| GLOBAL MASTERS OF ARTS PROGRAM COMMENCEMENT |
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Ambassador Barbara Bodine's commencement address for the fourth Global Masters of Arts Program on July 24, 2004 focused on what she identified as "the wisdom gap" and its influence on the United States' post-war effort in Iraq. Ambassador Bodine describes a decision making process that reduced the role of the State Department to observer and led to decisions that ignored dissenting views and represented ideology rather than reality. Ergo, what she referrs to as the "wisdom gap". Remarks made by Ambassador Barbara K. Bodine (below) Remarks made by Provost Jamshed Bharucha
Closing the Wisdom Gap
There is a certain cliché to commencement addresses – All valid – if you are addressing a fairly typical collection of fairly typical – even exceptional- twenty-something graduates. In fact, I gave just that speech last May in California. Someone in my office suggested I just dust that off, make a few minor tweaks, and use it today. Tempting – but wholly inappropriate. First, no graduate of Fletcher is “fairly typical” – not just even exceptional – but unique. Fletcher has always been a special place. One of the first graduate schools dedicated to international relations – diplomacy – distinguished not only by its faculty and its academic standards but also by its commitment to a student community that represents the international community, and seeks to serve that global community. Founded on a innovative concept during an era when the United States was first coming to terms with its nascent role as a world power, and in the heady if not naïve years after World War One when there was the belief, not just that hope, that there were other tools to advance the national interest besides great armies, and great carnage. The Fletcher School is more than a graduate school or a professional school, but a unique sort of service academy for those who practice the art of international politics, economics and security with the weapons of mediation, negotiation and multilateralism…armed with history, the science of politics, the dynamics of economics, the power of the media and the frameworks of international law and convention. At a time when some of our leaders have declared that “time for diplomacy is over” – much like the declaration of the end of history – and when the collaborative, political solution appears to be the final and not the first option, it bears remembering that - in the hands of the skilled practitioner - the arts valued here, learned here - are and remain equally if not more effective and relevant today. I am not here today to wrap you in the mantle of Warriors for Peace – warriors in suits and cell phones– but to be encouraged by and to encourage your commitment to another less
glamorous, less sexy, less understood and less telegenic form of service….One
with increasing risks and sacrifices. As a friend of mine responded to a
congressman denigrating the reality of the service the diplomat – Fletcher has continued to grow and adapt as the demands of the students and the world they intend to serve has evolved. Its focus is not solely on the next generation of diplomats but on the next generation of leaders of NGOs and multilateral organizations, bankers, entrepreneurs, journalists and teachers – the ever-widening range of those engaged in international affairs. But it has stayed true to its basic principles and objective. The Global Masters in Arts Program represents the finest in those traditions and
history that have made Fletcher such a special place. I applaud Fletcher and Dean Nutter’s innovative spirit to devise and launch this program that combines the opportunities of technology and the importance of the resident graduate environment. I probably shouldn’t admit this – there is something of a gnawing fear that if this address does not go well they will revoke my degree – but many of Fletcherites will concede that we learned as much from each other in all-night informal debates as we did in the classroom. Our political, geographic and national diversity (there wasn’t much gender diversity in those days) forced us to debate and defend our views against our most uncompromising opponents – each other. Some of my best friends today are those I studied and argued with on my way to my degree. We still don’t always agree, but we have never closed off the dialogue that began at Fletcher too many decades ago. That brings me to my central theme this morning – The Wisdom Gap. I first heard this phrase at one of the innumerable seminars, panels and debates in Washington on things Iraq. This one was about the time of the first anniversary of the fall of Baghdad – or at least Saddam’s statute. It was a thoughtful panel of practitioner-scholars, free from the partisan heat and public cant that has all but obscured public debate and understanding on these questions. After a well-done but not surprising review of events and history, one panelist addressed what he considered the fundamental flaw. He looked beyond the debate over the quality or use of the intelligence, the divide between State and Defense, the relative weight of what one pundit calls the War Between the Policy Wonks and the Political Hacks, or the planning – or lack thereof – on post-conflict reconstruction…although all those are real and worthy of examination. What he focused on was The Wisdom Gap – a failure of assessment and diagnosis – clinical and dispassionate – not devoid of the realities on the ground, but grounded on reality and not ideology. Someone once asked me the difference between a pragmatist and an ideologue. The best I could come up with was that a pragmatist seeks to adapt policies and programs to reality; an ideologue seeks to fit reality to his policies and programs. This is not a cold-blooded realpolitic vs. idealism – idealism and ideology are very different beasts. To simply accept current reality as immutable would deny the possibility of change, progress and improvement. But to change you first have to understand. However, a policy or program pursued in defiance of reality is like a fun house mirror that distorts whatever is put in front of it. More specifically, The Wisdom Gap reflects, as he described it, a dysfunctional interagency process that mirrors the distortions in the consultative process with allies and friends, bilaterally and multilaterally. - When debate – the simple presentation of alternative views, information, analysis and prognosis - is seen as dissention, and dissention as disloyalty, debate is chilled. - When friendship is measured by unquestioning acquiescence and disagreement become betrayal, then the friendship becomes sterile. - When negotiations operate like a child’s level – Let’s compromise; let’s do it my way – then the partnership dies. And, you have a Wisdom Gap. This is not the same as The Senate Select Committee’s “group think”. Group think to me is something of a spontaneous phenomena; The Wisdom Gap is induced. I have been at State long enough to have worked in Republican and Democratic Administrations, ones with strong national security advisors and absent secretaries of state; with strong secretaries of state who eclipsed virtually the rest of the Cabinet in influence and access; and secretaries who routinely deferred to other cabinet