

**OPERATIONALIZING THE DUTCH GREAT LAKES REGIONAL STRATEGY
A DISCUSSION PAPER**

FINAL VERSION

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This is a discussion paper written by outside consultants. The opinions expressed here are the consultants' only and do not reflect official Dutch assessments or policy .

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INTRODUCTION

THE GREAT LAKES REGIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES

1. The 1999 African policy of the Government of the Netherlands states that,

The priority objectives for Africa are:


1. *promoting peace, security, and stability through conflict management and prevention;*
2. *promoting good governance and good policy;*
3. *promoting capacity development of people and organizations (including combating HIV/AIDS);*
4. *promoting pro-poor growth through support for the private sector in Africa;*
5. *managing the environment and natural resources (including water).*

2. The “Great Lakes Concept Note” of December 2003, which has been used as the basis for this discussion paper, elaborates on these policy objectives, applying them to the concrete politics of the region. According to this document and given the problems of the region, the priorities of the Dutch *regional policy* are objectives 1, 2, and 5, while *bilateral relations* with “partner” countries (Rwanda and Uganda) ought to focus on objectives 2, 3, and 4.

3. In applying the Dutch African policy objectives to the Great Lakes region, the “Concept Note” elaborates on their contents, giving them specific meanings, including the following:

- It is repeatedly stated that the overall goal of the Great Lakes regional policy is “*promoting peace and stability;*”
- Given this overall goal, the primary objective must therefore be focused on security and conflict management / prevention;
- The second objective on good governance / policy apparently refers to efforts to improve the state’s capacity to govern effectively (i.e. via programs promoting democracy, transparency, anti-corruption, etc.), whereas developing civil society and private sector capacity is seemingly part of the third and fourth objectives (organizational capacity development, and pro-poor growth / private sector development, respectively);
- The third objective (capacity development) cannot be considered in the same manner as the others, since capacity development is likely to be included as a component in every other objective;
- In the Great Lakes context, the fifth objective of the Dutch African policy (management of natural resources) addresses the so-called “illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC,” along with more classic examples of natural resource and environmental management. However, the primary reason why the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC is raised in the Concept Note is not because of the long-term regional ecological effects (although there may well be many), but rather the impact on peace and stability. From our point of view, these two issues are radically different in their nature and goals, with the illegal exploitation of natural resources closely related to objectives 1 and 2 (peace and governance) rather than objective 5 (management of natural resources). For the purposes of this report, we will split objective 5 in two: Chapter II will deal with the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, and Chapter III will deal with the sustainable management of natural resources and environment in the Great Lakes.

Therefore, when translated into a “solution hierarchy” as presented in the diagram below, the Dutch Great Lakes policy has the overall goal of peace and stability, to be reached through five objectives, which in turn will be fed by a sixth objective (capacity development). Two objectives (represented by dots in the diagram) have been temporarily excluded from the regional program, while the objective on governance focuses solely on the state’s ability to govern rather than on civil society or the private sector.



4. Our terms of reference request us to produce a discussion paper that will help the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs convert the regional policy presented in the Concept Note into an operational program. Our point of departure will thus be the three objectives to be covered by the forthcoming regional program. We will indicate evident inter-linkages between these objectives as we go along. Each chapter begins with an analysis presenting what we consider to be the major factors for operationalizing the objective. We then move on to a set of propositions on potential priorities based on a number of criteria, including:

- high impact activities
- opportunities the donor community has missed or failed to invest in sufficiently
- goodness of fit with the Great Lakes Concept Note
- particular capacity or comparative advantage of the Netherlands.

These propositions should be considered as a menu among which the Dutch can choose, based on internal political and institutional factors we cannot master.

Even though the fourth objective on pro-poor economic growth has been excluded from the regional program and was thus outside of our mandate, there are pro-poor economic measures that we believe merit consideration for a regional program aimed at peace and stability because of their potentially significant peace-building pay-offs. Even within ordinary bilateral partner country programs (or for that matter, with non-partner countries), it is possible to implement these measures with a regional perspective. The promotion of pro-poor economic growth does, after all, have a strong regional dimension. The economies of all the Great Lakes countries, including Tanzania, are deeply interlinked. Large amounts of regional trade, and to a lesser extent investment, have been a defining feature of the region for many decades if not centuries; these regional economies have persisted, although to a lesser degree, even under conditions of war and instability. Where trade is reduced, it hurts both sides of the trading relation: the dramatic

reduction in food trade between Maniema and Burundi, for example, or between Masisi and Rwanda, has hurt all sides, in all countries. We therefore took the initiative to make a few propositions that seem to fall under the more traditional pro-poor economic programming realm. These are presented in Annex 1.

