The UN’s Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers

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An ad hoc group of reforms aimed at achieving greater integration of the UN system during peace operations has largely ignored the numerous barriers to their implementation. Accordingly, these integration reforms have fallen far short of their goal of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN’s efforts in countries in, or emerging from, conflict. Integration reforms are hindered by the absence of both adequate organizational change and accompanying incentives for implementation. The article outlines some of the key barriers to integration within the UN structure, and within war-to-peace transitions generally. The analysis highlights evidence of the need to revise these reforms, and concludes with suggestions for altering UN procedures and practices to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its post-conflict efforts.

The success of international post-conflict efforts is challenged by the fragmentation of the ‘international community’ in implementing them. In response, the UN has developed a series of integration reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its post-conflict responses. Specifically, these reforms aim to consolidate field-level leadership, centralize support from headquarters, systematize joint planning, institute interagency programming, and develop compacts between the UN system and national governments. However, the reform impact has been greatly diminished by the absence of accompanying incentives or effective organizational change backed by long-term political engagement and support. Cases of successful integration are largely attributable to ad hoc initiatives, with high transaction costs, undertaken by individual staff voluntarily circumventing barriers. These reforms need to be revisited in the light of these barriers – specifically, the fragmentation of the UN structure and the complexity of war-to-peace transitions – and revised accordingly.

The article first identifies the relationship between multidimensional peace operations and integration reforms, and then outlines the reforms and assesses the degree to which they have achieved their immediate objectives and the prospect for reaching the overarching goal of increased efficiency and effectiveness. We then discuss the numerous barriers to the implementation of integration reforms within the UN system and in war-to-peace transitions. The article concludes with a call for UN member states and the Secretary-General to support the development of more effective integration reforms.
Multidimensional Peace Operations and UN System Integration

The growing number, size and importance of UN-led, multidimensional peace operations creates great organizational challenges, arising in part from the UN’s desire to integrate the large number of tasks and UN actors that accompany such operations under one strategic framework. To accomplish this, the UN has instituted a series of reforms intended to engage ‘its different [post-conflict] capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner’, here called ‘integration reforms’. These aim to help all UN agencies work toward compatible goals in post-conflict countries where the Security Council has mandated a peace operation: ‘Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy.’

An integrated mission is a ‘strategic partnership between a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation and the UNCT [UN Country Team], under the leadership of the SRSG and the DSRSG/RC/HC’. The term ‘UN system’ refers to all UN entities active in a post-conflict country. The term ‘mission’ or ‘peace operation’ refers to the multidimensional peace operation mandated by the Security Council and run by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) (or possibly by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)). The UN Country Team (UNCT) refers to the UN entities that are part of the UN system present in the field, but are not part of the mission. The UN mission is led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the coordination between the UNCT and DPKO/DFS is primarily managed by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Representative (DSRSG/RC/HC/RR).

The Integration Reforms

Between 1997 and 2007, the integration reforms were articulated in seminal UN reports (the Programme for Reform (1997) and the Brahimi report – Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000)); were spurred on by external evaluations (i.e. a Norwegian-based Report on Integrated Missions (2005)); were revised or developed anew in internal guidelines (i.e. the Secretary-General’s ‘Note of Guidance’ (2006), the Integrated Mission Planning Process (2006), and the Integrated DDR Standards (2006)); and were invented at the field level (e.g. consolidated peace strategies and compacts).

The first set of reforms aimed to consolidate mission-level leadership by increasing the responsibility given to the SRSG and the Deputy SRSG (DSRSG). For the SRSG, this meant giving him/her ‘authority over the force commanders, civilian police commissioners, resident coordinators and humanitarian coordinators’. The importance of this leadership position was explained by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his Programme for Reform (1997). This stated that the role of the SRSG was vital to ensure an ‘integrated approach’ in
the field, ‘where lack of cohesion or differences among the United Nations entities can be exploited by the parties’. In addition, the SRSG was important because peace accords were not ‘self-catalyzing’, and political leadership was necessary to oversee the implementation of a fledgling accord.

Nonetheless, doubt remained as to the degree of authority possessed by SRSGs to carry out these increased responsibilities. In response, the Secretary-General issued ‘Notes of Guidance’ in 2000 and 2006. The 2006 ‘Note of Guidance’ established that the ‘SRSG is the Senior UN Representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations in a given country’. Furthermore, the SRSG ‘speaks on behalf of the United Nations in a given country’, ‘establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UN Country Team’, and ‘ensures that all the UN components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach’.

