



Climate negotiations beyond Kyoto: developing countries concerns and interests

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Abstract

Five years down the road from Kyoto, the Protocol that bears that city's name still awaits enough qualifying ratifications to come into force. While attention has been understandably focussed on the ratification process, it is time to begin thinking about the next steps for the global climate regime, particularly in terms of a deeper inclusion of developing countries' concerns and interests. This paper begins doing so from the perspective of the developing countries. The principal argument is that we need to return to the basic principles outlined in the Framework Convention on Climate Change in searching for a north–south bargain on climate change. Such a bargain may be achievable if we can realign the policy architecture of the climate regime to its original stated goals of sustainable development.

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1. Introduction

The recent Conferences of the Parties to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) seem to have managed to resuscitate what had seemed to be a sinking Kyoto Protocol, despite the US decision to abandon the agreement (Müller, 2002b). However, the decisions taken during this process of post-Kyoto negotiations leave the Protocol riddled with all the many problems that had dogged the original agreement while further diluting its content. From the perspective of the developing countries of the south, the Protocol, which had been imperfect to begin with, is now all the more imperfect (Agarwal et al., 1999; Najam, 2001).

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While some have argued that the first period targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, even if achieved, would be a rather meagre step at best (Malakoff, 1997; Najam and Page, 1998), others have pointed out that the Protocol is best viewed as a long-term architecture for solving the climate problem through sequentially negotiated, legally binding emission caps (Grubb et al., 2002). In either case, the buy-in to the Protocol, including by developing countries, has largely come on the basis of the argument that ‘getting the foot in the door is critical’ at this point and even if its current targets are diluted, the Protocol is the first, necessary, step towards ‘bigger and better things’. After the US decision to withdraw the Protocol’s European supporters have struggled hard to reach the ratification goals set up in the original agreement. Although still not there, the Protocol’s resilience has been impressive and it is now just one key ratification shy of arrival into force. However, this post-Kyoto negotiating process has been arduous and has required some key compromises on the Protocol as it was originally negotiated, including on issues related to sinks and to carbon trading (Müller, 2002a). In this bartering process, the so-called ‘flexibility mechanisms’ within the Protocol have been flexed to the maximum (Agarwal et al., 2001).

So, where do we stand some 5 years down the road from Kyoto? The purpose of this paper is to take stock of the Kyoto Protocol from a developing country perspective.

Up till now, the Kyoto process has been focused on the short-term need to launch the implementation phase, to get ratifications from the industrialized countries listed in Annex 1, and thereby to bring the Protocol into force. However, the focus on the longer-term objectives of the UNFCCC cannot be postponed for too long. Developing countries are bound to have a prominent role in meeting these goals, both directly (through emission caps) and indirectly (through emission trades). In this regards, the developing countries are now confronted by both challenges and opportunities.

The challenges emerge from the fact that developing country concerns, which had always been marginal to the thrust of the UNFCCC, have become even more marginalized in recent COPs as energy has had to be diverted to get reluctant northern countries (those listed in Annex 1) to accede to the Kyoto Protocol. As the industrialized countries dragged their feet, the concerns of the developing nations have largely been lost in the dust. With the Kyoto dust now beginning to settle, it is time to bring these southern concerns to the forefront once again. The early focus on mitigation targets has been entirely logical since industrialized countries have been the principal contributors to the carbon build-up and remain the predominant carbon emitters (Müller, 2002a). However, the post-Kyoto period has been so consumed by getting Annex 1 countries to agree to what they had already agreed to at Kyoto that there has been little time or energy left for other issues, particularly those that are of greater interest to the south.

This has only deepened the existing north–south tension in global climate politics (Müller, 2002b). Moreover, some in the south fear that in the desire to get the north to accede the Protocol has been structured in ways that could be detrimental to southern interests once they also have to take on future mandated commitments, as they will inevitably have to (Agarwal et al., 1999). For example, in deciding to set first period emission targets as a percentage of 1990 emissions rather than as an allowance of emissions per capita, the Kyoto Protocol has set an allocation precedent which benefits those with high current emissions rather than those whose current emissions are low. There is a fear that if this precedent were to influence future target-setting then those living in developing countries—most of whom have relatively low per capita emissions—would be saddled with much lower emission allowances than their counterparts in the most industrialized countries of Europe and North America; in essence, this would reward the higher current per capita emissions in the north rather than rewarding the relatively lower emissions in the south (Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Najam and Sagar, 1998). For most part, developing countries would have preferred an arrangement based on maximum allowable emissions according to some

negotiated formula and a clear focus on linking climate change and sustainable development (Banuri and Sagar, 1999; Najam, 2001; Sokona, 2001).