THE GREAT LAKES REGIONAL PROGRAM SCOPE AND GENERAL STRATEGY

5. Geographically, this paper focuses foremost on the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda -- the four countries most deeply involved in each other's wars and identified as the Great Lakes nucleus in the Concept Note. However, although we do not refer much to Tanzania, it is addressed in some chapters because of its significant involvement in the dynamics of the Great Lakes.

6. What does the notion of a regional program entail? Conceptually, a regional strategy refers to three types of interventions, all of which are discussed in this report :

Type A: actions that are undertaken on the regional level to address trans-border matters or dynamics through existing or newly created regional organizations or ad-hoc regional mechanisms, such as free trade agreements, trans-border environmental matters, international security, and the like;

Type B: actions that are undertaken within several countries in parallel, whose design and implementation are a function of regional dynamics, such as the current MDRP program;

Type C: actions that are undertaken within several countries in parallel to address national problems that share common characteristics, as well as actions with national aims that may have an indirect impact on regional dynamics--including actions that employ regional approaches such as regional exchanges and horizontal learning activities. A pro-poor national program launched in parallel with a regional exchange would be an example of this third type.

One may therefore view the propositions set out in this report through the lens of this typology:

CHAPTER I: SECURITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, PROPOSITIONS

- I.1 Help build a new regional security architecture through the regional conference process (Type A)*
- I.2 Help build network to plan for peace (Type B)*
- I.3 Support community-based solutions to spoilers*
 - I.3.1 Support community conflict resolution mechanisms (Type C)*
 - I.3.2 Support community-based self-defense apparatus (Type C)*
 - I.3.3 Decrease access to natural resources (Type B)*
 - I.3.4 Support well-funded and well-targeted DDRRR (Type B)*
 - I.3.5 Enforce arms embargoes (Type A)*
 - I.3.6 Develop "at home" legislation*
 - I.3.7 Increase diplomatic pressures on states sponsoring spoilers (Type B)*
- I.4 Cautiously engage in security sector reform (SSR) programs (Type B)*

CHAPTER II: EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE DRC PROPOSITIONS

- II.1 Gradually integrate violent entrepreneurs into an acceptable exploitation regime (Type C)*

- II.2 Create local/regional development funds (Type C and A)*
- II.3 Create a fund management trusteeship: the External Compliance Monitoring Group (Type C and A)*

CHAPTER III: NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT PROPOSITIONS

- III.1 Select environment projects with the highest political pay-off (Type B and C)*
- III.2 Anchor the regional environment program in civil society (Type C)*

CHAPTER IV: GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GOOD POLICY PROPOSITIONS

- IV.1 Promote alternatives to rapid post-conflict elections (Type C)*
- IV.2 Conduct a long-term regional project of strengthening civil society (Type C)*
- IV.3 Work with States to create incentives for collective action (Type C)*
- IV.4 Create donors' conditions propitious to the emergence of a stronger civil society (Type C)*
- IV.5 Provide diplomatic pressures (Type C)*
- IV.6 Conduct a regional action-research to improve rule of law (Type C)*
- IV.7 Conduct a regional action-research on minority rights (Type B)*

ANNEX 1: PRO-POOR GROWTH PROPOSITIONS

- Proposition 1 Develop trans-border economic projects (Type A)*
- Proposition 2 Promote dialogue on pro-poor regional trade and investment agreements (Type A)*
 - 2.4 Forging new linkages*
 - 2.5 Strengthening the capacities of civil society actors*
 - 2.6 Advocating for pro-poor growth in high-level policy-making fora*
- Proposition 3 Launch labor-intensive employment programs (Type C)*
- Proposition 4 Provide block grants to highly decentralized partners*

7. Are there any such regional programs already in existence in the Great Lakes? There is a growing understanding nowadays among the donors' community that, *"without regional planning and participation, it will be impossible to have enduring solutions to crises that have engulfed the political landscape of the Great Lakes region. This is why a regionally-sensitive peace-building program which enables security and development actors to act coherently and in a mutually supportive way is so critical: for peace to be achieved, the interlinked economic and security dimensions of the conflict must be dealt with through integrated strategies."* Very few donor countries, however, have as yet developed such an explicit, integrated, or operationally-relevant regional policy. Belgium's 2001 regional policy document has been gathering dust in a drawer for years, and while people told us that SIDA has such a policy as well, nobody managed to show it to us. The Dutch seem therefore to be quite innovative in their attempt to operationalize a regional policy into a regional program.

