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The conference revealed a wide range of perspectives on the issue of preemption,
However, a few themes recurred throughout panel discussions. The following analysis
attempts to address these themes and synthesize the opinions expressed by participants.
An Inherent Right
Echoing a consensus between candidates in the previous night’s presidential
debate, panelists seemed generally to agree that states have a basic right to
preempt imminent threats to their national security. Several referred to Article
51 of the UN Charter, which mentions a state’s “inherent”
right to self-defense as an exception to the prohibition against unauthorized
use of force.
Although there is ambiguity as to whether Article 51 technically allows for
preemptive force, the US (and France, as Gilles Andréani noted) has long
held that preemptive action against an imminent attack is legitimate under both
the UN Charter and international customary law.
Preemption vs Preventive War
A number of participants, however, made the distinction between preemption
and preventive war. Several mentioned that the recent US-led war in Iraq did
not meet the established standards of necessity and imminence outlined by US
Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the 1837 Caroline incident. Others cited
the 2002 National Security Strategy, which states that preemption is justified
“even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s
attack.” Jack L. Goldsmith observed that in the current strategic environment,
temporal imminence is perceived as less relevant because of the magnitude of
the threat.
Highlighting the discrepancy between the traditionally accepted notion of preemption
and its implementation in Iraq, Stephen Walt called the use of the term by the
Bush Administration a case of “Orwellian word-speak.”
Doctrine or Tool?
There was some disagreement among speakers over the degree to which preemption
has attained the status of “doctrine” within US foreign policy.
While some felt that it represented merely a “tool within the policy toolbox”
available to decision-makers, others argued that under the present Administration,
the idea of preemption has been “raised to the doctrinal level of Containment
or Enlargement.” One participant suggested that preemption might be an
accidental doctrine: that while the Administration may not have intended to
make it the cornerstone of the “Bush Doctrine,” that has been the
overall effect.
Emerging International Norms
Both the development and implications of evolving international norms surrounding
preemption reappeared frequently throughout the conference. Citing NATO efforts
to forestall genocide in 1999 in Kosovo, Ivo Daalder noted the “emergence
of a new sense that sovereignty might be conditional and that states have a
duty to behave in a certain way.“ However, he also lamented the fact that
the Bush Administration believes that “pure motives and effective action
plans replace traditional forms of legitimacy, like a security council vote.”
There also seemed to be a consensus that preventive action short of war has
become increasingly acceptable. Several speakers mentioned the Bush Administration’s
Proliferation Security Initiative, which allows the US and its allies to search
planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile
technologies. The traditional “Just War” requirement of proportionality
was cited as a potential justification for PSI’s perceived legitimacy.
Given the degree of skepticism with which the recent Iraq war is now viewed
internationally, some believed that leaders will face more rigorous standards
in the future if they hope to employ large-scale methods of preventive action
such as regime change.
Others felt that the bar for preventive military action has been universally
lowered, and expressed concern about the precedent that the United States has
set for other states. Several participants mentioned that Russia, Israel, and
India seem to be embracing the concept of preemption, and some envisioned hypothetical
scenarios – such as a Turkish attack on Iraqi Kurdistan or Serbian preemptive
action against Kosovo – that might occur should more states follow the
US lead.
Military Implications
In a number of panels, speakers examined the implications of a “doctrine
of preemption” for the US military. Military analysts stressed that a
shift towards robust preventive actions by the United States would necessitate
both improved expeditionary capabilities and increased human and logistical
resources devoted to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Preemption
is likely to require swift and decisive action, which has an effect on military
readiness levels and deployability.
Ashton Carter presented a case study on the 1994 confrontation with North Korea
and highlighted the military planning done for a preemptive strike against nuclear
facilities in Yongbyon. He noted that it was difficult to convince many in government
that such a strike should be considered. He concluded that it was now too late
to consider such a preemptive strike against nuclear facilities in North Korea
because their nuclear materials have been dispersed.
“Exquisite Intelligence”
The importance of reliable intelligence was discussed in almost every panel.
Because a government’s case for preventive military action is grounded
in information, participants argued, it is crucial that the information received
be accurate, timely, actionable and as complete as possible. Col Charles Luttes
particularly emphasized the necessity of high-quality, “exquisite”
intelligence at both the strategic and the operational levels of military planning.
The problem, participants said, is that looking for weapons of mass destruction
in rogue states and finding terrorist cells present significant intelligence
challenges that are different from the Cold War. The US, they felt, is not yet
fully prepared to meet these challenges.
International Relationships
Panelists frequently alluded to the recent friction within many US diplomatic
relationships, and the failure of the US and its allies to come to a consensus
on the appropriate use of preemptive force. This was often juxtaposed against
the particular importance of strong allies in an international campaign against
terrorism. Asserting that “100% active, enthusiastic cooperation of partners”
is now necessary, participants listed over-flight rights, military basing issues,
interoperability, information sharing, allied involvement in reconstruction
efforts, and interdiction cooperation as a few areas in which international
support is essential.
Robert Litwak also discussed the damage that the Iraq campaign may have had
on non-proliferation efforts elsewhere, arguing that while “hardliners
hope that the other “evil” powers will learn the lesson from Iraq,
pragmatists are worried that Pyongyang and Tehran have been inspired to develop
their nuclear weapons programs.”
A New Framework?
Several participants offered suggestions on how to approach the lack of international
consensus on the use of preventive force. Many noted the failure that current
institutional efforts have yielded, and the inadequacies of existing legal standards
in the face of 21st century threats. During his remarks, Ivo Daalder proposed
that the international community consider a “new framework to supplement,
if not supplant, the UN framework.”
Antonia Chayes stressed that “a serious worldwide discussion of preemption...
is overdue,” arguing that discussion was necessary after the international
reactions to Rwanda and Kosovo. Chayes wondered whether “we need to rethink
the UN system” in order to better accommodate modern challenges.
Article by
Anika Binnendijk MALD '06
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