The DSRSG, in turn, was given the responsibility for ensuring the coordination of the developmental, humanitarian and political components of the UN system during multidimensional peace operations. To this end, the DSRSG was given four titles: Deputy SRSG, Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, and Resident Representative. According to the Secretary-General’s 2006 ‘Note of Guidance’, the Resident Coordinator (RC) is ‘responsible for the coordination of the UN Country Team and the planning and coordination of UN development operations’ as well as ‘donor coordination in the areas of recovery and development’. As the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), this same individual is responsible for ‘planning and coordinating all humanitarian operations and maintaining links with governments (and other parties), donors and the broader humanitarian community for this purpose’. In addition, the DSRSG/RC/HC is often also the Resident Representative (RR) for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), requiring her or him to manage one of the largest UN agencies in the field.

This quadruple hatting encapsulates the organizational and operational complexity of integrated missions. The creation of such a position shows that integration at the field level is essentially vested in and dependent on the ability of the SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC/RR. Unfortunately, as argued below, these positions are not given the authority necessary to integrate elements of the UN system, nor are there systematic efforts to ensure that the individuals occupying these positions have the requisite skills. Similarly, there is not a methodical attempt to build the senior leadership group as a cohesive unit: the focus is on selecting particular individuals rather than crafting a team, meaning that the individuals chosen for senior management jobs are not considered according to how they fit into the overall senior leadership structure.

The second set of integration reforms focused on the headquarters level, aiming to centralize support from headquarters and systematize joint planning through, first, the Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) and, later, the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). The IMTFs emerged from the Brahimi report, and were intended to comprise composite planning teams, including members from the humanitarian and development as well as peacekeeping communities. Intended to serve as the working-level focal point for the most
critical planning and implementation phases of multidimensional peace operations, the IMTF was one of the first attempts by UN headquarters to respond to the growing consensus that its security, development, humanitarian and human rights capacities should be collectively employed.

The first full IMTF was established in October 2001 for Afghanistan. While serving an important information-sharing function, the IMTF did not fulfil its strategic planning and management role, in part because the staff seconded did not have the requisite decision-making authority.\(^\text{15}\) A further constraint was that, in the interests of inclusion and representation, the composition of the IMTF was greatly expanded, in turn weakening its ability to have a coherent and substantive impact on the mission. The IMTF concept, nonetheless, lives on in a diluted form in the IMPP.

The IMPP aims to help UN actors ‘achieve a common strategic and operational plan that is responsive to the objectives of the UN system and the Security Council mandate’.\(^\text{16}\) Rather than establish a single working-level focal point such as the IMTF, the IMPP aims to create an interagency process to enable integrated operational planning, through to the planning for the mission’s withdrawal. Here the IMTF concept re-emerges as the ‘headquarters-based planning body responsible for implementing the IMPP for a specific country’.\(^\text{17}\) Preliminary reviews of the IMPP indicate its importance in convening the relevant UN agencies to develop a common analysis of the country context and agree on priorities. Nonetheless, the IMPP has serious shortcomings. It receives insufficient high-level support; it largely excludes field-level analysis and participation; and there is no individual, agency or group of agencies held responsible for translating the IMPP into action or evaluating its implementation. Moreover, the IMPP does not include sufficient analysis or guidance on how to manage the relationships with, and roles of, the international financial institutions; the non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and the regional, bilateral and national actors and initiatives, all of which affect the plan agreed within the IMPP framework. Ultimately, without a clear commitment from the relevant UN entities to implement the IMPP, supported by adequate funding, any IMPP plans are likely to remain on the shelf.

The third set of integration reforms focused on field-level integration through interagency programming and the development of compacts between the UN system and the national government.\(^\text{18}\) Most significant are the compacts, which outline a full programme of reforms aimed at stabilizing the country and improving governance. Although the compacts are usually initiated when peace operations are already under way and thus do not address integration upon deployment, they have made an important contribution to strategic integration of the UN system at the latter stages of a peace operation, by encouraging international actors to support the same core priorities. The most notable compacts are those developed for Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).\(^\text{19}\) In Burundi and Sierra Leone, the Peacebuilding Commission has also helped establish similar compacts, and the peacebuilding fund has provided the SRSG with the financial leverage necessary to create incentives for integration of the UN system. In both of these countries, after several rounds of trial and
error and in spite of systemic challenges, the UN has achieved an unprecedented degree of strategic and structural integration.

