



## Crisis Management in Libya: Learning the Lessons of 1986

*Sarah Charlton*

In April 1986, the Reagan administration, with the support of the Thatcher administration in the United Kingdom, bombed several targets within Libya as retaliation for Libyan terrorism that they believed had begun to challenge essential U.S. security interests. Although the stated goal was to change Libya's behavior and reduce its incentives for supporting terrorism, senior leaders and policymakers were quick to declare victory based on military success in striking the targeted sites. Libya's subsequent support for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which came down over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, and the bombing of the Union de Transports Aériens (UTA) Flight 772 in Africa, taken down over Niger in 1989, provide meaningful rebuttals to claims that the 1986 action succeeded in preventing Libyan support for terrorism.

The United States made several major errors in developing and assessing its strategy in 1986, which together prevented U.S. leaders from understanding that their actions would not reach their strategic goals or achieve their desired outcomes. First, the United States conflated military success with strategic success, when the two are not commensurate. It was also unable to match its strategy and chosen intervention to the outcomes it desired to produce.

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*Sarah Charlton, MALD 2012, is a master's degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. She previously worked as a management consultant for Monitor Group, where she specialized in growth strategies for emerging markets. She received her A.B. in Intellectual History from Harvard College.*

Moreover, U.S. decision-makers failed to adequately understand Libyan history and interests before seeking to shape Libyan incentives, motives, and behavior. Finally, it failed to understand that

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behavioral outcomes only become clear and can be assessed in the longer term. Policymakers would be well-advised to consider how some of these key lessons apply today, particularly as they contemplate whether or not military interventions will be—or even can be—judged a success.

### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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#### Gadhafi's Move Toward Confrontation with the West

In 1969, a bloodless military coup brought Muammar Gadhafi, a 27-year-old army captain, together with his co-conspirators in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), to the leadership of a country with a still tenuous national identity. A generation earlier, Libya had been forcibly assembled by the Great Powers out of the post-war remains of Italy's Fourth Shore, and brought under the leadership of the Idris monarchy, which lacked both popular legitimacy and bureaucratic capability.<sup>1</sup> With only a tenuous

hold on Libya, Gadhafi needed a force with which to unite its people.

Inspired by the success of Gamal Abdel Nasser, to whom he famously dedicated his revolution, Gadhafi sought to extend the anti-colonial fight by defining world powers as the new, colonial-style enemy—and by defining his regime in opposition to these oppressive forces, saying, “Now we should seek traitors, those who pave the way for the Americans, and kill them. The Americans today are like the Italians yesterday.”<sup>2</sup>

Gadhafi immediately claimed credit for the expulsion of American and British military bases from Libyan soil, even though the Idris monarchy had begun these negotiations years earlier.<sup>3</sup> Gadhafi also quickly took a position of leadership in the Arab world, negotiating new oil prices for Libya, Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in 1971, raising European oil prices by 35 percent overnight, and beginning a wave of oil nationalization by claiming British Petroleum’s oil concession now belonged to the state.<sup>4</sup>

These acts jettisoned Gadhafi to prominence, while increased royalties and the 1973 and 1978-79 oil booms quickly provided him with a hefty bankroll with which to finance his vision. Yet Gadhafi’s attempts to use these funds to propel himself to legitimate leadership positions faltered<sup>5</sup> and by 1974 he had already failed at several attempts to incorporate Libya as the leader of a larger Arab nationalist unit, including the failed unification of Libya and Tunisia via the Arab Islamic Republic.<sup>6</sup> With few legitimate outlets, Gadhafi’s oppositional framework manifested itself in supporting anti-colonialist, anti-Western groups of all ideologies and descriptions, among them guerrilla fighters, insurgents, and terrorists.<sup>7</sup>

This program most clearly manifested in fervent support for the Palestinian cause. Gadhafi began by providing Palestinian fighters with arms, explosives, and other supplies to enable their terrorist activities, but later expanded to more material support: after the Palestinian extremist group Abu Nidal was expelled from Iraq and was denied sanctuary in Egypt and Jordan, he offered them safe harbor in Libya, where he also provided them with space for training camps.<sup>8</sup> Over time, his support became

increasingly indiscriminate, with arms and funds supplied without deeper concern for the underlying philosophy or goals of the recipient organization. By 1986, Libyan-funded terrorism stretched across the world, with the strongest efforts undertaken in Libya’s own sphere: the Middle East and Europe.