The opportunity for the south emanates from the fact that the case for making the link between climate change and sustainable development is already enshrined in the text of the UNFCCC (Rayner and Malone, 1998; Banuri et al., 2001). This focus was effectively side-lined in the operational provisions and marginalized in the Kyoto Protocol, which became principally focussed on mitigative goals and emission reductions (Sagar and Kandlikar, 1997; Najam and Sagar, 1998). However, persistent protestations by the south have triggered a resurgent interest in trying to address the links between climate change and sustainable development (Müller, 2002b). The increasing interest in issues related to climate adaptability and the related focus on the social, economic and climatic resilience of vulnerable communities and ecological systems allows a good opportunity for this linkage to be strengthened (Munasinghe, 2000; Banuri et al., 2001; Huq and Sokona, 2001; Beg et al., 2002). The emerging shift towards longer-term goals and the importance of the developing countries in meeting these goals provides the south an important opportunity to make their sustainable development concerns more prominent in any future refinement of the climate regime, especially including future negotiations on specific targets and responsibilities for the developing countries.

2. Southern concerns

The original UNFCCC was not viewed as a great victory by the developing countries which had wanted the Convention to focus more directly on issues of historical responsibility, sought more immediate mitigative action, and demanded adaptive assistance for the most vulnerable communities and countries (Dasgupta, 1994; Hyder, 1994; Rajan, 1997; Sagar and Kandlikar, 1997). Since then, the climate regime has become even less sympathetic to these concerns of the south (Agarwal et al., 2001; Huq and Sokona, 2001; Najam, 2001). As already pointed out, this has largely been a case of neglect and inattention, rather than outright assault. For most part, this has been a direct result of the overwhelming preoccupation by policy makers, scholars, and activists with getting Annex 1 countries to agree, and then accede, to the Kyoto Protocol. In focusing on this short-term objective, the longer-term goals of the UNFCCC—especially those related to sustainable development—have tended to slip. The result has been a systematic marginalization of the core interests of the developing countries.

While developing country governments and scholars have raised a number of specific concerns regarding the direction in which the global climate regime has evolved, these relate generally to three large categories of concerns:

- First, the principle of inter- and intra-generational equity and responsibility which was so central to the discussions of global climate change up till the adoption of the UNFCCC has been side-lined in the discourse since then, especially since the Kyoto agreement.
- Second, the focus of the regime has become skewed towards minimizing the burden of implementation on polluter industries and countries, instead of giving priority to the vulnerabilities of the communities and countries at greatest risk and disadvantage.
- Third, the primary focus of the regime is becoming the management of global carbon trade and meeting short-term targets, distracting due attention from the longer-term challenge of stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.

Let us explore each of these concerns separately.

First, issues of **equity and responsibility between and within generations** have been amongst the central themes in the policy as well as scholarly discussions on global climate change (see Weiss, 1989; Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Jamieson, 1992; Gadgil and Guha, 1995; Shue, 1995; Najam and Page, 1997; Banuri and Sagar, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Baer et al., 2000; Carraro, 2000; Munasinghe, 2000; Müller, 2002a). The discussion on this issue was particularly heated during the years leading up to the UNFCCC. Although it still figures as an occasional theme in the scholarly literature, it is increasingly avoided in the policy discussions. Indeed, equity seemed to be amongst the first causalities of the Kyoto process, where even the pretence of some form of equity between emission reduction targets was quickly abandoned amidst the arbitrariness and global horse-trading on which the agreement was ultimately based (Reiner and Jacoby, 1997; Najam and Sagar, 1998). Even though the European Union has chosen a framework of burden sharing amongst its own members on the argument of equity and fairness, the Kyoto regime *as a whole* is devoid of a basis in equity and emanates, instead, from the basis of stated willingness and political expediency. For example, there is no clear reason *a priori* why the Kyoto Protocol willed a target of 7% below the base year emissions for the United Kingdom, 6% for Japan and 0% for New Zealand. The lack of a clear and predictable formula or basis for emissions reductions not only sets a bad precedent for the future but leaves the developing countries without any clue about the basis on which they will be required to enter the regime at some future, unspecified date. Developing countries themselves must bear at least part of the responsibility for this. By resisting any discussion of future developing country targets, they effectively abdicated the opportunity to influence the Kyoto formula and, more importantly, the precedent it has set for the future trajectory of the regime.

