The “Diplomatic” Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy
Professor Alan K. Henrikson
Revised text of speaking notes used as basis for a lecture at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) and also for an informal talk to the Fletcher Club of Japan at the home of Mark J. Davidson, Tokyo, July 18, 2006.
There has been a noticeable change in American foreign policy. Or a change, at least, in the way it is being conducted. This, actually, is a distinction, seldom considered explicitly, that I would like to explore: that is, the contrast between U.S. “foreign policy” itself and the institutions, procedures, methods, and also the style, or characteristic way, in which it is carried out—in a single word, “diplomacy.”
Usually, diplomacy is considered to be distinctly secondary to foreign policy—policy here being understood to be the overall set of goals, and basic strategy for achieving them, that positions a country in world affairs. It is commonly said, with considerable reason and historical justification, that no amount of diplomacy, including what we now term “public diplomacy,” can make up for, or offset, a bad policy. I do not disagree with that view.
What I wish to suggest, however, is something quite different, and perhaps bolder: It is not that diplomacy can compensate for foreign policy but that it can actually, to some degree, replace policy. Nowadays, the means chosen and approach taken may be becoming more important than the stated ends of a country’s involvement in the world. There are signs, in the current development of the foreign relations of the United States of America, that this may in fact be happening.
On the new primacy of “diplomacy,” at more than just the rhetorical level, I quote Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In her confirmation hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 18, 2005, she said, in her prepared remarks: “September 11, 2001 was a defining moment for our nation and the world. Under the vision and leadership of President Bush, our nation has risen to meet the challenges of our time: fighting tyranny and terror, and securing the blessings of freedom and prosperity for a new generation. The work that America and our allies have undertaken, and the sacrifices we have made, have been difficult—and necessary—and right. Now is the time to build on these achievements—to make the world safer, and to make the world more free.” And then she stated: “We must use American diplomacy to help create a balance of power in the world that favors freedom. And the time for diplomacy is now” (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/40991.htm).
Secretary Rice’s declaration of “diplomacy” may be considered, in retrospect, to mark a shift in the way the United States during the time of President George W. Bush addresses the world. A diplomatic turn, I shall call it.
Before presenting some of the evidence that I believe illustrates, and maybe even substantiates, the idea of such a shift in America’s national attitude, I pose a prior question, a fundamental one: Is a “diplomatic” turn in U.S. foreign policy a good thing, necessarily? As a historian of America’s international involvement—a diplomatic historian—I naturally am inclined to believe that it is. To me, diplomacy is civility and civilization itself. It is the way by which different peoples in their geographically separated situations, from their richly diverse cultural backgrounds, and out of their sometimes conflicted and divergent experiences—meet to overcome mutual estrangement, and, ideally, to contribute to the larger peace and, on the basis of that, material and social progress.
There is another, contrasting view of diplomacy, however. It is that diplomacy carries within itself a dangerous and craven tendency toward compromise, both of national interest and of moral principle. That it risks, in a word, appeasement. No one has expressed this skeptical, indeed oppositional view of diplomacy more bitingly than Richard Perle, former Chairman of the U.S. Defense Department’s Defense Policy Board and earlier, during the Reagan Administration, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. A recent op-ed article by him in the Washington Post (June 25, 2006) sums up, in its very title, his opinion of the current trend in American policy, and his view of who is responsible: “Why Did Bush Blink on Iran? (Ask Condi).”
What is his reasoning? In the article, Perle states: “President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran knows what he wants: nuclear weapons . . ..” “President Bush, too, knows what he wants: an irreversible end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the ‘expansion of freedom in all the world’ and victory in the war on terrorism.” “The State Department and its European counterparts know what they want: negotiations.”
How is it, Perle asks, that President Bush, who had “vowed that on his watch ‘the worst weapons will not fall into the worst hands,’ has chosen to beat such an ignominious retreat”? The answer he offers is: proximity.
“Proximity is critical in politics and policy,” he explains, going on to say: “And the geography of this administration has changed. Condoleezza Rice has moved from the White House to Foggy Bottom, a mere mile or so away. What matters is not that she is further removed from the Oval Office; Rice’s influence on the president is undiminished. It is, rather, that she is now in the midst of—and increasingly represents—a diplomatic establishment that is driven to accommodate its allies even when (or, it seems, especially when) such allies counsel the appeasement of our adversaries.”
