The Fletcher School

An Evening with The Brookings Institute Discussing Trilateral Issues: Japan, Greater China and the United States

On November 15th, Richard Bush III, Director of The Brookings Institute’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS), as well as two of the Institute’s visiting fellows—Quan Jing and Tomohiko Taniguchi, discussed the core strategic and tactical threads that bind the United States, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) together in the Pacific Rim.

Sponsored by The Hitachi Center for Technology and International Affairs and the Fletcher ASIA Club, this was the second in what is now an annual visit from Brookings Institute North Asia Scholars to The Fletcher School.

China is rising

Tomohiko Taniguchi, Brookings’ Japan Scholar, editor-at-large at Nikkei Business Publications, and a well-known political and economic commentator in Japan, spoke first.

He identified the temperature of current Sino-Japanese relations as a “cold peace,” characterized by shared economic interests but also ongoing political disputes, over a century of historical grievances, and one particular security flashpoint: Taiwan.

“Supposing Taiwan becomes part of China—through one nation, two systems, or through outright annexation—what will happen then?” Taniguchi asked his audience.

The waters off of Taiwan’s coasts are physically much deeper than the mainland’s, he said, and reunification would facilitate Chinese Naval exercises much closer to Japanese-frequented sea routes. Japan might interpret this as a threat.

He went on to explain why a more powerful China is considered so threatening. “China is not only one of oldest, largest, and vibrant countries, but it is also one of the most wounded and youngest, and it desperately wants its place of glory in history. That’s why it is the most dangerous.”

Not unsurprisingly, Quan Jing, a career diplomat and the first PRC government official to participate in the CNAPS Fellows program whose lecture followed Taniguchi’s, felt differently.

Jing challenged his colleague by pointing out that, in China, many perceive the close U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Taiwan military relationships as menacing, and Sino-U.S. relations in the past have suffered as a result of this perception.

On the other hand, after the September 11 attacks, Sino-U.S. relations seemed to change.

A positive shift in Sino-U.S. relations?

After September 11, U.S. officials realized that China was not the adversary they had thought it was; instead, according to Jing, Islamic fundamentalism was the real enemy.

Now, shared interests in nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and trade have broadened the basis for Sino-U.S. cooperation. There have also been a significant number of high-level exchanges among the leaders of both countries.

Yet, in spite of these positive developments many disputes remain, and, he added, “mutual suspicion reigns.” Jing called special attention to Taiwan as “the one issue that could possibly destroy the whole [Sino-U.S.] relationship.”

“While Taiwan will never declare independence,” he said, “its tactic is to move along the path to de jure independence, by cultivating the Taiwanese identity and making moves towards constitutional revision.”

Beijing considers these actions highly provocative, and claims they are in blatant disregard of the PRC’s one-China policy (which states that Taiwan is a part of China). According to Jing, the Beijing government would consider further moves towards de jure independence as acts of war.

A war between Taiwan and China would very likely involve the United States—Taiwan’s great defender, and possibly Japan—America’s closest strategic ally in East Asia.

A positive framework for trilateral relations

Richard Bush III, CNAPS director and the evening’s final speaker, agreed with his colleagues on the strategic importance of Taiwan to all three nations concerned. But, he pointed out, thinking of Taiwan as a pawn in the larger nations’ contest for power is “a negative scenario.”

Instead of focusing on areas where the three powers could come into conflict, it is important for each country to recognize its common interests with each of its neighbors.

For example, he pointed to North Korea’s nuclear program as “a problem that, although difficult, encourages and demands cooperative relations among all three great powers.” And the resulting 6-party talks are positive instances of “where common interests override competing interests.”

“It is in this kind of regional architecture,” Bush concluded, “that it is best to embed the U.S.-China-Japan relationship.”

Continued discussion

While all the students and guests present hope that each country’s respective political and economic evolutions can occur in a peaceful international environment, everyone also recognizes that risks remain and that this is an era of uncertainty. More discussion is critical.

Building on a successful May 2004 conference in Qingdao, China, The Hitachi Center will facilitate further discussion about the security and economic dynamics of this trilateral relationship in a two-day symposium entitled “Partners Managing Risk II,” which will be held at The Fletcher School in April 2005.

Article by Claire Topal, MALD '05