The three sets of reforms discussed above were initiated and led by DPKO/DFS. Indeed, the integration of the entire UN system during peace operations has largely been managed by DPKO on behalf of the Secretary-General, even though the SG and (as a result) DPKO has no formal authority over the other UN entities. The role of DPKO and, to some extent, the newly established DFS in initiating and implementing the reforms has in turn led other UN entities to equate ‘integration’ with compliance with DPKO/DFS’s ‘security first’ agenda (see also Shetler-Jones, in this issue).

A final set of reforms does not explicitly address interagency integration, although they have made it more feasible. They are intended for individual UN agencies, or groups of similar agencies, rather than the entire UN system. They include important efforts by the UN Development Group (UNDG) and its members to create more coherent and integrated strategies between the UN’s development agencies and establish more regular contact with DPKO/DFS. They also include the humanitarian community’s own internal integration effort (the ‘cluster approach’), in addition to a concerted effort by the humanitarian community to develop a common position on integration (see Harmer, this issue). Despite these sector-specific attempts to improve internal integration and coordination, however, there remains no concerted effort to improve coherence or integration between the various sectors, nor are they explicitly linked to the integration reforms. It is also notable that one key UN agency, DPA, has made few efforts to integrate with other UN entities or relevant partners.

Finally, there have also been internal integration efforts within DPKO/DFS, all of which will require shifts in its organizational culture. For example, efforts are under way to improve recruitment processes for senior mission leadership, by establishing a headquarters mechanism responsible for recruitment and policy and by increasing the process’s transparency. The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section has also completed its ‘capstone doctrine’, which (among other things) emphasizes the ongoing importance of integration. At the field level, DPKO/DFS has established two analysis structures – the Joint Operations Command (JOC) and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) – that have the potential to improve planning and communication within the UN system and possibly with partners. Preliminary assessments show that the potential contribution of these specific mechanisms to interagency integration has been under-valued, and that their overall impact within the mission is highly dependent on both mission leadership and the composition and mandate of the JMAC/JOC (see Shelter-Jones, this issue).

In 2007, bucking the integration trend, DPKO was divided into two separate departments: the Department of Peace Operations (still referred to as DPKO), charged with planning and managing missions; and the DFS, charged with providing logistical and administrative support. To ensure that these two departments could work together, the DPKO and the DFS established Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs). The IOT concept was originally outlined in the DPKO-led plan to professionalize peacekeeping (‘Peace Operations 2010’), which envisaged
them as the DPKO point of contact for field missions and partners. Nonetheless, when the DPKO split took place, IOTs also became a convenient tool to integrate DPKO and DFS. While it is still too early to assess the impact of this, it is notable that there has not been significant discussion about their role vis-à-vis the rest of the UN system.

While all of the reforms discussed here have made some contribution to integration, either at the interagency level or within one agency or a group of agencies, they have largely fallen short of their aims. This is due in part to the weakness of the integration reforms, which are more akin to recommendations than robust reforms, lacking the incentives and organizational change necessary for full implementation. Consequently, when integration has been successful, it has largely been due to the efforts of entrepreneurial staff that make the reforms appear more robust than they actually are.

Assessing the Contribution of the Reforms to Efficiency and Effectiveness

The goals of integration reforms are to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN system operating alongside or as part of multidimensional peace operations. The objectives – to consolidate country-level leadership, centralize support from headquarters, systematize joint planning, institute interagency programming, and develop compacts between the UN system and the national government – are assumed to be means to these ends. To improve the efficiency of the UN system, integration aims to minimize duplication and optimize ‘available logistical, human, and financial resources to meet the combined aims and mandates of the various components of the UN presence’.20 To improve the effectiveness of the UN system, integration reforms aim to help the UN system ‘maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner’.21 However, the integration reforms have not yet systematically improved the efficiency or the effectiveness of the UN system during peace operations.