Surely, this is not only grossly unfair but also simplistic. For one thing, it minimizes the importance—and the very authority—of the Presidency of the United States. It further underestimates the willfulness—some would say, stubbornness—as well as the strong personal views and sometimes just reactions of this particular U.S. President, whose resolve is impressive. Particularly since the events of September 11, 2001, he has determined his own course. Richard Perle’s explanation of the recent shift in the Bush administration’s approach—its “diplomatic” turn, I have called it—in terms of the newly increased of influence of the State Department or, more broadly and somewhat more vaguely, the “diplomatic establishment,” with hints of British and other European influence, does not comprehend all of the considerations and factors at work. It does not account, for example, for either the previous apparent ineffectiveness of the State Department under the impressive figure of General Colin Powell or the somewhat puzzling decline in policy-making influence of the Department of Defense. It also does not, and this is a key point, account for the independence, even the originality of Condoleezza Rice in advocating and promoting within the U.S. government what she calls “transformational diplomacy.” This surely is not something that a “diplomatic establishment,” certainly a Euro-Atlanticist one, would by itself have generated.
Some of the elements in Secretary Rice’s presentation of transformational diplomacy, most notably her outline of it in her address at Georgetown University on January 18 of this year (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm), do largely represent a continuation of what the State Department has been doing for some years, only now at an increased rate. The use of small, one-person, electronically connected American Presence Posts (APPs), for example, began some time ago. It was an innovation during the Clinton administration, and had antecedents in earlier administrations. As with the Pentagon’s even-earlier emphasis on “transformation,” advances in technology have been at least a permissive, if not the driving, factor behind it. Setting up many more APPs is only a relatively new idea. However, Secretary Rice’s personal determination to move diplomats out of some of the very large U.S. embassies in major capitals of Europe to other parts of the world, particularly regions of the developing world where most of the world’s population increasingly lives, is quite radical—and has been perceived as such. “Goodbye, Paris, hello Chad,” quipped Walter Russell Mead of the Council on Foreign Relations, in the Los Angeles Times (January 29, 2006).
This initiative comes under what the State Department terms “global repositioning”—or changing “our diplomatic posture,” as Secretary Rice described it in her Georgetown speech. As she pointed out, to illustrate her argument, the State Department currently has roughly the same number of personnel in Germany, a country of 82 million people, as it does in India, a country of one billion. It would be very hard to attribute this particular thrust of Secretary Rice’s transformational diplomacy to the influence of a Europe-oriented “diplomatic establishment.” Actually, it would be almost as plausible to attribute it to a rejection of “diplomacy”—that is, a rejection of diplomacy as it traditionally, or “conventionally,” has been conducted, with diplomats talking mainly with each other and foreign ministry officials, as the now-somewhat-outmoded 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations suggests it should be done. The days of Metternich, and even of Harold Nicolson or George Kennan, are over, she apparently believes. “It’s exciting to be a diplomat these days because it is not just about reporting on countries. It’s not just influencing governments. It’s being a part of changing people’s lives,” she said at Georgetown.
What Secretary of State Rice envisions, she then said, is a diplomacy as “bold” as President Bush’s vision—a policy vision—of supporting democratic movements and institutions abroad “with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” In order for America fully to play its role, she believes, it “must send out into the world a diplomatic force”—one that is diverse in background and well trained in languages and also better equipped with administrative skill. Members of this force must be willing to go anywhere and, moreover, be prepared to do things. “Localization,” it is called, means reaching beyond the borders of traditional diplomatic thought-structures and also moving out of foreign capitals into other large cities and towns, and even into countrysides. Diplomats, a follow-up paper on transformational diplomacy by the State Department explained, henceforth “will move out from behind their desks into the field, from reporting on outcomes to shaping them” (www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm).