8. The inability of donors to convert good intentions into operational programs may be partly due to the following causes, which will have to be dealt with by the Dutch in its current process:

- Contrary to bi-lateral programs which have well-identified partners, regional programs lack clear institutional anchors. Indeed, for national policies, the obvious institutional partners are governments, of course, as well as local civil societies. In the Great Lakes region, however, there is no evident institutional anchoring for a regional policy: regional inter-state organizations, which would be the preferred partners, are absent or extremely weak, while regional civil society networks, although more advanced than their inter-state counterparts, are just emerging. The Netherlands can support regional inter-state organizations if and when they (re)-emerge, but this typically takes a great deal of time (the Nile Basin Initiative for example, has been discussed for more than 10 years and still has no agreed-upon policy). In addition, there is often a justified feeling that many of these organizations risk being little more than paper and per diem producing machines: black holes in which money disappears with little tangible output. On the other hand, the situation of regional civil society is evolving very positively: a new set of regional grassroots organizations and women's organizations are gradually emerging. The main challenge is how to strengthen these networks and work with them without destroying them under the weight of outside money, expectations, and requirements. We will come back to this later in Chapter IV.
- There is also a difficulty in positioning the regional program alongside the existing bi-lateral programs. The boundaries between what should be in the regional program and what should be in the bi-lateral programs are not always clear, particularly for Type B and C interventions.
- In addition, choices need to be made: a regional program cannot emerge from piling up activities and programs on top of already heavy national workloads. The 2003 Great Lakes Concept Note contains many valuable insights and constitutes a stimulating first step on the difficult road of developing a regional program. Ultimately, however, it falls short of its aims, for it does not contain many limitations and choices; somehow, after prioritizing three objectives, all other areas of foreign and development policy are re-opened for engagement at the end of the Concept Note, as are all possible partners and modalities for intervention. This is understandable: diplomats do not like to close off doors and options; flexibility is always important in good policy making; and, in any case, all issues are related and, it often seems, of the highest priority. Yet, choices need to be made: it is simply impossible, financially and organizationally, for the Netherlands to be active in all sectors.
- Finally, adding a regional program to existing bi-lateral ones is not as simple as adding a new bi-lateral program: it needs specific institutional adjustments. Indeed, contrary to bi-lateral programs which have well-known, fine-tuned management processes in place, regional program management processes have not yet been defined, particularly when regional programs must emerge out of a consensus between bi-lateral actors. To help move forward towards a better mastery of these institutional requirements, we raise some questions on this issue in Chapter V, as we also try to identify the next steps that ought to be taken for the launch of the Great Lakes regional program to be effective.

9. The Dutch 1999 African policy recognizes that *“the nature of the problems and the severity of the situation in Africa now call for a more cohesive deployment of political instruments and development resources ... Africa’s problems require a holistic approach. Each must be tackled through political, economic, diplomatic and security means as well as through the provision of aid. The Netherlands will intervene at different levels and with a range of different partners.”* The Concept Note also explains that the Dutch policy will seek to connect to local initiatives and organizations in the region, whether in the governmental or non-governmental sector, *“since in some African countries the state has limited capacity and lacks legitimacy in many areas,*

partnerships should be sought with non-governmental actors where possible.”. In other words, “a flexible multi-actor strategy will be adopted, which may lead to different aims and different partners in different countries and areas,” depending on local problems and opportunities.

We agree that any regional strategy must be flexible, adapted to local circumstances, must combine the tools of both foreign policy and development assistance, and must include non-state actors in order to succeed. In fact, we believe that working with non-state actors is a critical factor of success for the Great lakes regional program, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters. A regional strategy that rigidly limits actions and partners to an a priori determined list is bound to be counterproductive. The crucial challenge, though, will be to remain flexible, while at the same time maintaining a strategic and regional vision. Also, the Dutch actors on the ground must avoid falling into the trap of micro-level, ad-hoc activities. This means that the Netherlands should probably focus on a few identical issues in all the countries of the region, in order to get some specialized knowledge and a significant added value over what other donors already do. This also means that good analysis is required at all times, as well as close cooperation between diplomacy and development, for they both work on different variables of the same complex problems at the same time.

10. Finally, we feel we must also raise the question of values. Let’s face it: there are simply not enough paying jobs (park guardians, road construction, infrastructure reconstruction and labor-intensive works more generally) to reintegrate all ex-combatants, so monetary gain alone (making peace pay) will not guarantee peace and stability in the region. Similarly, there are not enough peacekeepers or soldiers or even community defense forces around to protect all people from all possible attacks. At the end of the day, one of the main constraints on the use of violence in all societies lies in the values and rules by which people live -- as members of communities of birth, of residence, of faith, of choice. Throughout the region, these value systems have been severely hurt – the result of decades of neo-patrimonialism, poor leadership, violence, whipped-up ethnic antagonism, divide-and-rule policies, and more violence.