Efficiency

Integration reforms have largely fallen short of their efficiency aims because they have failed to establish incentives and mechanisms to encourage UN agencies to share resources and invest in collaborative efforts. Instead, compliance with integration reforms is relatively voluntary: each UN entity decides the degree to which it will commit resources to integrated efforts. The main integration reforms intended to increase efficiency are the consolidation of leadership under the SRSG and the creation of the common DSRSG/RC/HC/RR position. However, neither function is supported by system-wide authority. The SRSG does not have financial authority over the peace operation or any real leverage with which to promote integration of the UN system. The DSRSG/RC/HC/RR is tasked with using ‘coordination’ to ensure efficient integration of the UNCT and the peace operation. In cases where the SRSG or DSRSG/RC/HC/RR has improved the efficient allocation of resources, it has been through ad hoc or exceptional arrangements between the mission leadership and donors (e.g. in
the DRC and Burundi), including through the peacebuilding fund. In general, however, the SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC/RR have not been able to increase significantly the efficiency of the UN system during peace operations because their nominal hierarchical control is not accompanied by the strategic authority to serve as a kind of clearing-house for national and international partners, or the operational authority to minimize duplication and optimize resource allocation. Moreover, concerted integration efforts, where existing, are undermined by inflexible and incompatible administrative and financial systems. Resource-sharing and collaborative efforts are too often only achieved through high transaction costs borne by UN staff that develop inventive ways of working with incompatible systems. For example, the Integrated Office of the UN in Burundi (BINUB) was only able to share resources with members of the UNCT through a special administrative agreement, one which the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was unable to replicate. As a result, the efficiency of integration reforms is largely dependent on the capacity of individuals to navigate a highly inefficient system.

Effectiveness

Assessing the likely contribution of integration reforms to the effectiveness of the UN system during peace operations is a particular challenge because the impact of such operations, and of the larger UN system during them, is not systematically or collectively monitored and evaluated. In order to assess the likely impact of integration reforms on improving the effectiveness of the UN system during peace operations, we developed four criteria focusing on the relationship between organizational functioning and impact on stabilization and peace.

The first criterion, prioritization of transitional imperatives, refers to the UN’s capacity to direct scarce resources toward activities likely to be necessary to support effective war-to-peace transitions. Most integration reforms have focused on this criterion, as evident in the 2006 ‘Note of Guidance’, which emphasizes the importance of shared priorities among peace operation actors. The IMPP, the compacts, the revised functions of the SRSG and the creation of a common DSRSG/RC/HC/RR position are intended to support the prioritization of transitional imperatives by identifying the priority needs in a country and organizing the UN to meet them. Nonetheless, the IMPP rarely leads to actual programme prioritization, or at least not for agencies beyond DPKO/DFS. Instead, this participatory process often results in a ‘laundry list’ of programmes matching the mandates of the participating UN agencies (i.e., supply-driven) that neither reflects the most critical priorities in the post-conflict country (i.e., demand-driven) nor outlines clear incentives for increased coherence between programmes or more efficient production of outcomes. In the cases where prioritization has occurred through the development of compacts – such as those developed in the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), the Integrated UN Mission in Burundi (BINUB), and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) – it resulted from an unusual degree of collaboration, backed by robust and sustained political engagement and processes, which led to agreement on priorities between donors, the SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC/RR, and the host government. Even in
these successful cases, however, prioritization remains difficult, and there is no dedicated mechanism to evaluate systematically, revise and adapt the chosen priorities in relation to the fluid post-conflict dynamics.

The importance of the second criterion, management of compatible contradictions, is widely ignored in UN documents on peace operations, peacebuilding and integration. Instead, it is largely assumed that the majority of the UN’s activities implemented in or alongside multidimensional peace operations are compatible. The only acknowledged and managed contradiction is that between the political imperatives of the SRSG and the humanitarian imperatives of the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). At times, the UN has addressed this by placing the OCHA office physically outside the DPKO/DFS structure and thus the direct supervision of the SRSG. Otherwise, integration reforms have to a large extent ignored other potential contradictions, such as those between stabilization and governance, or liberalization and institution building (discussed in further detail in the next section). As a result, the UN has not developed guidelines and mechanisms to help its leaders and staff to manage these potential tensions and trade-offs.25

