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Deterrence in War against Terrorism - Dr. Brad Roberts |
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The opinions here are of the presenter’s own and do not reflect
the views of the Institute for Defense Analyses and/or other
affiliated organizations/agencies. In the field of security studies, the emergence of Al-Queda illustrates the inadequacies of the current theories and paradigms on terrorism. Dr. Brad Roberts, of the Institute for Defense Analyses, gave a presentation at The Fletcher School describing some of the innovative and pioneering work being carried out by the defense studies community in devising a deterrence strategy against the new brand of terrorism. Roberts concludes that deterrence cannot play the central role in the war against terrorism, as it did during the Cold War. Part of the reason for this is the myriad of terrorist typologies that hinders the construction of an encompassing and effective anti-terrorism stratagem. The main objective of a deterrence strategy is a good understanding of the terrorist-actors. The second objective is to explicate their strategy of conflict: how do they use violence; what is their cost/benefit analysis; and what can be done to affect their calculus? The new strain phenomenon of terrorism calls for new approaches in answering these questions, with Al-Queda being an illustrative example. Traditionally, terrorism analysts have focused on the organizational aspects of terrorism, with leaders acting like CEOs who operate their organizations similarly to companies. In shaping the action of terrorists, the conventional method would focus on leaders and suicide bombers. The reality, however, is much more complex. Al-Queda, for instance, exists as a multi-level institution: at many levels it resembles an organization but it also acts like a revolutionary movement, as well as a cult. Within this system, there exists a multitudinous set of actors, each type with diverse and at times competing interests. Additionally, Al-Queda style terrorism is one of a ‘complex-adaptive system,’ that is, it is able to withstand pressures from anti-terrorist forces by moving its assets and resources around. Thus, the conventional approach to combating terrorism that focuses efforts on a central gravity point, such as the state-sponsorship model which holds states accountable for terrorist activities, would not address this new phenomenon of terrorism. The appropriate deterrence strategy must be able to directly address the type of terrorism at hand and take into consideration the manner in which the terrorist group utilizes violence. The role of violence can be subdivided into 3 different categories: instrumental violence, apocalyptic violence, and catalytic violence. Instrumental violence is used to shape societal beliefs and propagate political ideas, an example being the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. In the mid 1990s another type emerged; apocalyptic violence, the objective of which is to kill in the millions to purify society because the act facilitates rebirth. A famed example of apocalyptic violence is Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo. The third category is catalytic violence, which intends to unleash a force of change. The Oklahoma City bombing serves as an example to American right-wingers that they have the capacity to stand up against the federal government. When the objective of violence fails, that is, when the world does not respond in the manner the terrorists intended, some terrorist movements collapse since they have no capacity to adapt. Others, on the other hand, can adjust tactics and thus perpetuate themselves. If terrorists have the ability to learn and adapt (a complex adaptive system), then they are pursuing a coalition war. As a part of the deterrence strategy, one would think in terms of breaking the coalition and destroying the connections within their system. If a terrorist group is not a complex adaptive system, then the strategy would be to figure out their vulnerability and a way to exploit it. Al-Queda is a complex adaptive system. In the formative phase, Al-Queda terrorists learn about the weakness of the US strategy for deterrence. To them, America is a paper tiger since we avoid a direct confrontation but rather choose to fight war with technology, and thus confirm their conviction that we are reluctant to take risks. Thus, with Al-Queda we are missing the opportunity to deter. The direction for future research of terrorism and deterrence studies should explore the capacity and ways by which terrorist groups adapt and also the cause of their extinction. Knowledge of these dynamics is essential to construct a deterrence strategy. In the war against Al-Queda, we are fighting a complex adaptive system, which means that there is no central gravity point in the strategy of deterrence. Thus, the current strategy which is to hold states responsible for terrorists does not address the entirety of the problem. A more viable deterrence strategy should focus on building distrust among the different terrorist nodes in this system because the group functions on trust. |
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2002 The Fletcher School, Tufts
University |
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