### Lead-Up to the 1986 Intervention

On U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s third day in office in January 1981, he received a memo that clearly noted that the United States and Libya were likely headed for increasing confrontation on the international stage, suggesting that “Gadhafi’s recent success in [invading] Chad ensures that his aggressive policies will pose a growing challenge to U.S. and Western interests.” The memo also noted that the problem was unlikely to solve itself: “The domestic and exile opposition to his regime is poorly organized and ineffective. . . Barring an assassination, he could continue in power for many years.”<sup>9</sup> The message was clear: the Reagan administration had to choose between accepting Libya’s pattern of behavior for the foreseeable future, or taking proactive action to change the current situation.

Plans for participation in a joint U.S.-Egyptian military invasion of Libya eventually sputtered to a halt due to leaks on both sides, as well as U.S. Defense Department estimates that real support for an Egyptian assault could rise to six divisions and 90,000 troops, representing a substantial ground war.<sup>10</sup> The Reagan administration shifted its focus to covert action intent on overthrowing the Gadhafi regime, though National Security Council-initiated actions, approved by Congressional committees, proved ineffective.<sup>11</sup> The administration more openly confronted Libya in the Gulf of Sidra, where Gadhafi was claiming sovereign jurisdiction in excess of that allowed by the law of the sea. A U.S. freedom of navigation exercise led to two Libyan aircraft being shot down by American F-14s in August 1981 in the first U.S. air battle undertaken since the conclusion of the war in Vietnam.<sup>12</sup>

## The 1986 Bombings

Libya's retaliation came on April 5, 1986, when it undertook the bombing of the La Belle Discotheque in Berlin, Germany, a club frequented by U.S. servicemen. Late in the evening, a four-pound pipe bomb filled with nails exploded in the busy club, killing two U.S. servicemen and a Turkish woman, as well as injuring 229—many so severely that they lost limbs in the attack.<sup>13</sup>

In the United States, Libya's involvement in the attacks was immediately clear: intercepted communications from CIA listening stations monitoring East Berlin captured key messages from the Libyan People's Bureau (the Libyan embassy) that provided a smoking gun for Libyan involvement in the attack. The U.S. Army brigade in Berlin intercepted an April 4 communiqué, reading: "we have something planned that will make you happy. . . It will happen soon, the bomb will blow, [and] American soldiers must be hit." Translations of this message, and accompanying warnings to troops, came too late to avoid the tragedy at La Belle.<sup>14</sup> A message sent immediately following the explosion clearly connected Libya to the bombing, stating: "the operation had been successful and could not be traced to Libya."<sup>15</sup>

For Reagan and his administration, this required a rapid, decisive response. In his subsequent memoirs, Reagan noted that the evidence provided was a potent smoking gun, and that it was too clear to avoid taking action: "We had irrefutable proof that Colonel Gadhafi was responsible for bombing the disco. . . We had to show him he couldn't get away with such things."<sup>16</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, again writing in retrospect, noted that all were in complete agreement: "In short, this time we have our proof. And so we decided to give the focused response to terrorism that we had always planned to deliver when our proof was clear."<sup>17</sup>

Smoking gun in hand, the United States turned to military planning, which had begun in earnest several years earlier when the CIA learned that Gadhafi was widely discussing plans to assassinate Reagan and other senior American officials, and intensified when the Abu Nidal group's 1985 attacks on European airports were

traced back to Libyan sponsorship.<sup>18</sup> Planning had ultimately focused on a single strike against critical infrastructure—an action Reagan believed was justified in U.S. self-

defense—with the further aim of designing the intervention to make Gadhafi understand that sponsoring terrorism came with a clear price. Targets mooted by EUCOM (United States European Command) included economic, military, and terrorist-related sites—all of which would impose different social and financial costs on the Gadhafi regime.<sup>19</sup> Seeking to minimize civilian casualties, as well as avoiding imposing costs on military units that represented the best hope for an internal coup, the administration settled on a series of targets connected to terrorist training and operations, elite military units connected to the regime's domestic control, and defensive infrastructure.<sup>20</sup>