The third criterion for assessing the likely contribution of integration reforms to the effectiveness of peace operations addresses the degree to which the reforms make the UN a better partner – thus reducing the barriers to effective implementation. Because the UN implements the majority of its activities in partnership with the host government, donor governments, other multilateral organizations, NGOs and civil society, the effectiveness of the UN’s work is highly influenced by the quality of its partnerships. Skilled SRSGs and DSRSG/RC/HC/RRs have provided the leadership necessary to improve the UN’s high-level partnerships, as exemplified by the development and implementation of compacts with national governments. Nonetheless, these compacts have not altered the incompatible rules and procedures of each UN agency, and thus have not reduced the administrative burden borne by the UN’s partners. Nor are they sufficient where sustained engagement by both international and national partners is lacking, in terms of supporting and exerting the necessary pressure to keep the political processes on track. Meanwhile, other integration reforms, such as the IMPP, have focused solely on internal UN mechanisms and, surprisingly, have not systematically included the host government or partner organizations in their analysis, planning or other deliberations. Most integration reforms have focused solely on the relationships between UN agencies rather than the UN system’s relationships with partners, in spite of the latter’s importance for the effectiveness of all UN efforts.

The final criterion focuses on the ultimate purpose of multidimensional peace operations, the achievement of a sustainable peace, which requires strengthening the capacity of the host state and society to sustain peace. Integration reforms have made an uncertain contribution to this final criterion, due in large part to the difficulty that peace operations face in building and transforming national and local institutions.26 In fact, peace operations are at times criticized for weakening the capacity of the state, because ‘international actors substitute for a state’s service delivery capacity, with a likely dampening effect on development of
sustainable national capacities’. While peace operations have made an important contribution to stabilizing post-conflict countries and overseeing political transitions, their ability to build and transform the institutions of state and society is unproven. Integration reforms have not addressed this criterion for effectiveness, as they are largely based on the assumption that the UN has the right pieces, and just needs to assemble them correctly.

In summary, integration reforms have made some contribution to the fulfillment of their immediate objectives, but have not led to much-needed systematic improvement in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of multidimensional peace operations. Moreover, these reforms have not been accompanied by the incentives or mechanisms necessary for integration of the UN’s highly diverse and fragmented organizational structure, thus falling short of the envisioned change and desired impact. Successful cases of integration have, to a great extent, resulted from the initiative of individual UN staff managing to overcome the enormous barriers to integration – within both the UN system and war-to-peace transitions – rather than as a result of a systematic move toward integration. It is to these barriers we turn next.

Barriers to Integration

What prevents integration reforms from having the intended impact? Why are they not accompanied by the incentives and mechanisms necessary for full implementation? The primary explanation is the enormous barriers to implementation within the UN system and in war-to-peace transitions. Only through an explicit analysis of the barriers can effective reforms be developed. In this section, two of the primary barriers from among several are outlined to help explain the gap between the intention and outcome of integration reforms: the fragmentation of the UN structure and the complexity of war-to-peace transitions.

Fragmentation of the UN Structure

The UN’s dispersed entities, and their separate governance structures, funding sources, procedures and organizational cultures, make integration one of the UN’s greatest challenges (see also Rubenstein et al. in this issue). In addition to the principal organs of the UN – the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice and Secretariat – the UN system presently comprises 16 specialized agencies, 14 funds and programmes, and 17 departments and offices. Several UN entities that play a crucial role in peace operations – the Office of the Secretary General (OSG), DPKO, DFS, OCHA, the Department of Legal Affairs (DLA) and DPA – are all located in the Secretariat and report to the Secretary-General. The other non-Secretariat entities that may play a critical role in peace operations report directly to their own governing bodies, and then to the Economic and Social Council. The only body currently mandated to bring together all of the executive heads of the organizations of the UN System – the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) – has yet to address the issues and dilemmas associated with the integration of the UN system during peace operations.
Administrative policies, business practices, human resource systems, evaluation standards and accountability mechanisms vary between UN agencies. These systems were developed by each agency or group of agencies, and are designed to serve its particular mandate rather than the interest of the larger ‘integrated’ UN system. As a result, common services are difficult to arrange and other resource-sharing and collaboration mechanisms are often inhibited by rigid rules and regulations. In addition, the ability of non-DPKO/DFS agencies to support the implementation of Security Council mandates is significantly hampered by their separate funding mechanisms and reporting lines. Because each UN entity has its own organizational culture and standard operating procedures corresponding to its mandate and programmatic focus, they often lack familiarity with the culture, discourse and procedures of others. This is a significant barrier to communication and understanding, and thus to the development of integrated strategies and approaches, and it has not yet been remedied by processes like the IMPP.

