Time to Stop Meddling in Somalia
Reprinted from World Politics ReviewBy Natalie Parke, F08
August 10, 2009
Recently, U.S. policy in Somalia hit a new low, with the shipment of 40 tons of arms to a government on the verge of overthrow, if not nervous collapse. Worse still, last Thursday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with the president of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and promised to expand U.S. support. This perpetuates a long history of unsuccessful meddling in the affairs of Somalia, from Black Hawk Down to air strikes against al-Qaida suspects to support for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. Somalia would be better off without our spasmodic interference.
That's not to say the U.S. doesn't have national interests at stake in the country and region. A humanitarian crisis demanded our attention in the early 1990s, a crisis that still persists. In addition, there are now al-Qaida connections in Somalia to worry about, as well as piracy in the Gulf of Aden. We've acknowledged that instability and anarchy in Somalia lie at the root of all of these issues. Yet we find ourselves in policy paralysis as the situation in the country exceeds even the worst-case scenarios.
The best we've come up with is to resolutely support Somalia's internationally backed TFG, which has virtually no governance capacity. Clinton claims that this specter of a government is "the best hope we've had in quite some time for a return to stability and the possibility of progress in Somalia" -- a tall order, given the state of things. Forty-three hundred African Union peacekeepers have the unenviable task of providing little more than guard duty for the TFG and the buildings that house it. Increasingly, the TFG is coming up short in its fight against al-Shabaab, the leading rebel movement that controls parts of Mogadishu and most of south and central Somalia.
Al-Shabaab's version of extremist Islamic governance is not popular with many moderate Somalis, even if it does engender a degree of terror-inspired stability. And it's not clear, were al-Shabaab to assume power, that it would be able to maintain consolidated authority. The group has, however, mobilized Somalis and jihadists with the attraction of a nationalist, radical Islamic agenda -- one that feeds on Somalis' resentment of the intrusive actions of outside powers, especially neighboring Ethiopia.
By contrast, the TFG is largely viewed as an extension of the international actors that many Somalis blame for their suffering. Perversely, our dogged support for the TFG probably undermines its domestic legitimacy. Fourteen failed attempts to establish a government in Somalia should teach us that, at long last, it's time that we lay off.
Unpalatable as it seems, the most pragmatic strategy may be to let Somalia undergo the growing pains of a fledgling state, hoping that moderate Somali Muslims will prevail and that power struggles within al-Shabaab will cause the movement to implode. When the dust settles, we should be prepared to define our terms of engagement for whatever government emerges, whether it be the TFG, al-Shabaab, or some other group.
In the meantime, the U.N. and African Union should work with neighboring countries to ensure regional stability by securing borders and building an informal coalition of states that are tolerant of -- if not enthusiastic about -- the evolving Somali state. That involves preventing any renewed Ethiopian invasion, imposing sanctions against Eritrea for its support of Somali militants, and demanding accountability for Kenya's handling of refugees. The U.S. should support a comprehensive international effort and appoint a senior official who is dedicated to guiding it.
Most important, the U.S. should promote multilateral initiatives to address the escalating humanitarian crisis, both inside Somalia and outside, as refugees stream over borders. Given the hostility to any U.S. presence, multilateral efforts are the best means of channeling our aid. Out of all the possible U.S. interventions in the country, multilateral humanitarian aid might be -- and might always have been -- the most valuable allocation of our resources. It's the least we can do, and it's probably the safest way to avoid the costs of meddling, while not relinquishing our involvement in the country.
Eighteen years of meddling in Somalia should be enough to teach us that we have yet to find the solution to the country's problems, and that it just might be too costly, politically and militarily, to come up with one. Of course, there's no guarantee that Somalis, left to themselves, will necessarily achieve sustainable peace. But everyone might be better off if we shifted our time, energy, and resources away from misguided efforts that end up prolonging violence, and directed them instead toward alleviating the suffering of Somalis.
• Natalie Parke is a research associate at the Century Foundation and graduate of The Fletcher School.