Grand Corruption in Colombia’s ‘Parapolitics’
Reprinted from New Routes Journal
By Daniel Friedman, F09
Originally posted in the third 2009 issue of New Routes Journal.
In 2006, a laptop belonging to a paramilitary warlord was seized by the Colombian government. Even in a country plagued by more than four decades of continuous war, its contents were startling and troubling. In addition to revealing information regarding more than 500 murders and political assassinations, the computer’s files revealed widespread collusion between highlevel government officials and illegal armed groups. Despite the fact that lowlevel corruption in Colombia is relatively rare, the corruption of high ranking public officials is a major problem. In particular the phenomenon known as ‘parapolitics’ has resulted in long-term corrupt relationships formed between government leaders and illegal armed groups. Understanding the nature of this corrupt pattern is critical to successfully implementing peacebuilding, democratic governance, and anti-corruption programmes in the nation.
Colombia has tragically experienced internal strife and violence for much of its history. The current conflict dates back more than four decades and involves fighting between the government, leftist guerrillas from the FARC1 and ELN2, and various right-wing paramilitaries. The relative ease of coca farming, when coupled with Colombia’s difficult terrain and chronic political instability has led to the nation’s emergence as the world’s principal cocaine producer and exporter. Narcotics trafficking is one of the principal methods used by the illegal armed groups to finance themselves and is at the source of much of the country’s corruption.
Defining the problem
This article will utilise the definition of corruption most frequently cited by Colombian jurists and anti-corruption practitioners, which is “behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains.” While Colombians almost universally view corruption according to this definition as morally wrong, surveys of Colombian citizens indicate that many view such acts as ‘inevitable’ or relatively unimportant in comparison to other crimes. In other words, while Colombians will almost universally condemn corruption, they are somewhat inclined to tolerate it.
This view of corruption has the potential to reduce enthusiasm or cooperation with any anti-corruption strategy and needs to be taken into consideration. Writing on the subject, the former Colombian Minister of Justice said, “It is essential [for Colombians]… to reject the idea that [corruption] is an inevitable condition to which we are all condemned.” Cultivating this rejection, however, is a major challenge. Not surprisingly, the conflict is often cited as Colombians’ chief concern when surveyed, well above corruption. As a result, any programme which actively shows the link between corruption and the conflict is likely to meet with greater levels of public support.
An unusual pattern
Corruption in Colombia occurs disproportionately at the highest levels of government, while [petty] corruption is perceived to be relatively rare. For example, less than three percent of Colombians report ever being asked for a bribe by a police officer or public inspector. Colombian public services and low-ranking officials have among the lowest perceived corruption rates in Latin America.
Conversely, high-level officials and institutions appear to be the most susceptible to corruption. Within the Colombian context this is logical, as only those with a great degree of authority have the power to divert resources, change government policies or pass laws in a way that will substantively benefit narcotics traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitaries. Most reported instances of corruption typically involve powerful legislators, judges and military officials, and accusations are usually tied to the conflict and narcotics trade.
It is also worth noting that while the Colombian government is rife with corruption at high levels, the institutions themselves remain intact. No “shadow state” has emerged like those seen in portions of sub-Saharan Africa where the government has become so corrupt and debilitated that official institutions cannot function or an institution in its entirety is used for the personal benefits of the authorities. Many high level officials carry out their duties diligently and the government as a whole is generally deemed to be at least functional on a basic level despite high levels of corruption. Institutions still work largely, albeit inefficiently, towards their designated purposes.
Parapolitics
High-level corruption in Colombia frequently appears in ‘conventional’ forms, where public officials are paid bribes for illegal acts on an individual basis. For example, naval officials have received bribes to divert patrols away from drug trafficking routes, and investigators have been paid to close cases against leaders of illegal armed groups. However, in 2006 the ‘parapolitics’ scandal revealed the existence of a somewhat unusual and particularly troubling form of corruption.
The term ‘parapolitics’ describes the ongoing, long-term collusion between elected political officials and illegal armed groups involved in the conflict. Unlike more conventional forms of corruption, parapolitical corruption is a long-term relationship and involves the systematic abuse of authority by a political official to benefit armed groups. While the scandal has only reached the front pages in the past few years, some of these corrupt relationships appear to have existed for decades.
Alliances between politicians and armed groups may exist for a variety of reasons. Armed groups have used bribery, campaign contributions, offers of private protection, and threats of violence to co-opt public officials. Ideological sympathies may also play a role. It is interesting to note that many politicians who have supported an armed group said that they did so out of a genuine conviction that it was best for the country. Corrupt politicians aiding the right-wing paramilitaries may not have aided the guerrillas under similar circumstances and vice-versa. However, as these alliances almost always feature some type of material benefit for the officials involved, they still must be viewed as a form of corruption.
A Colombian cultural inclination towards bureaucracy and documentation has made the corrupt linkages between elected officials and armed groups startlingly clear. Politicians have signed lengthy contracts with guerrilla and paramilitary commanders stating their allegiance to the armed group, detailing the type of support the official is to offer the armed group and the benefits to be provided to the politician in exchange for their corrupt behaviour. In particularly flagrant cases, paramilitaries have financed aspiring politicians’ campaigns, threatened locals with violence in exchange for votes, assassinated rival candidates and provided officials with armed protection in exchange for years of political favours.
Parapolitics has been revealed to be shockingly widespread. A former militia leader once famously bragged that a third of the entire national congress had been elected with paramilitary support. Since the scandal first broke in 2006, hundreds of executive officials, national congressmen, mayors and municipal councilmen have been implicated.
Working to break the cycle
As one analyst explained, parapolitics “goes well beyond the problem of corruption”. The intersection of corruption and conflict is undeniably exacerbating and prolonging the violence in Colombia. The government’s otherwise successful efforts to crack down on illegal armed groups are directly undermined by corrupt officials who support them. Corruption allows armed groups the opportunity to increase their revenues through drug trafficking and money laundering while evading prosecution. Parapolitics in particular allows many illegal actors to operate with impunity. The corrupt relationships can be deadly. Entire villages have been massacred with the support of corrupted local leaders. This linkage makes effective anti-corruption strategies an essential part of peacebuilding in the region. Anti-corruption programmes will not only serve to reduce corruption as a societal ill, but will help to eliminate a major factor fuelling the conflict.
The phenomenon of parapolitics also provides lessons and warnings to any organisation working to implement democratic governance and peacebuilding programmes in Colombia. Even if they choose not to directly engage in anti-corruption work, they should still be aware of corruption’s effect on the conflict, especially as NGOs are increasingly choosing to work with politicians at the grassroots and municipal levels of government. While these partnerships are theoretically beneficial to the peacebuilding effort, the high numbers of municipal officials implicated in the parapolitics scandal requires careful stakeholder analysis and vetting prior to establishing relationships with politicians. Parapolitics should also serve as a warning of the risks inherent to anticorruption programming in the region. NGOs, reporters and government employees working to expose corruption have received death threats and large numbers have been killed.
The unique pattern of corruption in Colombia creates critical linkages between high ranking public officials and armed groups. It inherently ties corruption to the conflict and feeds the violence. In light of this, the potential risks and benefits of anti-corruption work, especially as it relates to building peace in Colombia, are too great to be ignored.