And yet, communities still survive, values still persist, and mechanisms of authority still exist. These are in a constant state of flux, threatened one instant, reaffirming themselves the next. As outsiders, we cannot find solutions for people – they must do it themselves. They will do so by building on their own values, norms, systems, processes, authorities, and so on. We should be able to work gently and respectfully with these – which means a willingness to work with different types of organizations than we are used to working with in the practice of development, as well as taking some risks and taking on a more flexible, long-term approach to working with them. This is patchy, leopard-skin style work, where instances of progress coexist with instances of resistance, and the aim is to support the forces of progress, help them extend, and change some of the cost-benefit calculations. We need to trust local people, and stay with them for the long haul.

CHAPTER I. SECURITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT:

10. *There exists a deep mutual distrust between the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. And for good reason--each country has allowed rebels to operate from their territory in order to threaten neighboring states. Yet, **the** key security problem in the region is not fundamentally one of states competing militarily with each other, but rather states being undermined and challenged continually by internal civil wars in the first place, and these wars systematically spilling over into neighboring territories and/or being backed by neighboring countries. These civil wars, however, are closer to “warlord competition” of the Middle Ages or modern gang warfare which captures an often unwilling population into it, rather than civil wars with a strong ideological dimension and popular support.*

11. *The second crucial security problem is the existence of spoilers – warlords who do not consider themselves bound by peace agreements and seek to endanger accords through the use of violence. Spoilers are an especially intractable problem for the DRC, but are also a key issue in Burundi; ten years ago they played a crucial role in Rwanda’s genocide. The third crucial security problem is the existence of unprofessional and predatory armies -- part and parcel of predatory regimes, but often escaping them.*

12. *Propositions of possible Dutch interventions for sustainable solutions to these security problems are:*

I.1 Help build a New Regional Security Architecture through the Regional Conference process (Type A of regional interventions).

I.2 Help build a network of people to plan for peace (Type B).

I.3 Support community based solution to spoilers (All Types)

I.3.1 Support Community Conflict Resolution mechanisms (Type C)

I.3.2 Support Community-based self-defense apparatus (Type C)

I.3.3 Decrease access to natural resources (Type B)

I.3.4 Support well-funded and well-targeted DDRRR (Type A)

I.3.5 Enforce arms embargoes (Type A)

I.3.6 Develop “at home” legislation

I.3.7 Increase diplomatic pressures on states sponsoring spoilers (Type B)

I.4 Cautiously engage in SSR programs (Type C).

Even if they are not as directly linked to the Regional Conference as proposition I.1, propositions I.2 to I.4 must also be implemented in close relationship with the Regional Conference process and results.

ANALYSIS:

13. It is an understatement to say that the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi inhabit a world of deep mutual distrust. Rwanda and Uganda have launched two rebellions in the DRC in the last decade, and both countries have deployed their military to occupy huge portions of the DRC for extended periods. Even today there is a feeling throughout much of the DRC that Rwanda and

perhaps Uganda still have military on Congolese territory or at least continue to exert immense influence through proxy militias. Rwanda and Uganda, once allies, have fought each other three times in Kisangani, and in 2003 had troop buildups on each other's border; opponents to the regime are welcomed with open arms in the other country. Burundian rebels attack from the territories of the DRC and Tanzania; in the past, they did so from Rwanda as well. The remnants of those who carried out the Rwandan genocide have long roamed freely in the DRC, receiving support from Kinshasa. And so on, and so on. The Great Lakes region seems to be the archetype of a Hobbesian world at the international level.

14. And yet, this is not the core problem; rather, there are three other underlying security problems that lead to this international instability. Indeed, *the* key security problem in the Great Lakes region is not fundamentally one of states competing militarily with each other in an anarchic international arena, but one of states being undermined and challenged over and over by internal civil wars –and of these civil wars spilling over into neighboring territories and/or being nurtured and used by neighboring countries and their international allies. The second crucial security problem is the existence of spoilers –armed groups that do not consider themselves bound by the peace agreement and seek to endanger it through the use of violence. The third problem is the existence of unprofessional and predatory armies -- part and parcel of predatory regimes, but often escaping them.

15. All these causes of insecurity, finally, are themselves the result of, and deeply embedded in, the deepest problem of the region, namely the pervasive ill governance and neo-patrimonialism that was legated to each country since independence and that has been developed to an unprecedented level since (“dysfunctional states” in the words of the Great Lakes Policy Note). This is a major linkage between security issues (first objective of the regional program) and the governance objective (second objective of the regional program); lasting progress on the security issue cannot be achieved without progress on the governance issue, which will be discussed further in Chapter IV.

Civil wars

16. Let us now look more closely at these civil wars, the prime root cause of insecurity in the region. All of the civil wars in the region display two crucial security dimensions.