I have stressed Secretary Rice’s argument for “transformational diplomacy” not so much because it has, as yet, achieved noteworthy successes. I emphasize it because it represents, I sense, the possible emergence of diplomacy (whether actually transformational or not) as a source of policy, and not just as a reflection of it. That is to say, the encounter of diplomats with reality around the world can and should profoundly inform American official thinking about the world, including the policy ideas of America’s leaders. An actual reversal of direction in the policy-flow here is implied. The “location” of the diplomat would be the Sun instead of the Moon!
The more localized, or field-involved, diplomacy is, surely the more capable it can become of supplying the information, the understanding, and also the impetus and institutional initiative, needed for policy change. In some situations, such as those of the many new countries to which the U.S. government has in recent years sent ambassadors, to establish new posts, it is policy creation that is called for. “Country plans” for those places could not exist before. Officials in Washington, in or outside the Beltway, cannot possibly have an accurate or full view of, for example, what the real situation is in the Republic of Georgia or, in another region of the world, East Timor, or of what the people there want and need—or even, for that matter, what the American interest might be in those situations.
Very general policy concepts such as the “global war on terror” or “ending tyranny in our world”—or their positive counterpart of supporting “the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture,” to quote President Bush—are simply too all-encompassing, too abstract, and also, frankly, too ambitious to be useful as guidelines for actual day-to-day diplomatic practice, in real-time. Moreover, the expectation that diplomats “carry out” these policies, in everything they do, can lead to distortions, of behavior and of intellect and of morale.
Foreign policy strategies must, more and more, be localized and, increasingly often, locally developed. This sometimes can be done at the regional level as well as at the national level or subnational level. Communications technology, a key factor in what may be called the “Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs,” paralleling its military counterpart, makes networking possible—that is, increased horizontal consultation between and among diplomats and officials. New and more complex hierarchies are created thereby.
The locus of initiative in actual working-policy planning, in an era that calls more for practical realism than for ideological rightness, increasingly may lie with diplomats themselves, rather than with top leaders or even those designated as “policy planners” or, at more intermediate levels, “policy coordinators.” In today’s world, foreign policy, if it is actually to work well, has to be variegated, not just adapted to situations but often adopted from them.
Feedback, to use the cybernetic term, is becoming the origin of policy. Going further, one could say that the diplomatic action taken that is the basis of feedback-reportage increasingly is policy, not just the “expression” of it—of policy goals conceived far away and in high places. This is a more systems-oriented, “operational approach” to the study and conduct of foreign policy. It is analogous to, though broader than, “effects-based operations,” in military parlance. The diplomatic feedback I have in mind, to borrow a term from the political scientist Karl W. Deutsch, is not just goal-seeking. It is goal-changing.
The diplomatic system, and the larger political system of which it is a part, actually learns, on this model, and learns not just what it was initially taught (i.e., policy principles and doctrine) but entirely new things (factual truths) produced by new environment. Deutsch explains this theoretically in his study, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (1966):
A more complex type of learning is the self-modifying or goal-changing feedback. It allows for feedback readjustment of those internal arrangements that implied its original goal, so that the net will change its goal, or set for itself new goals that it will now have to reach if its internal disequilibrium is to be lessened. Goal-changing feedback contrasts, therefore, with Aristotelian teleology, in which each thing was supposed to be characterized by its unchanging telos, but it has parallels in Darwinian evolution (p. 92).
I guess what I am suggesting therefore, with regard to the foreign policy of the United States, is that it become more Darwinian, or “fit” and likely to “survive,” than Aristotelian, or “end”-oriented. It is perhaps fortunate that, according to this way of thinking, the very failures and setbacks of U.S. foreign policy, of which there lately have been many, can be, if these negative learning experiences are quickly and efficiently converted into changed policy, the basis for future success, or “evolutionary” advance. Diplomacy, on the ground, can be the facilitator of such adaptation.
Diplomats have, of course, long been accused of “localitis”—or, to use a more elegant philosophical and sociological term, situationalism (a concept that is sometimes used to explain Japan’s remarkable adaptiveness). That, essentially, is the charge that Richard Perle has made against Secretary Rice, viewing her as having been “localized” by the Department of State and its diplomatic personnel, influenced by the new ethos of conflict-avoidance of the Europeans. It is very likely that Perle’s view of Europe today matches that of a fellow neo-conservative, Robert Kagan (“Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, no. 113, June and July 2002), who sees Americans and Europeans as coming from, respectively, Mars and Venus—owing largely to their disparity in military strength and outlook, rather than their manliness as such.