The Reagan administration attempted to unite the international community behind the need for a punitive response, potentially including both diplomatic and economic sanctions, but the initiative failed.<sup>21</sup> Anticipating this failure, parallel diplomacy had already begun with heads of state on securing allied support for the potential—and increasingly likely—military strike. While British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in examining the American and British evidence on Libyan involvement with terrorism, gave her assent in leveraging U.S. Air Force bases in the UK for a possible attack, other European leaders were not so generous, with the French and Spanish refusing over-flight rights through their sovereign airspace.<sup>22</sup>

With avenues of approach limited, U.S. plans for intervention in Libya became increasingly technically difficult, requiring multiple in-air refueling as planes circumnavigated Spain en route to targets in Tripoli. Despite the technical

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challenges, however, the U.S. strike, launched on April 15, 1986, was largely successful in hitting its selected targets.<sup>23</sup>

## LESSONS LEARNED

### Lesson 1: Do Not Mistake Military Success for Strategic Success

In the wake of the 1986 bombing, both the United States and the UK were quick to announce victory over Libya—without waiting to see whether their intervention had achieved its desired strategic goals. Even in retrospect, and with full knowledge of Libya’s later support for the UTA Flight 772 and Lockerbie bombings, leading statesmen continued to insist that the intervention was a clear success.

In Caspar Weinberger’s memoirs, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon*, Weinberger insisted that the American plan had been a winning one:

The surest way to measure the success of an enterprise is to ask whether it achieved its objectives. Our objective here was to end Gadhafi’s belief that he could use terrorism without cost. That was accomplished. . . . Thus, our goals were realized, and one source of the export of terrorism was stopped at least temporarily [emphasis added].<sup>24</sup>

There seems to be little critical reasoning inherent in Weinberger’s addition of the phrase “at least temporarily.” Responses from other key political leaders echo Weinberger’s declaration of victory. Reagan noted, “I have to say that he quieted down after the attack. I guess he’s sane enough to understand that we would retaliate anytime we had proof linking him to terrorist acts.”<sup>25</sup> Thatcher, the only European leader to support the strike, later recalled, “The raid was undoubtedly a success. . . . The Libyan raid was also a turning point. . . . It turned out to be a more decisive blow against Libyan-sponsored terrorism than I could ever have imagined. We are all too inclined to forget that tyrants rule by force and fear and are kept in check the same way.”<sup>26</sup>

Yet while the 1986 bombing may have discouraged overt Libyan support for terrorism and terrorist groups, it clearly did not deter direct Libyan involvement in the larger-scale, more

devastating Lockerbie and UTA bombings. In terms of death toll, as well as psychological impact, Libyan terrorism can be deemed more “successful” following the 1986 strike than it ever was before. More inflammatory rhetoric quieted down during that period, with fewer murmurings of grandiose and near-delusional plans such as planning Reagan’s assassination. Perhaps such posturing no longer seemed necessary to Gadhafi because he had achieved his desired results through successful attacks. In this interpretation, the silence that followed from April 1986 to December 1988 was perhaps better described as more foreboding than comforting.

Together, the statements of victory from major leaders—held up over time despite subsequent events—all suggest that not only did the United States not perceive the limitations of the 1986 operation, but that the lesson for future leaders on how to manage meaningful long-term change is perhaps not as clear as it should be. In retrospect, the Libyan operation should hardly be declared an unqualified success, despite military success in striking targeted sites.

### LESSON 2: To Succeed, Choose a Strategy That Can Produce the Desired Outcomes

The U.S. response to the Libyan crisis involved the single use of air power to strike exclusively at military targets within Libya. The stated goal of the intervention was to alter Gadhafi’s long-term behavior—to end his support for terrorism against the West—but the intervention and concomitant methods selected were incapable of achieving this end.

Yet analysis of the strategic uses of air power suggests that the Reagan administration’s desired outcome—an alteration of Libyan incentives to participate in terrorism to affect a long-term change in behavior—was simply unachievable from a single series of air strikes. In *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, Robert Pape suggests that there are four main functions that can be expected from the coercive use of air power: punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation.<sup>27</sup>

Both punishment and risk focus on compellence, or encouraging an opponent to stop their current actions and change their behavior,

largely by causing civilians to incur the costs of the planned intervention. Punishment aims to influence the will of a nation's people by "inflicting enough pain on enemy civilians to overwhelm their territorial interest in the dispute. The hope is that the government will concede or the population will revolt."<sup>28</sup> The more moderate function of incurring risk seeks "to raise the risk of civilian damage slowly, compelling the opponent to concede to avoid suffering future costs."<sup>29</sup>