The difficulty of integration at the field level can also be traced back to the headquarters-based mandating and budgeting process for peace operations. The Security Council develops the mandate for a peace operation. The assessed budget is developed by the DPKO, DFS and the Department of Management (DM) and then submitted to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Fifth Committee, which report to the General Assembly. The politics between the permanent members of the Security Council (P5) and the Group of Developing Countries (G77) that make up the majority of the General Assembly often play out through this mandating and budgeting process. Decisions about peace-operation mandates and budgets are often based on political considerations and arbitrary templates rather than a thorough analysis of the needs and existing capacities of the post-conflict country. Meanwhile, the budgeting of funds, programmes and agencies is disconnected from General Assembly deliberations on the peace-operation budget, and this can result in the absence of funding for crucial post-conflict activities. A similar disconnect is evident in the failure of the UN political bodies to utilize the organization’s political capital, and this is, in turn, connected to the significant expansion of UN peace operations – which then proceed without the political work having been done; for example, in the absence of a robust political process or agreement.

As noted above, the SRSG and, by delegated authority, DPKO and DFS are responsible for preparing the Security Council report on which the peace operation’s mandate is based; developing the peace operation’s implementation plan, budget and related modalities; ensuring deployment; and managing the peace operation. As also noted above, peace operations are funded out of the assessed contributions that UN member states provide to the peacekeeping budget; once allocated by the Fifth Committee, these funds are managed by DPKO/DFS. All other UN agencies are financed through voluntary contributions, usually for specific types of programmes and/or for a particular country. Because of the disconnect between the processes underpinning assessed and voluntary funding, DPKO/DFS often experience difficulty in implementing joint programmes with other UN entities, which may not be able to mobilize voluntary
contributions or adapt programmatic processes within the necessary time frame. In most cases, the members of the UNCT do not significantly adapt their budgeting and programming systems and time frames to support key targets in the war-to-peace transition, as outlined in the Security Council mandate. DPKO/DFS, on the other hand, can mobilize resources relatively quickly, even in areas where UN agencies, funds and programmes hold a programmatic comparative advantage. This creates a dynamic in which the operational delivery of DPKO/DFS is closely scrutinized by the Security Council, sometimes at the expense of ensuring sustainable outcomes. Indeed, individual accountability for operational delivery may be at odds with collective accountability for impact, yet only the former is noted.

In this respect, it is worth observing that the performance review mechanism for peace operations is inadequate. Crucially, there is no effort to evaluate the overall effectiveness and efficiency of a peace operation or the UN system during a peace operation. Instead, DPKO/DFS assess the degree to which they have implemented the Security Council mandate, focusing primarily on output rather than outcome. Yet the Security Council mandate is an insufficient standard for both the UN mission specifically, and the entire UN system present in the country generally, because it results from political negotiation between UN member states rather than a thorough assessment of the host country’s needs and the capacity of the UN presence (see Jennings and Kaspersen in this issue). Thus, there is a critical need to encourage greater, system-wide accountability for the collective impact of the UN system on war-to-peace transitions. Each UN entity should be compelled to examine and evaluate its contribution to this collective impact (see Campbell in this issue).

Increasing detail of peace-operation mandates

In recognition of the importance of a multidimensional approach, the Security Council increasingly lists detailed, multisectoral activities in peace-operation mandates. Rather than leading to greater interagency cooperation and accountability, the inclusion of these activities in peace-operation mandates often simply multiplies the functions carried out by the UN Secretariat (i.e. DPKO, DFS and DPA). This ignores both the existing capacity of the UN system in-country, as well as the peace operation’s authority and ability to fulfil its many tasks – which may be restricted by its capacity, time frame, resources and outdated rules and regulations. However, a satisfactory organizational approach to address this challenge has not yet been developed. The Security Council does not generally acknowledge that meeting the larger aims set out in mandates may require deeper engagement from the Council in general and increased dialogue, specifically, with the larger UN system and greater collaboration from the outset with the UNCT, other international actors and national actors. Similarly, even where all UN entities present agree to develop a common implementation plan, restrictions on the use of assessed contributions, as well as the unpredictability and earmarking of voluntary contributions, can prevent DPKO/DFS and other UN entities from collaborating. This has significant implications for the timeliness and effectiveness of post-conflict activities.
The challenge of partnerships