I myself, as an avowed Atlanticist having long taught a Seminar on the Atlantic Community, actually view the influence of the transatlantic “diplomatic establishment” as being, on balance, a positive one. It broadens the range of American official thinking. And it can provide checks if not actual balances against momentary or excessive U.S. policy enthusiasms. The recent dramatic adjustment of U.S. policy—apparently a volte-face—with regard to relations with Iran over the nuclear issue, of which Richard Perle is so critical, is probably the best case in point. The fact that the United States government, with President Bush going along and possibly even deciding the course, is collaborating with the British, French, and Germans (the “EU-3”) and also Javier Solana and the European Council, as well as with Russia and China as fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council—and also with those countries, including Japan, that belong to the G-8—in order to try to persuade Iran to accept an incentive package with verifiable controls—is a step forward in diplomacy. It does attest to a “European” influence of which Perle complains. But it also reflects a realization in Washington that the previous approach, of brandishing “sticks” while others proffered “carrots,” was not working. An adjustment in policy was needed.
The U.S. position now, as expressed in letter (June 15) I have received from the Office of Iranian Affairs of the State Department, is as follows:
To give diplomacy the best chance to succeed, Secretary Rice announced on May 31 that if Iran fully and verifiably suspends enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, the United States is willing to become a full party to the negotiations with Iran.
This still noticeably conditional commitment to engage in joint diplomacy might not produce results either. The leadership in Tehran might not respond, or might not respond clearly or soon enough. The new violence in southern Lebanon, with Israel engaged in heavy armed conflict with Iran-supported Hezbollah, greatly complicates the situation. Economic sanctions and, conceivably, even stronger measures might be required. But a serious prior effort at collaborative “negotiation” surely will be a good basis for a wider consensus on the need for more forcible action—or more direct diplomacy, including a high-level U.S. mission to Iran itself—should further steps be in order.
The Iran case is the most obvious example and evidence of an overall “diplomatic” turn in American foreign policy. But there are others. I shall briefly cite several more.
One, an important example, is the recent modification of the U.S. government’s rigid and demanding attitude toward the United Nations—in this case, almost despite rather than because of the influence of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the brilliant but bellicose John Bolton, currently again under Senate consideration for formal confirmation in his job. The role this man has played at the United Nations, regardless of what one may think of it given his “undiplomatic” demeanor and belligerent manner, does illustrate my point about the growing autonomy and the increased de facto policy-making function of the diplomat on the scene. It also illustrates the need for emphasis to be placed, as policy initiatives taken by diplomats themselves become more common and more widely reported, on appointing representatives that do not have idées fixes and can interact creatively in their situations.
In December of last year, the membership of the United Nations, under pressure from Washington especially (but also from capitals of some of other rich dues-paying member states including Japan), agreed to cut off funding for the United Nations in this, the second half of the year 2006, unless substantial progress were made by the UN in carrying out managerial reform. A systematic review of United Nations mandates also was demanded, though not all of the major contributors to the UN budget fully supported the American insistence on that, preferring instead a more selective approach. Happy to say, late last month it could be reported: “U.S. drops insistence on UN budget cap for 2006.” Ambassador Bolton, unwilling to give up completely, warned that although the administration itself had decided on paying U.S. dues in full for 2006, a question remained as to “whether Congress shares that perspective” (Reuters, June 26, 2006). At least, a major policy adjustment was made, in part because of “feedback” not only from UN officials themselves but also from the wider diplomatic community in capitals around the world.
Still another indicator, though perhaps not so clear a sign, of what I have characterized as the “diplomatic” turn in U.S. foreign policy is the recent statement coming out of Washington that the United States government would not “rule out” joining a successor regime, beyond the year 2012, for the UN’s Kyoto Protocol on global warming. “I never rule anything out,” said the American negotiator, Harlan Watson. Admittedly, my interpretation may be grasping at straws. It also may reflect an overestimation of the intellectual and political effect of Al Gore’s movie, “An Inconvenient Truth,” based in part on his own negotiating experience in the environmental field as Vice President. Nonetheless, as Ambassador Watson observed, many Democrats and some Republicans are for a Kyoto-type system to cap greenhouse-gas emissions. “Senator (John) McCain and other potential (presidential) candidates have spoken very favourably for a cap and trade system,” he said (Gerard Wynn, “U.S. Won’t Rule out Joining Kyoto Successor,” Reuters, June 27, 2006).
