Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control, the work of Natasha Bajema, Fletcher PhD Candidate
Coming from a small city in the Midwest, Natasha Bajema frequently finds herself described by friends and family as eccentric (i.e. always studying seemingly obscure topics), a vagabond (i.e. always on the go, moving from place to place) or cosmopolitan (i.e. traveling to distant locations and meeting fascinating people from all over the world). But at The Fletcher School, we describe this lifestyle as “normal.”
Not long ago, when Bajema explained to folks back home that she had chosen nuclear nonproliferation as her area of study, she frequently received puzzled and even more often, troubled looks. “What’s that?” they would ask with hesitation, subtly indicating that they would rather not know all the gloomy details. Since 2002, however, when the term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) entered the mainstream, the question has changed slightly. “Now people will ask me with interest: how is it that you became interested in nuclear nonproliferation? Well, by chance actually, I reply.” Bajema laughs, showing some discomfort that her studies somehow became “trendy” overnight.
After all, before beginning her graduate studies in international policy at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in California, Bajema received a BA from Calvin College in Michigan with a major in German. Subsequently she spent four years working in various jobs: as a nanny for a German family in Berlin, a translator and interpreter at an engineering firm in Bad Duerkheim, an intern and trade assistant at the US Foreign Commercial Service in Frankfurt, and a marketing coordinator for a German manufacturer in Michigan. “Given my experience in marketing and trade, it was not surprising that I had initially chosen to study international trade when I began my graduate studies at the MIIS. But already in my first semester, I began an unexpected transition toward nuclear nonproliferation,” Bajema explains.
“During a class on comparative environmental policy, I became interested in energy policy, and more specifically nuclear energy policy. Although nuclear issues had already entered the forefront in my mind, it was not necessarily by intention that I began to think about weapons proliferation,” Bajema explains. “I was very intrigued by Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy and started to develop a research proposal to examine this decision and eventually I applied for a German Chancellor Scholarship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. However, at the time, most of my friends were studying something called nonproliferation and working at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). Consequently, our Friday night conversations at the local pub often revolved around the imminent threat of ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons proliferation. I was frustrated that I had comparatively little to contribute to these discussions, so I decided to check it out this nonproliferation business for myself and took a job at CNS for the summer of 2000. Well, I became hooked and the rest is history.”
After returning from a year in Berlin and Bonn as a German Chancellor Scholar in 2002 and armed with an MA in international policy, Bajema began her professional career in nonproliferation as a Junior Political Officer in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations in New York. In 2003, Bajema accepted a position as a Research Associate for the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University. At CIC, she was involved in a research project that examined the evolution of multilateral security institutions since the end of the Cold War. Bajema wrote a paper exploring how international responses to the threat of WMD proliferation have evolved since 1990; “In reality, until 2001 the way that we understood and countered the proliferation threat had not evolved much beyond the various approaches established during the Cold War, with the exception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program,” Bajema explains.
Since 2003, there has been a great deal of high-level thinking about how to address the new dimensions of the proliferation threat, including proposals by President Bush, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General ElBaradei and the UN High- level Panel. In November 2003, the United Nations Secretary-General established the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to consider how the United Nations might be reformed to address the challenges of the 21st century. After Dr. Bruce Jones, the Deputy-Director of CIC, was appointed to the research staff of the High-level Panel, Dr. Jones tasked Bajema to support the work of the Panel in the area of threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Working closely with the research staff of the High-level Panel, Bajema wrote extensive analytical briefs outlining the legal non-proliferation framework, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the non-proliferation instruments and providing a wide variety of possible recommendations for improvement. “This was an extraordinary opportunity for me. My experience working for the High-level Panel will definitely inform my research at The Fletcher School.”
In pursuit of a PhD, Bajema considered The Fletcher School as her first choice. “Given my policy background, I chose Fletcher for its combined academic excellence and professional orientation.” As for her future plans, Bajema wishes to remain active in both academia and international policy, possibly lecturing as a professor, conducting research at a think tank on international security issues, or consulting for the US government.
At Fletcher, Bajema is continuing her focus on nonproliferation and arms control. She has selected security studies, international organizations and political systems and theories as her three fields of study. Her dissertation will draw questions from theories of international cooperation and regime analysis to examine the evolution and the current state of the nonproliferation regimes.
“We are at a critical point within the nonproliferation regimes,” Bajema explains. “The regimes have not yet been adapted to meet the demands of the rapidly changing international security environment of the post-Cold War era. In fact, the negotiations for strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have reached a stalemate for the most part.
“Although the nonproliferation treaties represent an important normative basis for countering WMD proliferation, I am not sure if these are the appropriate cooperative mechanisms for the 21st century. It is clear that these treaties are not adequate to meet the challenges posed by new dimensions of the proliferation threat, in particular the emergence of non-state actors with the potential to have a strategic impact. It is less clear where we need to go in terms of mechanisms and modes of cooperation for addressing these threats at the global level.”