The abandonment of the equity principle—particularly in regards to the least developed countries (LDCs) and in the context of the related principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’—is of grave concern to the south. The regime’s loss of interest in the principle of equity and responsibility only encourages the abuse of the principle by its members. Indeed, the essence of the equity-in-climate-policy argument was turned on its head by the US Congress (Byrd-Hagel Reolution, 1997), which bemoaned the “disparity of treatment between Annex I Parties and Developing Countries” in terms of emission requirements and demanded equity of a different kind by resolving that the US Congress would not approve any agreement that would “mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period.” From this logic, the disparity between the average American who emits just under 20 t of carbon dioxide per year while the average Indian emits less than 1 t and the average Chinese around 1.34 t, becomes unimportant while that between a US that is required to reduce emissions and a China that is not becomes paramount. From a southern perspective, as the desire for efficiency overwhelms both equity and responsibility, the distinction between ‘luxury’ and ‘survival’ emissions is lost and any discussion of global or generational fairness becomes all but mute (Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Najam and Sagar, 1998).

On the second issue, the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; see especially Working Group II report) has suggested that even if the Kyoto Protocol is implemented in full, the impacts of global climate change will start being felt within the next few decades and that **the most vulnerable communities and countries are those which are already the poorest and least able to adapt to these changes**. This is because the impact of climatic events is not only a function of the intensity of the event but of the resilience of communities, the poorest communities tend

also to be the least able to adapt (Downing et al., 1996). The threat is especially pressing for the least developed countries and the small island developing states (SIDS), where any economic development they may be able to achieve in the next few decades is in real danger of literally being swept away due to human induced climate change. In the past, climatic hazards such as floods, cyclones and droughts may have been attributable to nature alone; in the future they are likely to have a component that is human induced. More importantly, it is also clear that the past contribution of these countries to the climate change problem is miniscule. In this regards, much is made of the fact that emissions from developing countries is growing with their development and that somewhere in the next two decades the total emissions from all currently developing countries would equal the total emissions from all currently industrialized countries. Although stylized, this is factually correct. However, it needs also to be noted even in such a scenario the vast bulk of the global population would still be living in developing countries, and each individual in the north would still be emitting far more proportionally than their individual counterparts in the south. In essence, the citizens of the north will continue to remain disproportionately responsible for global emissions well into the future, despite whatever growth in emissions might happen in the south over the next few decades. The result is that those who have been least responsible for creating the crisis are, and are likely to remain, most at risk by its ravages (Rayner and Malone, 1998; Banuri and Sagar, 1999).

The sixth COP at Bonn did agree to set up a number of funds including a Climate Change Fund for capacity building and transfer technology, and the LDC Fund to assist LDCs in climate change adaptation (Huq, 2002). While the intent of these funds is noble, it is difficult to place too much faith in their potential, because: (a) they are voluntary, (b) they are to be managed via the still-controversial global environmental facility (GEF) which has inspired little confidence in the developing countries because its governance and agenda remains northern-dominated, and (c) they remain poorly funded (Huq and Sokona, 2001). Similarly, the solution proposed in the Kyoto Protocol—participation in carbon trade via the clean development mechanism (CDM)—is unlikely to benefit the poorest countries, because they are not positioned or likely to attract private sector funding in any case (Agarwal et al., 1999). It is quite conceivable that the CDM will follow the path of foreign direct investment—the much-trumpeted benefits will accrue to a handful of the larger developing countries, leaving the bulk of the south on the side-lines of the global carbon market (Banuri and Gupta, 2000).

