Lebanon in the aftermath of the June 2009 elections: Facing the National-Unity Government Challenge
Reprinted from The Mideast Peace PulseBy Benedetta Berti, F'10 (Ph.D. Candidate)
August 03, 2009
The victory of the "pro-Western" March 14 coalition in the June 2009 Lebanese elections constituted a significant political development that was welcomed by the international community as a step towards Lebanon's further democratization and consolidation of the "Cedar Revolution." However, several weeks have passed since the Saad Hariri-led coalition won at the electoral ballots, and still the newly elected majority is struggling to translate this political mandate into concrete political power. More specifically, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri, has been facing significant obstacles in appointing the new executive Cabinet.
The main challenge that the new PM faces is how to accommodate the reformist agenda and political platform of the new government with the existing balance of power within the country. In fact, although the March 14 forces won the Parliamentary elections, the political power within Lebanon is still at the very least equally distributed between the winning coalition and the Hezbollah-led March 8 alliance. As a result of the electoral system in place the March 14 forces won 71 of the 128 available seats-but they obtained only roughly 45 percent of the total electoral votes; while the March 8 coalition gained 57 seats, receiving however the remaining 55 percent of votes.[i] In other words, the political mandate gained by Hariri's coalition is counter-balanced by the strong popular and political influence of the opposition parties-thus limiting the political maneuver of the elected government. Additionally, the complicated sectarian dynamics that dominate Lebanese politics further push the March 14 coalition to seek accommodation with the opposition forces.
For these reasons, the PM's approach to creating an executive Cabinet has been to stress the need to form a national unity government, integrating the March 8 forces within the new government. In implementing this program, however, Hariri has been facing a major obstacle: the March 8 request to be awarded at least one-third of the Cabinet seats.[ii] If granted, the "blocking third" request-aimed at continuing the arrangement created by the May 2008 Doha agreement between the two main political alliances--would award the opposition a veto power in authorizing any substantial reform, as the Lebanese Constitution establishes that any major legislative initiative cannot be approved without a two thirds Cabinet majority.
Therefore, PM Hariri is confronted with a substantial dilemma. On the one hand, Lebanon needs both a stable government and a peaceful resolution of its political controversies-and thus the PM has a core interest in integrating the opposition parties within the government's ranks. In fact, if the March 8 forces were to refuse to take part in the new government, the country could risk to be, once again, politically paralyzed. This outcome would be detrimental to the political stability of the country; and it would also raise the potential for inter-sectarian violence. On the other hand, granting the March 8 forces the blocking third would generate substantial frictions within the March 14 coalition, and it would limit the March 14's political maneuver and capacity to implement its reformist program.
Additionally, the PM, along with his electoral allies, are currently subjected to additional pressure to form the new government and to prove their autonomy and capacity to govern. This is especially true after the local media accused the last elections to have been "arranged" by foreign powers. Specifically, the Lebanese media has disclosed the details of an alleged Syrian-Saudi electoral understanding, where Syria agreed not to interfere in the elections and in the subsequent nomination of a PM, in exchange for Saudi reassurance that they would pressure March 14 forces to create a national unity government.[iii] Additionally, the alleged agreement included the pledge that the newly elected PM would visit Syria immediately after the creation of a new Cabinet, and that he would promote Lebanese-Syrian relations on the basis of the Taif Accord. Although the elected government denied any involvement in the Syrian-Saudi Pact; these unconfirmed reports have put additional pressure upon the new PM to form a new Cabinet and to prove the government's independence.
In this sense, the next few weeks are going to be decisive for the newly elected government-which needs to quickly form a Cabinet that is both able to foster reconciliation as well as to prove the March 14's autonomy and capacity to govern. A possible way to approach this complex political problem could be through the more direct involvement of Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. Suleiman could be awarded the right to nominate a third of Cabinet seats-a solution that could be accepted by the March 8 coalition, given Suleiman's neutral position and reputation. This proposal was originally ostracized within the ranks of the March 14 forces, as the "neutral Ministers" option diminished the elected government's political power, but it could now be accepted to overcome the current political stalemate.
Reference
[i] "March 14 bloc wins Lebanon election," Al Jazeera (English), June 8, 2009 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/20096813424442589.html, [ii] "Saniora rules out veto power for opposition in next cabinet," The Daily Star, June 15, 2009 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=103054 ; "...Aoun: opposition did not win majority but still has popular one," Tayyar, June 11, 2009 http://www.tayyar.org/Tayyar (In Arabic) [iii] Al-Mustaqbal, July 3, 2009; An-Nahar, July 3, 2009 http://www.annahar.com/content.php?priority=5&table=makalat&type=makalat&day=Fri
• Benedetta Berti is the Earhart Doctoral fellow in The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, specializing in international security and the Middle East.