The Fletcher School

“We are currently witnessing the development of a better relationship between China and Japan,” said Professor Michael Yehuda in a roundtable discussion on Sino-Japanese Relations on September 28th at The Fletcher School, “but important factors that limit these developments remain, and these constraints cannot be readily explained by current popular International Relations theories.”

A Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science and a Visiting Scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University’s Elliott School, Professor Yehuda was lauded on Thursday by colleague Alan Wachman as “a deep, broad voice on Chinese domestic politics, foreign policy, and the international politics of the Asia Pacific region.” His seminar was this year’s first in a monthly series hosted by The Fletcher School’s Hitachi Center for Technology and International Affairs.

So what do popular theories imply about the Sino-Japanese relationship and why do they not suffice to explain it?

Yehuda began by pointing out that despite a drastic increase in Sino-Japanese trade and economic interdependence in the past 30 years, “we find public expressions [by Chinese and Japanese alike] of opposition to one another and no sign of any development of visible constituencies seeking to promote better relations.” The absence of these constituencies discounts the theory of Liberal Internationalism as an explanation for the Sino-Japanese relationship.

He also challenged Constructivist readings of the relationship, noting that negative attitudes among Japanese and Chinese of one another are not necessarily socially constructed. “If anti-Japanese attitudes are woven into the very fabric of Chinese Communist Party ideology and legitimacy,” Yehuda asked, “then why have the Chinese put so much effort in reaching out to Japan in recent years?”

Realist theory offers no better explanation of the Sino-Japanese relationship. “The Realist school argues that Japan should break away from its security dependence with the United States [and develop closer ties with China],” Yehuda told his audience. Yet, despite talk of revising the Japanese constitution, he continued, U.S.-Japanese relations are unlikely to shift drastically in the near future.

Furthermore, Yehuda pointed out, “as far as China is concerned, the U.S.-Japanese alliance keeps a cork in Japanese militarism. The Chinese might be more concerned about a Japan free from U.S. influence and projecting its power and developing its capabilities.”

Ultimately, the problem goes beyond strategic partnerships. History and a need for public self-reflection are also obstacles to better relations.

Historical grievances have been integral in shaping mutual perceptions and attitudes. “In a way,” Yehuda reflected, “each party has been imprisoned by particular myths about history.
“Interestingly,” he went on to say, “the [Chinese] generation that actually experienced [Japanese] occupation is less vocal about [resentment towards] Japan then the current generation who did not live through it.”

Other challenges to improvements in bi-lateral relations stem from the lack of national self-reflection on both sides. According to Yehuda, the Chinese have not sufficiently acknowledged the importance of peace in Japanese society after World War II, and the Japanese have not suitably explained to their people why the Chinese harbor so much bitterness towards them.

Additionally, neither country has experience with dealing with each other as major powers. “Before [the late 20th century], one was always one up while the other was down.” Moreover, Yehuda added, each country’s political systems and values are different. These differences, at a time of “national resurgence” in both countries, exacerbate tensions.

“Neither the Chinese nor the Japanese recognize the legitimacy of each other’s security and national interests and neither has articulated a strong idea of what its own real interests might be.” This lack of communication and combined with mutual suspicion, Yehuda said, further strains relations.

Ultimately, China and Japan must find ways to improve their respective self-images, acknowledge each other’s grievances, and stop allowing small disagreements to escalate into large-scale conflicts. Naming the problem, however, is much simpler than implementing a solution.

“It’s not that the constraints cannot be overcome,” Yehuda concluded, “unfortunately it’s just that overcoming them is very difficult.”

In addition to its monthly speaker series, The Hitachi Center will also be hosting part II of it “Partners Managing Risk Symposium” in April, addressing questions linking China, Japan, and the United States. Part I was held in May 2004 in Qingdao, China.

The Hitachi Center for Technology and International Affairs: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/hitachi/

Article by Claire Topal MALD '05