17. The first dimension is the national one, i.e., several local armed forces, one of which is in control of the state, seeking to establish state control and a monopoly on the use of force over the entire national territory by victory or negotiations. Without the existence of this national dynamic, the wars in the Great Lakes region would be much shorter and the security issue in the region much easier to deal with. However, it is important to note that few of these armed forces, whether in control of the state or not, are considered by the population as mainly fighting for broad-based popular interests, but are rather considered as mainly fighting for their own private interests. These civil wars, mainly motivated by the desire to control natural resource rents or get access to state resources, are thus closer to “warlord competition” of the European Middle Ages (Skaperdas, 2002) seeking control of cities, or to gang warfare seeking control over markets for extortion (Mehleum, Moene and Torvik, 2001). This type of violence draws the unwilling population into it, unlike civil wars that tend to have a strong ideological dimension and popular support on both

sides. This particular feature of the civil wars in the Great Lakes has important consequences for those working for sustainable peace and stability. Peace and stability between warlords and gangs does not necessarily mean peace and security for the population in their everyday life; life under the dictatorships that preceded the civil wars was a bitter experience of that reality, as associations of Rwandan women reminded their government in early 2002 in refusing to contribute to the Rwandan war effort in the DRC.

18. Then, as a second dimension, all civil wars in the Great Lakes region, over and over, spill outside the borders of the warring state and/or are backed by neighboring states and their international allies who make alliances with warlords, thus adding an international dimension to the security issue in the region. To understand the severity of this dimension, it suffices to remember that the current presidents of both Rwanda and Uganda came to power in military campaigns launched from adjacent countries; the same holds for parts of the current coalition governments in Burundi and the DRC.

19. This analysis of the security issue in the Great Lakes, where national factors are placed at the forefront and external factors are secondary, diverges from most of the current analysis, particularly in the case of the DRC. Indeed, most analysts, whether Congolese or foreigners, explain the ongoing insecurity in the DRC as being mainly, if not solely, the result of outside invasions or external interventions (with most of their deep anger directed at Rwanda), with very few if any national factors. Logically, the solution following such an analysis is to work for the retreat of foreign troops, which should allow the country to return to the situation prevailing before the external intervention, assuming that this previous situation was characterized by peace, security and stability for the people. We strongly disagree with this analysis, which can produce disastrous effects in the search for sustainable peace and stability.

20. If civil wars in the Great Lakes are, in the first place, the result of national factors, then why have civil wars so systematically become internationalized and not simply stayed confined to national borders, as they have in many parts of the world? The Concept Note for the upcoming International Conference on Peace, Security, and Development in the Great Lakes repeatedly mentions “blood, cultural and linguistic ties” as the reason for the internationalization of civil war in the region. This is indeed important. Throughout the region, as a result of the artificial nature of the state boundaries drawn during colonization, as well as of subsequent migratory and refugee flows, there are strong cultural, ethnic, clan, and even family ties across borders. As a result, rebels can easily find refuge in neighboring countries with people with whom they have much in common and, at times, share a cause. Another result is that people often come to see neighboring countries as the mirror of their own, or reinterpret internal events in terms borrowed from the outside.

21. Another major reason why domestic civil wars systematically become international affairs in the Great Lakes lies in the deliberate actions of leaders who take advantage of these ties to create international dimensions to their national conflicts. All seem to live with a tit-for-tat approach, in which the maxim “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is the only basis for policy. As a result, there is a decades-old history in the region of countries financially and militarily supporting and protecting the rebel movements of their neighbors – who promptly return the favor, and so on, in a seemingly endless cycle. In addition, many are weak and poor states with porous borders: they are often simply incapable of controlling the flows of arms, people, and natural resources across their

borders, even if they wanted to. Moeller interestingly argues that this is because these countries are actually under-militarized, incapable of defending themselves. If they had bigger and stronger armies, capable of defending their borders, he argues, there would be more stability in the region, following the axiom that “strong fences make good neighbors.” While one can disagree with his notion that bigger armies are needed –especially when they remain predatory—his point is clear: military weakness is a crucial part of the problem. Related to this is the existence of regular and massive refugee flows, which create new economic, political, and social tensions for host nations, and present potentially destabilizing forces just over the border from the country of origin.

Spoilers

22. Spoilers are armed groups who do not consider themselves bound by a peace agreement and seek to endanger it through the use of violence. Spoilers are thus a peace negotiation phenomenon: there needs to be a negotiated peace process for spoilers to exist, for warlords to step out of the process. The presence of spoilers is one of the greatest problems in the Great Lakes, but on a very different scale from one country to another. Uganda for instance faces a rebellion which it has not wanted to solve diplomatically, though not a problem of spoilers as such in the absence of a peace agreement. Spoilers are an especially intractable problem for the DRC, and they are also present in Burundi.

23. There are two ways this is so in the DRC and Burundi. The first is the “warlord” characteristic of the ongoing civil wars in these countries. The lack of an ideological platform and popular support to these so-called civil wars allow many of these warlords to act as spoilers, and they may have good personal incentives to do so: they may feel excluded from the national peace process, have unsolved grievances that caused them to come into being in the first place, want to continue profiting from the abundant natural resources of the country, or simply not know how to live a different life. These spoilers also have plenty of opportunity considering the way natural resource exploitation allows them to pay for their arms, and the absence of major peacekeeping forces allows them to operate without fear of international confrontation.

