Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan assesses the
U.S. Afghan policy, praises Collin Powell’s performance
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., the former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
and former Dean of the Fletcher School evaluated the U.S. Afghan
policy and discussed how the U.S. is securing her interests in
the ongoing post war reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.
Drawing on his observations as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
from 1973 to 78, Eliot gave a brief account of Afghan history and
politics. He described the historical evolution of relations
among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras as the principal
ethnic groups in the country since Afghanistan became a buffer
state between the Russian and British empires in the 19th
century. Tracing the roots of the dispute between Afghanistan and
Pakistan to the border drawn by the British between British India
and Afghanistan in 1890s, Ambassador Eliot argued that the desire
of the ruling Pashtuns in Afghanistan to seek a referendum for
the Pashtuns inside Pakistan to determine whether they want merge
with Afghanistan has since strained the relations between the two
countries.
After World War II, the U.S. entered into alliance with Pakistan
to contain the USSR, thus, declining the Afghan request for
military assistance. The U.S. refusal in turn prompted Afghans to
turn to the USSR for military assistance and equipment.
Nonetheless, Ambassador Eliot asserted that by 1978 the
U.S.-backed negotiations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan
about the dispute over Pashtunistan had made real progress. But
the Soviet leaders who disliked the prospects of reduced tension
between Afghanistan and Pakistan and had already realized that
Davood Khan—the then President of Afghanistan—opted for a more
independent stance in domestic and foreign policy, backed a
communist coup in April 1978 that ended the Pashtun tribal
government. Afghans, viewing communism as anti-religious revolted
against the communist government in Kabul. Fearing that the
Afghan mujahedin would ultimately topple the communist regime,
the Red Army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. The ensuing
war lasted more than a decade, claimed more than one million
lives, and made Afghanistan plunge into the dark ages. In 1989,
the Red Army left Afghanistan, but the communist regime lasted
three more years. In 1992 the mujahedin entered Kabul.
The U.S. armed and trained the mujahedin through the Pakistani
military intelligence service-the infamous ISI-throughout 1980s.
However, Ambassador Eliot stressed, the U.S. had no alternative
as the conduit of support for the mujahedin. The ISI in turn made
sure that the weapons reached those mujahedin it could control. A
Pashtun leadership in Kabul who was loyal to Pakistan would
ensure that the issue of Pashtunistan would be resolved in favor
of Pakistan. But Rabbani’s group who captured Kabul in 1992
consisted predominantly of Tajiks and Uzbeks not Pashtuns. So the
Pakistani military decided to create their own military asset,
the Taliban. Saudi money and Pakistani military training and
support created a fighting force that took over almost all parts
of Afghanistan by 1996. Although many U.S. observers initially
hoped that the Taliban could be an acceptable solution to the
Afghan crisis, such hopes rapidly waned when the Taliban hosted
Osama Bin-Laden. Bin-Laden who had fought along with the
mujahedin in Afghanistan in 1980s, returned to Afghanistan after
he was expelled from Saudi Arabia and Sudan.
Ambassador Eliot praised the U.S. policy in Afghanistan after
September 11 and said that he was amazed at the speed and
efficiency that the U.S. forces showed in uprooting the Taliban
and Al-Qaede. He also maintained that the current political and
economic developments in Afghanistan such as the Loya Jarga and
foreign aid are major steps towards achieving democracy and
reconstructing Afghanistan. Yet he warned that Afghanistan
suffers from major security problems. Domestically, Afghan
warlords still rule much of the country with their private
armies. Regionally, Afghanistan is surrounded by countries with
poor records of democracy. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are ruled
by dictators. Iran is a theocracy led by mullahs who publicly
denounce democracy, and Pakistan is run by an Army General who is
increasingly becoming dictatorial. Ambassador Eliot briefly
answered a few questions about the U.S. policy in Afghanistan. He
plainly rejected the idea that the U.S. backed the Taliban before
September 11, and emphasized that the Taliban was simply a
creation of Pakistan. On the recent remarks by Zbigniew
Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to the former President
Carter, about the American aid to the Afghans before the Soviet
invasion, Eliot said that he did not know of any such initiative.
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