In addition to the challenges presented by the UN’s fragmented structure, the UN’s need to formulate strategies in collaboration with its numerous external partners also presents a challenge for integration. The increase in collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in the management and deployment of peace operations presents particular obstacles. Regional organizational structures, cultures and processes are different from those of the UN entities, greatly increasing the difficulty of command and control, coherence and coordination between the organizations. Building systematic cooperation with regional organizations requires that the UN and regional organizations make a substantial effort to understand each other’s institutional differences, create common ground, develop common objectives and priorities and, to the degree possible, realign procedures and management cultures.

Implications of fragmentation

In sum, the fragmentation of the UN system presents an enormous barrier to integration. The mandates for peace operations are developed by the Security Council with relatively little input from the field, while the budget is approved by the General Assembly on the basis of a relatively strict interpretation of procedures, rules and regulations. There is no impact assessment for peace operations or UN Country Team activities, and this greatly inhibits accountability and encourages each entity to focus on its own goals and priorities, without serious consideration for their impact on the war-to-peace transition. Increasingly detailed Security Council mandates, even if addressing increasingly complex situations in countries emerging from war, also risk discouraging integration.

Complexity of Supporting War-to-Peace Transitions

The other major barrier to integration is the complexity of supporting war-to-peace transitions. In contrast to the linear planning frameworks developed for multidimensional peace operations, transitions from war to peace are highly dynamic, complex endeavours with uncertain outcomes. Most peace operations aim to contribute to the peaceful development of a liberal democratic state featuring rule of law, free markets and liberal democracy. This is no simple or evident task. As emphasized in a recent study of UN peace operations, ‘successful peacebuilding is the surprise, not the expectation’.30

One particular challenge in supporting war-to-peace transitions is the management of the possible contradictions between the mandates and priorities of different UN agencies. The most visible and discussed contradiction, as noted above, is between political/military and humanitarian imperatives. Another can occur between political strategies that place former warlords in powerful positions in the government, and human rights strategies focusing on justice and accountability. Contradictions can exist between the imperatives of stability, which encourages the UN to govern, and governance, which requires the UN to build the capacity of the host country to govern. Potential contradictions also exist between efforts to strengthen the state and central government, and
those to bolster civil society. There are also likely trade-offs between efforts to build liberal democracies and market economies, which can lead to increased competition and conflict, and efforts to build state institutions, which can lead to stability but discourage accountability.31

The choices between these potentially contradictory approaches are highly political and have important implications for the people in the country concerned: ‘given the difficulty of understanding post-conflict dynamics and the even greater difficulty of correctly predicting the impact of one’s actions upon them, error is very likely. At the same time, the cost of error is extremely high and entirely borne by locals’.32 The lack of open acknowledgement and discussion of the competing imperatives existing within multidimensional mandates and the cost that uninformed choices can have on people’s lives pose a significant barrier to both integration and the success of multidimensional peace operations.

Integration Within What? The Absence of an Interagency Home

Finally, as was pointed out in the Report on Integrated Missions (2005), and seems to remain the case in 2008, integration is still perceived by most UN entities as becoming subservient to the priorities and procedures of DPKO/DFS.33 This reinforces the fear that increased integration will inhibit them from fulfilling their mandates. The UN lacks an interagency body that is accepted by the entire system as having the authority to develop a common approach to integration and coherence during peace operations. The only existing entity that might have the authority to mandate this type of interagency effort is the Chief Executives Board of Coordination, although it is currently not able to exercise this authority because of its poor composition and positioning within the organization.

Conclusion

The UN’s fragmented structure and political divisions, combined with the complexity of supporting war-to-peace transitions, present substantial barriers to successful multidimensional peace operations and to the integration of the UN system in this effort. Cases of success in integration are largely attributable to the initiative of individual UN staff finding ways of working around the numerous organizational barriers and learning from the fluid post-conflict environment.34 These successes come with high transaction costs: UN staff may spend as much time navigating systemic dysfunction as they do carrying out their assigned tasks.