Denial and decapitation, on the other hand, are functions that require air strikes for their destructive power alone, notably because such destruction enables ground or other kinetic forces to achieve militaristic objectives, and not because it can engender behavioral changes in the enemy:

Using air power for denial entails smashing enemy military forces, weakening them to the point where friendly ground forces can seize disputed territories without suffering unacceptable losses. . . [D]enial campaigns generally center on destruction of arms manufacturing, interdiction of supplies from home-front to battlefield, disruption of movement and communication in theater, and attrition of fielded forces.<sup>30</sup>

Decapitation, as more of a surgical use of force, focuses on "strikes against key leadership and telecommunications facilities. The main assumption is that these targets are a modern state's Achilles' heel."<sup>31</sup>

Of these potential air strike functions, the 1986 attack on Libya seem most similar to a decapitation strategy. The targets selected were purely military, and largely consisted of command-and-control assets: air fields, terrorist training camps, and central barracks. Without strikes at civilian assets, it seems unrealistic to suggest that there was any intention to encourage Libyan citizens to agitate for a new policy from their government. It is similarly implausible that the strikes could create unbearable long-term costs for the government and military—though this was also a stated goal—as there were no clear demands, no meaningful threat of similar strikes nor of augmenting violence that would change the incentives that were driving Libya's behavior.

If the goal of the U.S. attack on Libya was to encourage the Libyan government to alter its position of support for terrorism, or to encourage the Libyan people to put pressure on their government to make such changes, a punishment or risk strategy—requiring the issuance of demands and a plan for multiple potential operations—was needed. This would have necessitated a multiple-stage plan, as well the articulation of clear demands for the change in behavior required before the bombings or other military attacks would cease. By striking at Libya on only a single occasion, and without a clear statement of the desired change, it was not possible for the United States to achieve its strategic goals.

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### LESSON 3: Understand Your Target's Thinking Before Seeking to Shape its Behavior

Based on the declassified documents currently available, in April 1986, the U.S.'s understanding of Libyan motives, needs, and interests were not sufficiently developed to facilitate a meaningful behavioral change, even through a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic means—let alone through a single strike.

The first misunderstanding stemmed from a misinterpretation of Libya's recourse to terrorism. Weinberger believed that Gadhafi supported terrorism as an attempt to gain strategic advantage—as revenge for having to back down from military confrontations with the United States regarding Libya's coastal waters:

Gadhafi now turned to the use of terrorism to try to secure some advantage and escape from the continued humiliation he suffered as the world perceived how idle were his

threats, and unequal his courage, for taking any military action to match his words.<sup>32</sup>

Later in the same work, Weinberger reiterates this interpretation, that failure in the Gulf of Sidra led directly to Libyan terrorism: “At least twice, Gadhafi had tried by overt attacks, intimidation, threats and bluster, to assert control over international waters. He failed each time. When he saw that he could not accomplish his aim overtly, he then tried the covert use of terrorism.”<sup>33</sup> Weinberger’s interpretation persisted, despite the pesky fact that Libya’s enthusiastic support for insurgency and terrorism predated both Sidra incidents and stretched back almost a century.<sup>34</sup>

What Weinberger neglected to see was the broad history and legacy of both anti-colonialism and terrorist practices in Libya itself, reaching back to at least the beginning of the Italian occupation.<sup>35</sup> Yet irregular warfare and “anti-imperialism” as a mindset for conducting foreign affairs with greater powers was a part of Libyan culture. As modern Western historians of Libya have noted:

“Within [Libya’s] ideological framework, the confrontation with the West became a self-fulfilling prophecy it eagerly embraced as a vindication of its own ideological stance.”<sup>36</sup> It was the confrontation—not the success—that brought Libya what it sought. And in that light, the U.S.’s bombing of Libya—unanticipated and impossible to defend against—played into the Libyan game. It provided fuel for the fire, rather than the disincentive that Reagan and Weinberger sought.