secretaries. Throughout all the phases of that waxing and waning bureaucratic moon the debate, the dialogue, the consultations and cooperation continued. Yes, it was always much better to have the lead dog as your boss. But it was a competition of ideas, not guerrilla warfare. The debates could be heated but they were rarely personal. You might set out to vanquish policies and programs, but not your adversary…they weren’t adversaries, they were just temporarily muddled-headed colleagues. On national security issues regional combatant commanders, State, DOD, JCS, CIA and, increasingly, the FBI might battled mightily, but we stayed engaged. You knew that you would have to work with that person tomorrow, that you might need that person as an ally. We did not need to be friends; but we remained colleagues in service to the same nation, seeking to advance the national interest with sworn oaths to the same Constitution. The stakes are high and the contention intense but while you might question the sanity or intelligence of your colleague, you never questioned – or challenged - his loyalty. While the past has perhaps become romanticized, there were bridges, not walls. We understood that torching the bridges is not smart. We have found that breaching wall is not easy. A recent Washington Post article on the interagency debate on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against the Use of Torture and the President’s wartime prerogatives noted, way at the end – that when Justice and Defense grew weary of State’s objections, they just cut us out of the process all together. Only those who already agreed where allowed into the discussion. You don’t learn very much that way. About 20 years ago a mid-level Marine Corps officer at the NSC came up with a scheme to solve two policy dilemmas at one time –free American hostages and support anti-communist forces. When this was floated interagency, both Secretaries Weinberger and Schultz – who were not known for agreeing on very much – objected forcefully. The matter was taken off the table and both secretaries and their respective departments assumed that it had died a natural and fitting death. It was off the table, but not dead. The mid-level Marine – and his bosses – chose to ignore two independently reached assessments, two Department’s conclusions that this was a really bad idea for any number of reason…and then shopped for a friendlier patron…We ended up with Iran Contra. Today’s Wisdom Gap is the Ollie North Syndrome writ large. What did this mean for Iraq? It is a pretty well known series of events by now – - An interagency – not State-only just State-led - effort to plan the post-conflict period. An effort that drew in subject-matter experts from a wide range of departments and agencies, regional experts, post-conflict experts, Iraqis and anyone else who might be value added or a self-perceived equity – was shelved within months of the invasion. Not only was this interagency planning set aside, but most of the planners – who are far more valuable then the paper – were excluded. “Not Invented Here”. - A subsequent Uniformed Military Plan was studiously left as “draft” to preclude interagency review. It was written in a vacuum, implemented in a vacuum, and defied any coordinated effort. Warnings on the bona fides of Iraqi partners were ignored, as were warnings on probable looting and lawlessness. - Dissenting views on possible Iraqi resistance were dismissed out of hand – it would be roses and sweets, as were estimates on required troop levels, costs and revenue sources. - High-ranking officials lost their jobs or were marginalized. - Political orthodoxy was prized above expertise. The message got out around the bureaucracy quickly. A game plan dictated by Washington that is predicated on other actors playing predetermined roles for which they have not seen the script – such as the Iraqis – is foolhardy. It assumed a passivity on the part of other players, an ability to control the timeline - the dynamic. Decisions that should have been and could have been made in the field were routinely deferred to Washington for decision. What Tommy Franks once called a 10,000-mile screwdriver. The less flexibility allowed to those in the field, the greater the gap between objectives and realities. Broad goals and objectives must be decided at the national policy level, but those pesky subject matter experts – civilian and military - better be at the table, on the ground, and empowered to act. If for some idiotic reason someone put me in charge of an armored invasion of a country I might want a few of my wiser State colleagues at my side, but I would not expect them or ask them to figure out how to get X number of tanks and sundry equipment from A to B with the desired result. I would go find folks who knew tanks, knew warfare, knew the desert… Does this mean that if the post-conflict planning had been left at State and with a broader interagency and international team we would have avoided the gapping potholes we broke our axles on? No. … Well, yes in fact. There would have been mistakes, wrong-headed decisions, faulty implementation. No plan goes according to plan. No plan, no effort, no matter how well conceived, works according to expectations. A plan is no more than a framework, a guide that allows for contingencies, options, alternatives and the always-to-be-expected unexpected. But I do believe The Wisdom Gap, domestic and international, would have been significantly narrowed. I am not going to debate whether there would have been a war, but on the question of post-conflict, it would have been handled very differently. Not because we are necessarily – or solely – smarter. Just… that is who we are, that is what we do. The lesson has been learned. Congress, the Senate, has mandated that post-conflict planning will be housed at State. We recently stood up a new Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization who reports directly to the Secretary. Operative words in this new office and this new title not just the what – reconstruction and stabilization - but the how. Coordinators close gaps. So, what does all this mean for you? No doubt I have been preaching to the choir. You are practitioner-scholars, you have already been out there and done that. You signed up for and completed this extraordinary course because you want to do it better. < - You are really, really smart or you won’t be here; You already understand the value – the criticality – of clear-headed assessment, analysis of problems and thoughtful and thoroughly researched solutions. The luxury of time is rarely afforded to us in the real world, but the fundamental mental discipline is the same. You have experience the benefit and I hope the sheer joy of debating, discussing, revising and defending positions and ideas with a range of colleagues – and the recognition of a better product to show for it at the end. So… Take it home, take it to your office, your agency, your government, your institution, your business. Wisdom is not the same as age. Time on earth - a gold star for perfect attendance to life’s chores - is not wisdom. Wisdom is not data. The wunderkind on Jeopardy has data; few would look to him as a sage. Wisdom is not age, it is not data, not rank or power. Wisdom is simply the opposite of hubris. Welcome to the Fletcher Family |