Palace in Caracas, whether to occupy Venezuela's military bases, and more.
How the Trump administration navigates these challenges will have global implications in the great power competition with China and Russia, as well as on regional geopolitical rivals such as Iran and North Korea.
International Law
By John Cerone, Visiting Professor of International Law
(January 5) The primary body of international law regulating the legality of this strike is called the jus ad bellum, which refers to the rules of international law that govern recourse to the use of armed force between states.
The main argument supporting the strike’s legality would be that the U.S. used armed force with the consent of the legitimate government of Venezuela. The U.S., the European Union, and the Organization of American States all refused to recognize Maduro’s government as the legitimate government. Since the U.S. instead recognized the opposition candidate as the rightful president, it could argue that the strike was not against Venezuela, but on behalf of Venezuela.
The main counterargument is that Maduro’s government continues to be accepted by the UN General Assembly. This was evidenced most recently by the GA’s December 12 adoption of the report of the UN Credentials Committee, which accepted Maduro’s representatives as Venezuela’s delegation.
Another counter argument is that international law regards as the government whatever administration is in effective control of the state. However, this principle applies with less force when there is a rival government that enjoys significant recognition. In addition, the relative ease with which Maduro was captured, and the apparent absence of serious resistance by the authorities on the ground in Venezuela, raises the question of whether Maduro was in effective control.
A subsidiary argument that the U.S. might use would be that it was exercising the right of self-defense. However, this would be unlikely to pass muster with the "jury" of the international community.
Russia and the Oil Industry
By Mikhail Troitskiy, Visiting Professor
(January 5) The impact of Maduro's arrest on Russian oil exports depends on several factors that are challenging to assess. Certainly, many global importers have interest in replacing Russian oil with an equally cheap and less politically and logistically risky alternative. However, it is not clear how quickly additional Venezuelan oil can be delivered to market. This depends on whether a deal on governing Venezuela that would satisfy the United States can be hammered out promptly - without such a deal, the US has threatened to thwart the Venezuelan oil industry - and on how much investment and time are necessary to bring the technologically outdated Venezuelan spare capacity online.
Much depends on what happens with Russian business interests in Venezuela. So far, the Trump Administration has not threatened to squeeze any specific foreign power or its corporations out of the Venezuelan oil sector. Washington may be tempted to collaborate with the Russian oil major Rosneft in Venezuela - some experts have suggested that mixing Russian crude with heavier Venezuelan oil would be profitable to whoever controls Venezuelan oil trade. Reporting indicates that the Kremlin has offered resumed collaboration with Rosneft to U.S. oil majors, in an attempt to court the United States during its mediation on the Russia-Ukraine war. To make collaboration with Russia in the Venezuelan oil sector happen, the United States would need to lift its sanctions on Rosneft or other Russian oil companies.
Governing Venezuela
By Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics
(January 4) There is no dispute that Maduro’s dictatorship led to Venezuela’s catastrophic collapse. Under his rule, Venezuela’s economy imploded, democratic institutions were hollowed out, criminal networks fused with the state, and millions fled the country – many for the United States.
But removing a leader – even a brutal and incompetent one – is not the same as advancing a legitimate political order.
Venezuela’s infrastructure is already in ruins. If the United States assumes responsibility for governance, it will be blamed for every blackout, every food shortage and every bureaucratic failure. The liberator will quickly become the occupier.
The United States has historically been strongest when it anchored an open sphere built on collaboration with allies, shared rules and voluntary alignment. Launching a military operation and then assuming responsibility for governance shifts Washington toward a closed, coercive model of power – one that relies on force to establish authority and is prohibitively costly to sustain over time.
Force is fast. Legitimacy is slow. But legitimacy is the only currency that buys durable peace and stability – both of which remain enduring U.S. interests.
If Washington governs by force in Venezuela, it will repeat the failures of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya: Power can topple regimes, but it cannot create political authority. Outside rule invites resistance, not stability.
For more, read Professor Toft's piece in The Conversation
Salon quotes Monica Duffy Toft's analysis for The Conversation about Trump's use of hard power. (January 13)
Professor Monica Duffy Toft contributes an op-ed to The New York Times, part of a collection on how Trump's actions are reshaping the world order. (January 11)
Dean Kelly Sims Gallagher speaks to Politico about whether oil access motivated U.S. actions in Venezuela. (January 9)
Academic Dean Daniel Drezner comments to Financial Times about how events in Venezuela reflect shifts in global norms. (January 9)
Bloomberg interviews Professor Rockford Weitz about the oil industry's response to U.S. plans for Venezuela. (January 9)
Professor Rockford Weitz assesses the economic consequences of Maduro's ouster for Washington Examiner. (January 9)
Defense One includes Monica Duffy Toft's Conversation piece in a round-up of recommended analysis on Venezuela. (January 9)
French daily newspaper Libération cites Professor Michael Glennon in a story on Trump's territorial ambitions. (January 9)
Professor Rockford Weitz speaks to Political Fronts, a news commentary program published on YouTube, about U.S. plans for Venezuelan oil. (January 8)
Professor Michael Glennon provides analysis for PolitiFact on whether the capture of Maduro could qualify as a covert operation under U.S. law. (January 7)
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
Senior fellow John Burgess speaks to RFE / RL about the U.S. seizure of tankers linked to Venezuelan oil trade. (January 7)
For U.S. News & World Report, Professor Rockford Weitz analyzes how events in Venezuela will impact the oil industry. (January 7)
Professor Michael Glennon is interviewed by Italian newspaper Avvenire about the legal implications of U.S. actions. (January 7)
Professor Rockford Weitz speaks to Bloomberg Businessweek about the use of U.S. force in Venezuela. (January 5)
Academic Dean Daniel Drezner analyzes U.S. strategy towards Venezuela in an interview with GBH News. (January 5)
Professor Rockford Weitz appears on WILK radio to discuss Venezuela's political future. (January 5)
Professor Monica Duffy Toft authors a piece for The Conversation, analyzing President Donald Trump's ambition to "run" Venezuela. (January 4)
Academic Dean Daniel Drezner joins 12 fellow experts to offer analysis on how events in Venezuela could reshape the world order. (January 4)
Boston's Fox affiliate hosts Professor Rockford Weitz for a discussion on the morning of Maduro's capture. (January 3)