The Fletcher School

On Thursday, October 1 and Friday, October 2, 2004, The Fletcher School brought together policymakers and scholars from a range of fields to discuss the use of pre-emptive force in foreign affairs. Co-hosted with the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, the conference sought to examine the question of preemption through numerous lenses: legal, strategic, political, diplomatic, and military. Through each of these lenses participants attempted to evaluate the costs, benefits, and long-term implications of the United States’ recent foreign policy decisions and statements on preemption.

Keynote Address
The conference began with an address by Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, who laid out the case for preventive measures as conceived by the current administration. Both Bolton’s speech and the presidential foreign policy debate aired in ASEAN auditorium later on Thursday evening infused an invaluable element of political reality into the following day’s more academic discussions.

Panel 1: The Legal Framework
Friday morning’s schedule began with a panel chaired by Fletcher professor Michael Glennon on the legal framework surrounding a state’s decision to take preemptive military action. Gilles Andréani, head of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy planning staff, began by admitting that he had been concerned about his qualifications to appear on a law panel until he realized that on the issue of preemption, “the law is not going to be of much help. The debate has become one of strategic and political dimensions.”

Nevertheless, Andréani proceeded to outline some of the major legal thought on the issue, noting that while there is indeed an assumed right to anticipatory self-defense in international law, “the US government is broadening the definition. Its actions are not limited to anticipatory self-defense – they have moved to “preventive action.”

Harvard Law School professor Jack L. Goldsmith III cited the inherent difficulties in “trying to move customary international law into the nuclear or terrorist age.” Goldsmith argued that the traditional requirement of “imminence” to justify preemptive action “must be adapted to the new security environment.” It is no longer solely a temporal issue, he believes, but also should be considered according to the “gravity of the threat.”

Sean Murphy, of George Washington Law School, provided a synthesis of the traditional schools of thought on self-defense and called for further research into interventions such as the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo in order to develop a better understanding of emerging international norms.

Panel 2: The Strategic Environment
In the following panel, moderated by Fletcher dean Stephen Bosworth, each panelist considered the issue of preemption from a different angle. Ivo Daalder, of the Brookings Institution, focused on the practical concerns involved, highlighting that because it is sometimes necessary, “preemption isn’t the problem.” However, he continued, “the failure to create international consensus on legitimate of preemptive action is.”

Harvard professor Stephen Walt combined theory and policy analysis in his remarks as he offered a Realist critique of a doctrine of preemption. Walt remarked that “the US is now regarded with greater fear and suspicion, than any other time in our history,” a development which has encouraged other states to begin to balance against us. Citing a 19th century practitioner of Realism, Walt recalled Prussian leader Otto van Bismarck’s observation that “preventive war is committing suicide for fear of death.”

Walt was followed by General Bernard Trainor, former military correspondent for the New York Times and current Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Trainor provided a philosophical perspective in his discussion of the development and application of the Just War theory. He noted that, according to Catholic philosopher Thomas Aquinas, a national leader has a “moral duty to take the action that he thinks is necessary for those for whom he is responsible.” Aquinas believed that this responsibility applies, said Trainor, regardless of whether the leader is a “Woodrow Wilson or a Caligula.”

Luncheon speaker: Rudolf Scharping
Over lunch, Rudolf Scharping, former German Defense Minister and visiting professor at Fletcher, discussed the implications that recent US foreign policy choices have had for European allies. After alluding to the transatlantic ruptures incurred by the run-up to the US-led war in Iraq, Scharping observed that a change in US presidents could create unexpected results for Europe. While some in European capitals may be eager to see new policies coming from the Oval Office, he said, John Kerry’s plan to request allied assistance in securing Iraq could lead to some difficult political decisions for national leaders.

Panel 3: Politics and Diplomacy
The first panel of the afternoon, moderated by Fletcher professor Alan Henrikson, examined the political and diplomatic impacts of a policy of preemption. Antonia Chayes, former Under Secretary of the US Air Force and visiting Fletcher school professor, began with the provocative statement that “diplomacy can’t make a wormy rotten apple taste good.” Chayes outlined the failure of worldwide community to engage in a productive discussion on terrorism, WMD dangers, and preemption. In this vacuum, Chayes said, United States has undertaken an “unacceptable” policy of “presumptuous preemption.”

Hans Binnendijk, former National Security Council Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control and current Director of NDU’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy, spoke next. Binnendijk observed that while “there is strategic logic to preemption,” its most recent applications in US foreign policy have been “diplomatically counterproductive, politically divisive, and militarily strenuous. “ Therefore, he said, “don’t toss the doctrine, but revise it.” He suggested that the US “start with our European allies” in trying to rebuild an international consensus around the legitimate use of force.

The director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Division of International Studies, Robert Litwak dubbed Iraq the “high water mark of Bush’s doctrine.” The Bush Administration’s assumption that regime change would benefit counter-proliferation, Litwak noted, has led to interesting consequences in US relations with countries like Libya. There, the Administration has been forced to provide the “assurance of regime survival” of an illiberal regime in exchange for disarmament.

Panel 4: The Military and Operational Aspects of Preemption
Steve Flanagan, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU, chaired the final conference panel, in which panelists evaluated the nuts-and-bolts military requirements for successful preemptive action. Elaine Bunn, also of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, began with an analysis of the spectrum of preemptive action, ranging from arms interdictions to full-scale military invasions. According to Bunn, in a post-Iraq war world, the “bar is higher” for preventive war or regime change, because it will now be more difficult to establish the credibility of intelligence. On the other hand, small-scale interdictions will have a “lower bar” because “the implications of being wrong are not as severe.”

Colonel Charles D. Lutes, USAF, outlined a number of military necessities for US forces sent on a preemptive mission. These included the ability to respond quickly, the capability to operate with precision from long ranges, reliability, sustainability, and flexibility.

Ashton Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, concluded the panel presentations with a discussion of nuclear weapons in North Korea. Carter argued that there could be value in eliminating North Korea’s nuclear facilities in a targeted preemptive strike. In dealing with the regime, he said, “it’s important not to talk in self deterred way… You need to condition them so that they’re thinking carefully about the right reaction. ‘If you strike back, we remove you.’” Carter also stressed the need for improved US science and technology research and intelligence capabilities.

Overall, the conference provided a broad-reaching approach to the issue of preemptive force. Participants moved the discussion of preemption beyond the issue of Iraq and towards a more nuanced articulation of the origins, framework, and implications of the recent developments in US foreign policy.

The event was organized by Professor Michael Glennon and made possible through the generous support of Dr. Eileen Guggenheim Wilkinson (GMAP '01), the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

Article by Anika Binnendijk MALD '06