Finally, and flowing directly from the above, is the concern that the so-called ‘flexibility mechanisms’ of the Kyoto Protocol have turned it into a **global carbon trade regime that could distract from the original mandate of the UNFCCC**—i.e. the stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse concentrations. Significant problems with the Kyoto regime—including the issue of ‘low hanging fruit’ (whereby, the flexibility mechanisms will allow northern countries to ‘buy off’ the easiest reductions from the south leaving the developing countries saddled with more difficult and more costly reductions which they will have to make themselves at a later date); trades in ‘hot air’ (implying that Kyoto targets can be met with very minimal real emission reductions because of involuntary reductions that predate Kyoto, particularly in terms of the emission collapse that had accompanied the economic and political collapse of the former Soviet bloc); the exclusion of poorer countries and marginal groups, and the inadequacy of the Kyoto targets—have long been known and highlighted (see, for example, Malakoff, 1997; Najam and Page, 1998; Sokona et al., 1998; Agarwal et al., 1999; Banuri and Sagar, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Banuri and Gupta, 2000; Müller, 2002a). These lingering concerns were tempered by the belief that despite all the holes in it, the Protocol was a step in the right direction. However, it was and remains quite clear that the problems inherent in the Protocol will need to be somehow addressed, and soon. Moreover, the concessions made

in the last two COPs (especially on the issue of sinks) and the absence of the world's largest carbon emitter from the regime have made an already inadequate agreement all the more inadequate (Najam, 2001).

Most importantly, there is a danger that Kyoto has now become so much of a mechanism for managing global carbon trade that the issue of emission cuts for atmospheric carbon stabilization could be neglected, or at least delayed. The concern is that the emphasis on carbon trading solutions can distract and delay the difficult decisions that major emitters have to take in order to reduce their longer-term emissions; something that will most likely need to be done to achieve ultimate stabilization goals. This concern is urgent for the most vulnerable coastal countries for whom the delay in actual emissions cuts could have dire consequences; especially if the much touted flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol fail to deliver the expected benefits of carbon trading. For the emitter countries of Annex 1, it makes full sense to pin their hopes on a successful global market in carbon trade; for low-lying LDCs most vulnerable to climate change, the possibility of failure, even if remote, is both unacceptable and unimaginable.

3. Southern interests

While the south's concerns about the climate regime have evolved as the Kyoto Protocol has taken shape, the longer-term interests of the developing countries have remained relatively unchanged over the last decade or longer. While specific (and generally shorter-term) interests of particular countries and regions vary, the key interests of the south as a whole can be characterized within three categories:

- The creation of a predictable, implementable and equitable architecture for combating global climate change that can stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gasses within a reasonable period of time, while giving all nations a clear indication of their current and future obligations based on their current and future emissions.
- Enhancing the capacities of communities and countries to combat and respond to global climate change, with particular attention on adaptive capacity that enhances the resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable communities.
- The efforts to combat global climate change and the pursuit of sustainable development are two sides of the same coin. For either process to work, each must reinforce the other. To be at all meaningful, any global climate regime must have sustainable development as a central goal—at the declaratory as well as operational levels. With climate change, sustainable development becomes an untenable proposition; with sustainable development, communities and people become more resilient and better able to adapt to climatic and other changes in their environment.

Let us explore each of these interests separately.

Most environmental issues are long-term issues. Climate change is particularly so. The test of any climate regime is not simply what it will or will not do in the next few years, but also what it is likely to achieve over the next many decades, even centuries. Any policy architecture put into place today is likely to remain with us for a very long time (Jacoby et al., 1998). It is, therefore, very important that **the policy architecture we construct is robust enough to stand the political as well as the climatic tests of time**. The Kyoto Protocol, even though it is a step in the right direction, leaves much to be desired in terms of its implications for long-term policy (Cooper, 1998). Moreover, as discussed, the arbitrariness of the Kyoto targets and the lack of any objective basis for their selection leaves the countries

of the world—developing as well as industrialized—largely directionless on what might be expected of them in the future (Najam and Sagar, 1998). The architecture of the climate regime is, of course, still evolving and the Kyoto schema remains open to future change; especially if it remains mired in the political problems it now finds itself in. Arguably, a certain flexibility is already built into the Protocol's design and there is an expectation that it will evolve and mature both in terms of its basic structure and its allocation formula. It is worthwhile, then, to start thinking about the possible direction of such an evolution.