The second reason spoilers is an intractable problem in the Great Lakes is that for the first time in the region’s history, some of the spoilers not only are backed by international allies, i.e., neighboring and Western states and international corporations, but can also be considered as their proxy agents, who regularly return to their sponsor to receive instructions and support. Therefore, behind their personal interests to remain spoilers lies their patrons’ agendas; patrons may instantly create a new warlord / spoiler when their previous clients happen to join the peace process without their authorization. Trying to solve the spoiler problem needs therefore to deal with the internal incentives to their appearance and reinforcement, as well as with the external factors.

Predatory armies

24. The last main challenge to establishing security in the Great Lakes is the presence of predatory armies, which are part and parcel of predatory regimes, but often, like Frankensteinian monsters, end up escaping them and become one of the many armed groups fighting for their own interests. It is evident that the latter also produces the former: a frequent reason for the emergence of civil war can be found in the predations inflicted by military forces, whether during peacetime

or preceding wars; in addition, the fact that militaries are predatory and generally unprofessional makes them much less effective at winning civil wars (the FAZ from the end of Mobutu's reign onwards was and is the ultimate example of this, but many argue that this also partly explains the incapacity of the UPDF to win the war in Northern Uganda).

25. Take Uganda, for instance, which is, after Tanzania, probably the least problematic case. Here is a military which Museveni formed in the bush and which continues to be viewed by many as his own personal army. Parliamentary oversight of the defense budget is almost nil. Museveni himself can hardly be considered a civilian, even if he recently quit the UPDF. It is unclear to what extent the army continues to be accountable even to Museveni. Many of the army's soldiers, from the top to the bottom, are active in plundering the Congo and the Uganda northern provinces, and it is not at all sure that Museveni, let alone his government, has complete control. In the meantime, as many as 30% of army forces are thought to be ghost soldiers, with officers picking up the salaries.

26. Still, there is in Uganda at least a sense that there is some sort of give and take between the army and the government. Parliament is trying to seize more control, the press is relatively free, and on occasion even senior people who have abused power have been pushed aside. But the challenges towards a professional and accountable army in Uganda are still enormous. And this is the easy case: Rwanda and the DRC, for example, are vastly more challenging situations, with the army even more deeply embedded in politics, almost no internal counter-power, structural links between the military and the economic sector--including in the ruthless and violent exploitation of natural resources in the DRC.

27. In the countries of the Great Lakes region, the military is one of the crucial, if not the exclusive, loci of power. Behind civilian facades, real power is hidden, usually in small groups of military and civilian people – often not the ones whose hands we shake in Ministries of Foreign Affairs, international conferences, etc. In the long run, modifying this is one of the most crucial challenges donors face, not so much for reasons of security as for reasons of governance. Military involvement in the illegal exploitation of natural resources reflects and exacerbates this dynamic, as it further renders the military – and especially individual top-brass -- independent of and unaccountable to any civilian or governmental oversight. In addition, military professional ethos, to the extent it still exists, decreases, as differences between top brass and ordinary soldiers increase, factionalism rises, and soldiers engage in petty crime.

PROPOSITIONS:

28. If the Great Lakes is the archetype of a Hobbesian world, then, as Hobbes suggested, the only way out lies in the creation of authorities and rules. Since the first cause of insecurity in the region is the existence of a series of domestic civil wars, there is no single national strategy for creating security and managing conflicts in the Great Lakes. Each context is different and a donor's analysis must be fine-tuned to ensure that 'model approaches' are not merely replicated across the region without regard to the specific conflict dynamics at play. Peace agreements or victories must be achieved, spoilers dealt with, big parts of armies demobilized, disarmed, and reintegrated and the remainder professionalized and better controlled, communities' physical and social

infrastructures reconstructed, etc. The tasks are daunting. How can it be achieved in the particular situation of the Great Lakes?

Proposition I.1 Towards a New Regional Security Architecture (Type A)

The need to promote a Regional Security Architecture and the opportunity offered by the Regional Conference process

29. Even if the international dimension of the conflicts in the Great Lakes is not the prime factor of insecurity in the region, it is now so deeply engrained in the conflicts that it is hard for peace actors to work on the first dimension so long as the international dimension is still in force. Working for security in the Great Lakes is therefore similar to a reverse engineering process: first remove the additional dimension and then work on its first one. A regional strategy for promoting security and conflict management in the Great Lakes must therefore address first the key international factors promoting conflict in the region.