Something remarkable is happening, too, at the top level of U.S. decision-making. President Bush personally has discovered and is engaging in diplomacy. After a period of difficulty in relations with America’s neighbors to the south and to the north, President Bush went to Cancún in March of this year and met there with President Vicente Fox and the new Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper. To the latter he “uttered a friendly ‘Hola’” as the newly elected premier arrived at the president’s hotel. When asked if he felt good about the possibility of a U.S.-Canadian deal on softwood lumber—the subsidies question being one of the biggest issues on their countries’ bilateral economic agenda—President Bush answered, “I’m always optimistic.” (Brian Lache, “Bush ‘always optimistic’ on softwood deal,” The Globe and Mail, March 30, 2006). That was welcome news in Canada. In April the United States and Canada agreed on basic terms and on July 1 initialed a final legal text of a settlement
His relations with his counterparts in Europe and also in Asia also have been improved by diplomacy. His working relationship with British Prime Minister Tony Blair long has been close, especially so following the traumatic events of September 11, 2001. He also has struck up a friendly personal relationship with Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and was very supportive of him during the tense moments of the Muslim cartoon controversy, with its attendant demonstrations and even violence. Early last month President Bush invited Prime Minister Rasmussen to Camp David—the last foreign leader to visit there being Vladimir Putin—for conversation and a vigorous bicycle ride. “He’s very fast,” said Rasmussen. “I consider myself a skilled mountain biker, but it was challenging” (Michael Abramowitz, “Diplomacy on Two Wheels: Dane is First Foreign Leader to Visit Camp David in Two Years,” Washington Post, June 11, 2006).
When President Bush even more recently traveled to Vienna at the end of the Austrian EU Presidency for the (sometimes perfunctory) annual U.S.-EU summit meeting, his having formed personal relationships with some of his Atlantic counterparts paid off—diplomatically. “Europe Backs Bush on Growing Nuke Crises,” the Associated Press headline stated. While enjoying the new-found unity that the administration’s more collaborative diplomacy had achieved, with regard to the Iranian and also North Korean nuclear threats, President Bush was, nonetheless, “challenged” over the U.S. prosecution of the Iraq war and over the prison camp at Guantanamo. He was bluntly questioned by the press also about rising anti-American sentiment in Europe and other areas of the world. Being asked for his reaction to recent poll data indicating that the European public considers the United States to be the greatest threat to world peace was a confrontation—potentially a useful policy-making experience—with the current state of global opinion. The President did, of course, reject the idea of America being a threat to peace as ridiculous. “We disagreed in an agreeable way on certain issues,” he said, as a diplomat would (Terence Hunt, “Europe Backs Bush on Growing Nuke Crises,” The Associated Press, June 21, 2006).
The most idiosyncratically “special” example of all of President Bush’s personal diplomatic ties involves Japan. Although the Japanese government has now decided to pull its ground troops out of Iraq (where it nevertheless will continue to provide logistical support), relations at the leadership level seldom if ever have been closer. Here the “diplomatic” turn in U.S. policy has become a kind of “star” turn, with a celebrity quality. “A Friendship, on the Road to Graceland; In Sign of U.S.-Japan Alliance, Bush to Accompany Koizumi on Tour of Elvis’s Estate,” announced the Washington Post. The Bush-Koizumi roadshow in June 2006 had a colorful antecedent. “It is not often that the Queen of England is upstaged. But at a royal gala for world leaders in Scotland last year, even Her Majesty gave up the spotlight when the curtain [was] raised on The George and Junichiro Show,” the Post’s writer Anthony Faiola recalled. “Displaying the personal friendship that has helped bring the United States and Japan closer than at any point since the end of World War II, Koizumi serenaded an appreciative Bush—then celebrating his 59th birthday—with a verse from ‘I Want You, I Need You, I Love You.’ Now, it is Bush’s turn to show Koizumi the love.” This President Bush gladly did by accompanying the Prime Minister, who is soon to leave office, to Memphis on a sentimental visit to the Presley home. “It’s pretty unusual; it’s the first time this president has taken anybody to Graceland,” commented the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, J. Thomas Schieffer (Washington Post, June 27, 2006).