The U.S.’s second major error was to optimistically assume the results of the strike without a detailed understanding of the political situation within Libya. Much as with North Korea today, the information available about Libyan politics in 1986 was minimal due to the closed and cautious nature of the regime. As noted earlier, Gadhafi had spent much of the 1970s and early 1980s purging his opponents and all possible dissidents from government, leaving only a small corps of dedicated advisors, family members, and

tribesmen within his inner circle. Dissenters were few in number and much of the resistance lived outside Libya—in constant fear of Libyan assassination squads. Internal U.S. analysis acknowledged the difficulty of having a firm perspective in light of this environment. Libya was characterized as “hard to document since Libya is a closed society, with no opposition allowed.”<sup>37</sup>

Despite these formidable circumstances and this initial hedge against the certainty of the statements included, CIA memos penned in late August 1985 made sweeping statements of the probability of Gadhafi’s government being overthrown by dissident forces following a U.S. military strike:

Libyan dissidents are wary of close involvement with any foreign backer. . . For the moment, the exiles alone probably have the capability to conduct successfully only isolated sabotage operations. Nevertheless, the dissidents probably hope to launch another attack on Gadhafi in the near future to capitalize on his unpopularity as well as on increased foreign support. If the dissidents have well-positioned supporters in

the military willing to assist, we assess their changes of toppling Gadhafi at better than even.<sup>38</sup>

Despite the hedges included in the memo, the seeming certainty of these odds led U.S. leaders to interpret it to mean that a U.S. strike against Gadhafi’s military apparatus might be enough to encourage rebellion among the military ranks—providing the necessary support for outside exiles waiting for their moment. With an acknowledged lack of data, it is difficult to see how the results of the strike could be interpreted with any odds whatsoever. Indeed, subsequent to the strike there were few rumblings of a military-led coup.

#### LESSON 4: Behavioral Outcomes Can Only be Assessed in the Long Term

The Libyan strike was consistent with Reagan’s initial speech early in his presidency that terrorism or action against the United States

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would be met with retaliation—and if retaliation alone was the U.S. goal for the 1986 bombing, then that objective would have been met: Libya sustained extensive damages, particularly to its terrorist and military infrastructure. However, U.S. goals for this intervention were significantly more ambitious. In his address to the nation following the strike, Reagan noted:

We believe that this pre-emptive action against his terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Gadhafi's capacity to export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior.<sup>39</sup>

Despite having long-term goals for the intervention, including an alteration of Gadhafi's support for terrorism in the long run, the United States was quick to proclaim victory over Gadhafi for their military strikes, with U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz declaring:

Gadhafi, after twitching feverishly with a flurry of vengeful responses, quieted down and retreated into the desert. The Europeans, more alert now to the dangers posed to them by Libya, alarmed at the use of force by the United States and anxious to show cooperation with a popular U.S. action, took action of their own. We have finally gotten their attention. They forced drastic personnel reductions in the Libyan people's bureaus, and the activities of those remaining were restricted and watched. This action alone significantly curbed Gadhafi's terrorist capacities.<sup>40</sup>

On the 17th anniversary of his September 1 revolution, Gadhafi himself suggested that this analysis—and concomitant declaration of "victory"—was perhaps premature, that the strike might have done more to anger the Libyans than to deter them:

Today we say, O brothers, to hell with America, to hell with colonialism, to hell with imperialism, to hell with Zionism, to hell with agents of colonials, the agents of imperialism, the agents of Zionism. . . [Reagan], if you continue your tyranny, insolence, madness, and foolishness against the international community and

world peace, then I Mu'ammār al-Gadhafi, want to state that I can form an international army consistent of fighters against imperialism and against the United States of America personally. . . I can form an army outside Libya and I can take with me thousands of fighters from among the Libyans. This army will spread out to all corners of the globe and destroy the American presence everywhere.<sup>41</sup>

Despite Libya's angry rhetoric, in the years immediately following the strike, the United States believed that Libya had quieted down and that the strategic objectives had been achieved. However, an alternative interpretation is

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also possible: that the strike dissuaded Libya from some of its more overt terrorist activities, while doing little to address the underlying motivators and issues that led to the pursuit of terrorism in the first place. This interpretation is bolstered by Libya's later support for two of the worst terrorist incidents of the 1980s: the bombing of UTA Flight 772 in Africa in 1989, taken down over Niger, and the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988, which came down over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Indeed, careful analysis shows that these dramatic bombings formed only a part of Libya's enhanced terrorism campaign that followed the 1986 strike. The main effect of the strike was to drive Libya's foreign policy agenda even further underground, prompting them to conceal, rather than halt, their activities in light of potential consequences. While Libyan agents themselves may have been less active, historians have noted that Libya simultaneously increased its financial and other support for global terrorist groups: "In the spring of 1987. . . the Libyan government stepped up its support for so-called wars of national liberation."<sup>42</sup>