In terms of developing country interests, a more robust regime architecture would be one that defines its targets not in terms of symbolic short-term measures, but long-term atmospheric stabilization; which gives all countries a clear signal on what is likely to be expected of them in the future; which is based on clear and objective principles derived directly from the UNFCCC; and which is seen to be fair and equitable by all countries, north and south. This should not be read as a call for the abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol; rather, this is to build on the Kyoto promise by returning to UNFCCC basics. One potentially useful approach—although by no means without its own complications—is to move towards a per capita emission targets and a 'contraction and convergence' policy scenario aimed at atmospheric stabilization in the post-Kyoto phase (Agarwal et al., 1999; Meyer, 1999). Even if such targets are 'adjusted' on some mutually accepted bases—for example, economic output per unit of carbon, climatic zones, population density, etc.—they could lead to a more transparent and predictable regime that sends clear signals to all countries about the type of behavior that would reduce the regulatory burden on them over time. Moreover, such targets could be applied to all countries, north and south, thereby responding to the US demand for treating all countries equally and doing away with the 'class' structure of the current regime. Instead of a convoluted system of arbitrary percentage cuts for different countries, having a standard global emissions budget linked directly to the atmospheric stabilization would not only be more elegant and equitable but also more manageable in the long-term. Indeed, such a system could be a first step towards a more meaningful clustering of related agreements around a broader regime for all issues related to the atmospheric commons (Najam, 2000, 2003).

Moving to the second issue, 'capacity building', much like technology transfer, has been a much abused term in the rhetoric of climate policy. Both north and south reiterate by rote the importance of building capacity, yet neither has shown much willingness to invest meaningfully in doing so (Banuri and Sagar, 1999). In introducing the twin concepts of 'adaptive' and 'mitigative' capacity (by working groups II and III, respectively) the third assessment of the IPCC (2001) has made a significant contribution to the policy discourse by outlining what types of capacities are required, by whom, and when. The most pressing challenge in this regard is to **strengthen the social, economic and technical resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable against extreme climatic events**. The priority must be on those countries that are climatically most vulnerable as well as economically impoverished and therefore unable to 'cope' or 'adapt' with sudden and significant climatically induced disasters. This highlights the need to focus on issues of adaptation, especially in LDCs and SIDs where the threat of climate change is more immediate and intense while the ability to adapt is least developed (Huq and Sokona, 2001). As mentioned, COP-6 has already made a rather symbolic gesture in this direction by setting up a set of voluntary funds. However, there continues to be significant uncertainty about how much money will be available to these funds and how it will be used (Huq, 2002). The next step must be to fund these initiatives and to set up clear priorities for their use; depending on how large these funds are and how they use their endowments, they could be an important step towards aligning the climate change regime towards sustainable development.

While the developing country interest in capacity enhancement is self-evident, the new element is our growing understanding of *where* capacity needs to be enhanced and *what* capacities need to be supported and strengthened. In short, the capacity to adapt to climatic impacts—i.e. social, economic and technical resilience—is needed most desperately where the vulnerabilities are the most pronounced; i.e. at the local and community levels (Bohle et al., 1994; Ribot et al., 1996; Burton, 1997; Rayner and Malone, 1998; Downing and Bakker, 1999). However, effective capacity building at this level will require rethinking both *how* we do capacity building and *whom* we do it with. The shift towards strengthening the social, economic and technical resilience of vulnerable local communities will come from working directly with civil society and community organizations (Banuri and Najam, 2002). This will be more difficult as well as more expensive. However, this is an investment that can have payoffs both for climate change and for sustainable development; with each reinforcing the other.