30. The logical place for a donor government to start working on the international factor of the conflicts is to forge partnerships with existing regional organizations already addressing these issues. The problem is that no regional organization exists today that is representative of the entire Great Lakes region and has the capacity to establish a common security framework, like ECOWAS has done in West Africa or IGAD in the Horn. SADC is a weak guarantor of peace and security in the sub-region, as it is held captive to the political rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe, has intervened on one side in the Congo war, and does not include most states of the region. Both ECCAS and COMESA are institutionally weak and would be unable in the near future to operationalize anything of significance with regard to regional security, particularly since it falls outside their mandates. Uganda is party to both IGAD (which is leading the Sudan peace process and developing a conflict early warning and response mechanism for the Horn), and the EAC (which has led confidence-building measures, including joint military training and exercises among the Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan armies), but neither seems like an effective mechanism in the short run for dealing with problems far off in the Congo and in Burundi. Finally, even if the development of the AU common security mechanism is apparently well on track, there is still a long way to go before its operationalization and implementation. For these reasons, investing in a new regional organization with a security mandate could be smart. The region needs one.

31. But how to promote the creation of such a Regional Security Architecture in the current context? This is not something the Dutch government can make happen by itself; it can only facilitate the process. The upcoming Regional Conference on the Great Lakes offers an important opportunity though, since the creation of a new regional security architecture (“Stability Pact”) is a major aim of this Conference, and as indeed the Dutch are a key actor supporting the Conference. That said, the chances of success – of the countries creating such an architecture and actually living by its rules -- are not very high. There exists a profound lack of trust and common vision among the Burundian, Congolese, Ugandan, and Rwandan leadership. They seem to currently be locked in a Machiavellian world, where alliances are constantly changing in function of small advantages and big fears, where promises and agreements can at any time be abandoned for war and violence, where distrust and cheating are all-pervasive. Many of them benefit more from war

than from peace (we will deal with this in Chapter II), and often civilian leaders hardly control their militaries, or share the same predatory designs with them.

32. Before one can hope for defense and non-aggression pacts, institutional development, and actual joint operations and confidence-building, a common security vision must exist. To develop such a vision, good-faith negotiations must take place. While this is certainly one of the goals of the upcoming Conference, it is by no means assured that such a vision will be achieved--or if it were to be achieved, that it would be implemented. It is hoped that such a vision will arise from the process leading up to the conference, but the focus of the preparatory committees to date seems to have been national rather than regional. Parts of civil society are more dynamic and regionally-oriented at this time, but they may lack the knowledge and clout to have much of an impact on these highly sensitive matters (although, correctly so, the Conference organizers *are* seriously trying to include their voices).

Possible actions in preparation of the Regional Conference

33. Is there anything the Dutch Government can do in preparation for the Conference, beyond helping to fund its preparation? A number of people have suggested to us that the region absolutely needs some trusted actor to mediate between the key players in order to help lay the groundwork for the emergence of such a vision. The first step would consist of opening channels of communication, which could be done through initially confidential approaches by a small team of trusted outsiders, first acting as a go-between and then bringing key actors face to face. Perhaps the Netherlands could play such a facilitating role in the region, as it is now playing in Burundi between the FNL and the Burundian government. This fits with its self-description in the Great Lakes Concept Note, which states that “*the Netherlands is seen as a neutral and reliable partner who adopts an even-handed approach to the conflict dynamics.*” If it is true that the Netherlands possesses this reputation and network, we urge it to build upon this.

34. Once channels of communication are open, a facilitation team can provide technical support for the development of a common vision and program of action. Many of the people in power in the region lack knowledge of how to manage and implement confidence building measures, trans-border security mechanisms, protection of civilians (particularly women), etc. Confidential, high-quality, direct advice to the key people--prime ministers, ministers of defense, army top brass--can be of great help here. It would be useful to include women in the facilitation team to bring the specific preoccupations of women to the decisions makers’ attention. UNIFEM has experience in the region with bringing women and militaries together to talk about how women suffer at the hands of the military and how to stop it. Admittedly, this strategy will only work if the actors do want some form of regional security architecture, but lack the trust and knowledge to get there – a hypothesis which may not be correct, but should at least be tested (and, as we will discuss in other chapters, one can also work on creating incentives for them to actually want stability and peace). This is work that can start immediately, helping increase the chances that the Conference (still more than a half-year away, it now seems) will yield results. We are not remotely suggesting a formal envoy here, for this is too visible. A facilitative approach like the quiet diplomacy described above may fit the Netherlands better than a major, confrontational, public pressure/threat of conditionality one: the size of the Dutch budget is hardly sufficient to install enormous fear in

recipient countries—not even in Rwanda and Uganda, its partner countries, let alone in the other two.