Field staff in MONUC and BINUB have divided the integration concept into levels (policy, strategic, programmatic and administrative) and degrees (full integration, partial integration, or parallel processes and execution).35 They say that the level and degree of integration should be determined by the particular dynamics of the post-conflict country and the desired impact of the UN system.36 They also call for more flexible administrative regulations to enable integration, while nonetheless arguing that integration should only occur when absolutely necessary because of the time and energy required.37
We recommend that the UN and its member states take the experiences of its staff into account and revisit the design of current and future integration reforms, in light of the barriers to their implementation and their likely impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN system during multidimensional peace operations. A continuation of the current practice of developing weak reforms will only continue to frustrate staff, waste resources and achieve disappointing results. Furthermore, in an institution where there is no central authority to mandate comprehensive integration reforms, member states must play an important role in supporting more enlightened reforms. In particular, member states should develop a path to integrated funding for the entire UN system during peace operations; establish an interagency group to develop future integration reforms and mechanisms to encourage compliance and accountability, possibly by strengthening the CEB; reform administrative guidelines and business practices (to the degree possible) that currently block integration; encourage the development of incentives within each agency, fund, programme, office and department to integrate with one another; and encourage accountability for both individual and collective impact on war-to-peace transitions. These reforms will require member states and the Secretary-General to invest their political and financial capital in supporting and overseeing them.

There is no easy solution to the challenges of integration or war-to-peace transitions. The UN is a complex international organization and a large bureaucracy, and is highly resistant to change and adaptation. In addition, peace operations take place in extremely dynamic and uncertain contexts, where they must navigate many competing and politicized imperatives without clear criteria for selection among them. The solution is always context-specific, and there is no one blueprint for success. Thus far, accordingly, most cases of successful integration, such as those in BINUB and MONUC, are largely attributable to individual initiative. Yet, by revisiting the integrated mission concept and the series of related integration reforms, and identifying ways of creating stronger incentives for improved efficiency and effectiveness, the UN could create a much more conducive organizational environment for future successes: one that depends less on the actions of intelligent individuals in a dysfunctional system, and more on the efficient and effective functioning of the system itself.

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NOTES

1. Here ‘post-conflict’ refers to the time at which a peace operation deploys in a country emerging from war.

2. UN Secretary-General, ‘Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions: Clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator’, 9 Feb. 2006, para.4.

3. The term ‘agency’ or ‘agencies’ refers to all UN departments, offices, programmes, funds and specialized agencies, unless specific distinctions are made.

4. ‘Note of Guidance’ (see n.2 above), para.4.


7. ‘Renewing the United Nations’ (see n.6 above), para.119.

8. Ibid., para.119.


10. ‘Guidance on the Relations’ (see n.6 above); ‘Note of Guidance’ (see n.2 above).

11. ‘Note of Guidance’ (see n.2 above), para.5.

12. Ibid., para.5.

13. Ibid., para.18.


17. Ibid., p.4.

18. In terms of interagency programming, an important innovation is the 2006 Integrated DDR Standards to support advanced integrated planning and training for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This has proven difficult to implement due to incompatible and inflexible systems and procedures of the different UN agencies involved.

19. PBPS Internal Document – Governance Agreements, Nov. 2006, para.1. Current compacts include the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program in Liberia (GEMAP); the Afghanistan compact; the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact for Sierra Leone (IGAP); the International Compact with Iraq (ICI); and the UN Integrated Peace Consolidation Framework for Burundi. A recent review of these mechanisms identified the GEMAP as having the most powerful oversight mechanism with the strongest link to the Security Council.


21. ‘Note of Guidance’ (see n.2 above), para.4.


23. ‘Note of Guidance’ (n.2 above), para.2.

24. Eide et al. (see n.6 above), p.6.


27. Ibid., p.9.

28. Based on interviews with staff from UN missions in Sierra Leone, Haiti, Burundi and the DRC, and on the discussions during the series of seminars on multidimensional and integrated peace operations organized by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also Campbell, 2007 (see n.22 above).


33. See also Shetler-Jones, in this issue.


35. The concept of degrees of integration was developed by the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), specifically by Lise Grande, chief of the Integrated Office, and Ross Mountain, DSRSG/RC/HC/RR. See also Campbell (n.22 above).

36. Campbell (n.22 above).

37. Ibid.

38. See Campbell (n.22 above). These conclusions are based on in-depth interviews with staff of BINUB and MONUC.