Similarly, feeling powerless against superior American military capabilities, the Libyans also began reaching out for more lethal weapons, and drew the attention of the CIA for accelerating their internal weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs for both chemical and biological weapons from 1987 onwards:

Libya. . . began producing. . . chemical weapons in September 1987. Tripoli probably intends to use chemical weapons both as a force multiplier to gain regional domination and as a deterrent (perhaps through terrorist employment) against Egyptian or Western intervention. . . Libya is also actively pursuing a BW [Biological Weapons] capability, but probably will not be successful for three to five years.<sup>43</sup>

Even more troublingly, Libya also ramped up its pursuit of nuclear weapons, which it saw—much like North Korea or Iran today—as the only tool capable of seriously deterring American aggression. In July 1987, Gadhafi openly asserted, “The Arabs must possess the atomic bomb to defend themselves. . . This is an essentially defensive weapon.”<sup>44</sup>

Experts on Libya’s WMD program have suggested that the 1986 bombing significantly accentuated the “security imperative” that motivated Libya to begin aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons:

The Gadhafi regime’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability was driven primarily by a security imperative and its desire to deter external inference and intervention in Libya by states in its immediate neighborhood and further afield. . . The security imperative was bolstered by the American air strikes against Libyan targets in 1986 in retaliation for Tripoli’s involvement in international terrorism. The regime became concerned about similar attacks in the future and it appears that the possession of nuclear weapons, or at least creating the impression that Libya was seeking them, was seen as one way to strengthen the country’s otherwise limited ability to deter external aggression.<sup>45</sup>

The implication of this analysis is that the American strike in 1986 may have done more to alienate Libya from the global world order than to encourage the Libyans to halt their terrorist activities. Providing fuel for Libyan anti-colonialist

rhetoric by enhancing their feeling of victimization and vulnerability, it motivated them to seek enhanced tools for providing for their own safety and security. As

such, on the whole, the bombing may have contributed to destabilizing Libya and the surrounding region by demonstrating the value of WMDs, as they were the only attainable defensive capabilities that could deter a superior conventional military power. It is troubling to note that in the intervening years, these implications may have been better internalized by Iran and North Korea than by the United States.

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### LEARNING THE LESSONS OF THE 1986 CRISIS

When Libya’s support for terrorist activities led to the La Belle Discotheque bombing, with significant American casualties, Libya crossed the threshold from a security concern to a challenge to American national security interests. Attacks on U.S. military personnel, even under the guise of terrorism, could not be allowed to occur unpunished—not when such a clear smoking gun of accountability existed.

Yet America’s chosen strategy represented more an attempt to punish the Libyan military than to deter future actions detrimental to U.S. interests. A single military strike was an ill-suited choice for provoking a long-term change in Libyan thinking and behavior. While confirmation of failure came later, via the Libyan-planned and executed Lockerbie and UTA bombings, the Reagan administration could likely have anticipated that its actions in 1986 would not have produced the desired future results. To

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avoid falling into the same traps again, future crisis managers should take into account the four key lessons of 1986 before planning future military interventions that seek to drive long-term strategic changes in behavior.

*The views and opinions expressed in articles are strictly the author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher School.*

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<sup>34</sup> Notably, Omar al-Mukhtar, the “Lion of the Desert,” used irregular warfare as part of the Libyan resistance to Italian occupation in the 1920s; Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 79.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 24-32.

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<sup>37</sup> Adelman, 61.

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<sup>40</sup> Ronald Bruce St. John, *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife* (Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), p. 138.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>42</sup> Ronald Bruce St. John, “Libyan Terrorism: The Case Against Gaddafi,” *Contemporary Review* 261.1523 (1992), 215.

<sup>43</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb,” December 1988 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 11.

<sup>44</sup> Frank Barnaby, *The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), p. 150.

<sup>45</sup> Wyn Q. Bowen, *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink* (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2006), 11.