This brings us to the final, overarching, and enduring interest of the south in the pursuit of sustainable development. Yet, sustainable development must not be seen *only* as a southern interest. It is neither an opposition to the interests of the north, nor to the goals of the global climate regime. As the most recent IPCC assessment (IPCC, 2001) has made clear, the supposed dichotomy between the global of climate policy and sustainable development policy is false (also see Munasinghe, 2000). **Combating climate change is vital to the pursuit of sustainable development; equally, the pursuit of sustainable development is integral to lasting climate change mitigation.** The pursuit of sustainable development is a clearly stated goal of both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (see, for example, the preamble and Articles 2 and 3 of UNFCCC and Articles 2 and 10 of the Kyoto Protocol). Yet, there has been a hesitancy from those operating in the ‘climate arena’ to earnestly deal with sustainable development. While the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC has included a chapter linking the two, the linkage is far from integrated into the bulk of the report (IPCC, 2001). The issue remained one of considerable contention during the drafting of the Third Assessment Report and subsequent attempts to initiate a special IPCC report on climate change and sustainable development were foiled after heated debate within the IPCC. In short, although climate change and sustainable development were nominally included in the Third Assessment Report because of developing country pressure, it is still far from integrated into the climate change debate. While it is fair to celebrate the fact that sustainable development is now on the IPCC agenda and has made progressively greater inroads with each successive IPCC assessment, the incorporation of sustainable development concerns into climate policy remains far from complete.

The 1992 Rio Earth Summit clearly placed sustainable development as a common interest of all countries, developing as well as industrialized; a common interest around which related north–south bargains could then be built on other issues, including climate change. Unfortunately, this has not yet happened. The recently concluded World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) has tried to reinstate the concept to its intended place at the center of all environmental policy. A recent survey of more than 250 experts and practitioners from 71 countries rated climate change as the second most important issue (after poverty eradication) in terms of achieving sustainable development (Najam et al., 2002). It is time that those involved in climate policy recognize that sustainable development is similarly important to their goals. The climate regime will be a stronger regime if it forcefully re-establishes its links with sustainable development; it will certainly get more support from the developing countries if it does. Ignoring sustainable development’s importance to climate policy may or may not impact the future of sustainable development but will nearly certainly adversely impact the future of the global climate regime. Stated most simply, sustainable development is needed because it can provide the conditions in which climate policies can be best implemented (Munasinghe, 2000; Beg et al., 2002).

4. Next steps for climate negotiations

Five years down the road from Kyoto, and with the prospects of the Protocol coming into force finally inching towards reality, is there an opportunity to now move into a next phase of negotiation that could revitalize the global climate regime by expanding its intents and contents to incorporate developing country concerns and interests? Could a new climate bargain be struck which explicitly links the goals of combating climate change with those of sustainable development, designs a new and more inclusive architecture for the climate regime, and invests in meaningful capacity development for adaptation and societal resilience in the poorest and most vulnerable communities and countries?

Yes, it can. But only if governments, academics and activists from the south take the lead in actively enabling such change.

The lead for such a realignment of the climate debate will have to come from the governments of the south since they are the principal demanders of such change (Najam and Page, 1997; Sagar and Kandlikar, 1997; Banuri and Gupta, 2000; Sokona and Denton, 2001). Once the task of bringing the Kyoto Protocol into force is completed, we will have to start thinking about what is going to follow the Protocol. Developing countries, which have essentially sat on the side-lines of the climate discussions for the last 10 years, now have both the opportunity and the responsibility to become more active in, if not become the leaders of, this discussion.

The world's attention is already directed towards them and seeks, what the US has called, 'meaningful developing country participation' in the climate regime. If the south remains as quiet and uninterested in this new phase as it was in the previous one, participation is likely to be 'thrust' upon it in terms of mandatory targets of some sort. On the other hand, developing country governments could seize this opportunity to change the terms of the discussion and of the regime by reopening the questions of regime architecture, of investments in adaptation, of historical responsibility, of equity-in-climate-policy, and of meaningfully linking sustainable development policy to climate policy. The task of devising and putting forth proposals that match these interests lies squarely with negotiators from the south. Developing country negotiators will do well to start thinking about these issues. In the past, the south has been routinely reactive in its environmental negotiations with the north; far better at spelling out how existing regimes fail to meet their interests than at redefining those regimes (Najam, 1995). It is well past time that they change their strategy; the next phase of climate negotiations provide them with at least an opportunity to try.

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