The significance of the “Sayonara Summit,” of course, extends far beyond the scope of presidential diplomacy, however important that has been in advancing the U.S.-Japanese relationship—during a historical period when U.S.-European relationships often have been rocky. The Graceland journey reflects the Bush administration’s gratitude for the Japanese government’s support of U.S. policy—a policy that has not, it should be noted, in Asia or elsewhere tended until recently to place diplomacy first. The Washington Post writer explained President Bush’s gesture toward his Japanese counterpart this way: “The United States has been particularly appreciative of Japan’s increasing assertiveness under Koizumi. The U.S.-Japanese alliance is viewed today as a pivotal counterweight to China’s growing regional might. The Japanese government also has taken a hard line against North Korea, pushing forward with a joint missile-defense shield with the United States and threatening tough sanctions should Pyongyang test-launch a new intercontinental ballistic missile”—which it has now done. With an allusion to Japan’s help in the Iraq struggle, the Post writer noted correctly that “the U.S.-Japanese alliance is increasingly seen in global terms as well” (Faiola, “A Friendship, on the Road to Graceland,” Washington Post, June 27, 2006).
The U.S.-Japanese alliance—a term that would not have been so frequently or so freely used a decade or so ago—is, more and more solidly, built upon diplomacy, upon explicit collaboration, in intelligence-sharing and in other areas. It is also built, however, upon the balance of power or, more broadly (in Kissingerian terminology), a structure of “equilibrium” in Asia. Here we come back to Richard Perle and his criticism. He does have a point. Diplomacy, in order to be successful over the long term, has to be premised on an ability to use “other means.” A “Darwinian” strategy must be flexible. But the world—the external environment to which state-organisms must adapt in order to survive and prosper—is changing. The sheer costs and wider consequences of using military force today are much greater than they once were, in both political and economic terms. The United States is “learning” this in Iraq. With globalization, almost everyone, nearly everywhere, is affected by violence, just about anywhere.
Prevention of conflict requires close cooperation. And this can only be achieved through diplomacy. As President Bush said, following telephone conversations with the leaders of China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan, when North Korea test-fired its missiles on July 4, “My message was that we want to solve this problem diplomatically, and the best way to solve this problem diplomatically is for all of us to be working in concert” (“Bush calls for diplomacy on N. Korea Crisis,” The Associated Press, July 6, 2006).
“Twenty years ago,” as Richard Perle recalled in his Washington Post article criticizing “Condi’s” adoption of diplomacy as the country’s preferred new course, “I watched U.S. diplomats conspire with their diffident European counterparts to discourage President Reagan from a political, economic and moral assault on the Soviet Union aimed at, well, regime change. Well-meaning diplomats pleaded for flexibility at the negotiating table, hoping to steer U.S. policy back toward détente. But Reagan knew a slippery slope when he saw one. At the defining moments, he refused the advice of the State Department and intelligence community and earned his place in history.”
Earning a “place in history,” I myself would advise, is not a logical or appropriate objective for diplomacy—even at the presidential level. It is not something to which ordinary diplomats usually do, or should, aspire. Their goal is, admittedly, stability—the preservation and, through patient, precise, and constant work, including reality-based “negotiations,” the strengthening of peaceful relationships. Some relationships, to be sure, are not inherently peaceful ones. In those cases, forcible control might become necessary, with even sudden action being required in emergencies. Such situations, surely, are exceptional, however. Most international relationships today—including business relationships—do not require force to maintain them. With most of the economies of the world highly interdependent, and with globalization continuing to integrate our thinking as well as our material living, the risk of major disruption, including military “pre-emption,” resulting from idealism-inspired and even altruistic foreign policies such as those of the United States, can be simply too great for humanity to accept. That risk can be reduced, and is now being reduced, through a greater U.S. involvement in diplomacy.