Possible actions during and after the Regional Conference

35. Eventually, if and when a new regional security architecture starts taking shape (at the Conference or later), the Dutch government could provide financial support for its implementation. More importantly, the Netherlands could also become actively engaged in third-party verification mechanisms. Indeed, it seems evident that any durable solution to the security dilemma in the region will need to involve mechanisms in which neutral third parties monitor events on the ground, share intelligence, and develop any and all other mechanisms that may allow the signatories to an agreement to trust that cheating by the other parties is not taking place. The Great Lakes Concept Note suggests that the Netherlands could play a role in peace monitoring, together with local civil society (“*Ook zal steun aan vredeswaarneming worden overwogen, waarbij tevens zal worden gezien of een actieve rol voor het maatschappelijk middenveld kan worden weggelegd.*”) We strongly recommend this path, particularly if it is inclusive of civil society, and particularly women – since they have most to gain from security, as it may be the only path for people to place their own interests over those of the warlords and spoilers, thus opening the way to tackle the first dimension of the security problem. This will take time, and no doubt consist of numerous setbacks, but seeing the process through could make a crucial contribution to regional security.

Proposition I.2: Help build a network of people planning for peace (Type B)

36. Another action the Netherlands could do regarding regional security is working with people to plan ahead for what will follow at the end of the wars. It is not sure if the upcoming Conference will lead to more stability or not, or if that will come later; or if the current peace agreement will hold or not. What is sure, however, is that it is important to be able to act fast once opportunities of peace do emerge, to be ready to fill spaces for change that may open up with concrete actions that seek to solidify peace. Too often when such spaces emerge, nobody has a plan: it takes months to get going, lots of paperwork to be filled out, missions to be organized and meetings to be had, and in the meantime people remain stuck in a humanitarian aid delivery mode. This is a pity: much better preparation, in close connection to people in the ground, would serve everyone well. Such preparation should be done with civil society actors, including women, but also with governmental actors.

37. The Netherlands could advocate for (and invest in) a process such as IGAD’s Planning For Peace in Sudan. Planning for Peace has brought together networks of locally-based and international actors to construct a shared knowledge of peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction, and conflict management practices and principles particular to the Sudan. No similar initiative exists in the Great Lakes so far as we know. What makes this type of knowledge-building so important is that after major eruptions of violent conflict, immediate choices are made by national and international actors that carry long-term consequences; similarly, important opportunities for change are often missed under the pressure of emergency and chaos. Having a network of actors who share a joint vision and ethic can make a major difference for a region recovering from, or trying to prevent, violence and war.

38. It is here that it may be very important to specifically and intentionally reach out to women and their organizations: it is not necessarily that women suffer more than men during wars, or that they are innately more peaceful than men – rather, women’s experiences during and after wars are partly different from those of men, and their capacities and insights are important for reconstruction. If one starts dialogues and reflections with them early on, this will pay off in the long run. These women should preferably be well-connected to grassroots women organizations in order to avoid a situation whereby only urban realities are considered in the plan for peace.

39. If supporting the emergence of such networks in each country at war (currently DRC, Burundi and Uganda) is important, we think that part of the success of such networks lie in the fact that it should first be constructed on a scale that people feel they can control and manage. This means it is not necessarily at the national level, particularly in vast countries like the DRC and Uganda. In these two countries, war has been (and is still) evolving in a very different manner at the local level, even if they are occurring in a national framework of competition for state control. Even in Burundi, whose small size might lead one to consider a national scale network at first hand, war has been felt very differently in, say, the Ngozi area than in Bujumbura rural. The scars to be healed and the challenges faced by reconstruction and conflict management are very different at the local level. Such locally-based networks must take into account and be built upon existing peace-building initiatives and local institutions such as the “Barza Inter-communautaire” (presented in more detail below in paragraph 49) in North Kivu, Pole Institute interventions in Eastern DRC, the Bashingantahe institution in Burundi, etc ...

40. In an initial phase, such initiatives could take the form of trans-border networks linking communities and authorities living immediately across the borders and sharing the “blood, cultural and linguistic” ties. We can imagine such a network linking DRC communities of Ituri and North Kivu with Ugandan communities of the Western provinces, the DRC communities in North Kivu with Rwandan communities, the DRC communities in South Kivu with Burundian communities, etc. Later on, they can come together for larger-scale networking, if they feel the need and possess the strength.

41. These networks might need some capacity development, particularly in the areas of policy making and advocacy. Organizational capacity development refers however to the third objective of the African policy, which has been excluded from the Great Lakes regional policy. Nevertheless, it might be necessary to re-include part of this objective in the regional program if this proposition is selected, since some results related to it could not be produced without capacity development.

Proposition I.3 Support community based solutions to spoilers (Type C)

42. Normally, there are only two ways to deal with spoilers: entice them to join the peace agreement, or else coerce them through the use of force. Burundi is clearly continuing on its diplomatic path of inclusion, and there is hope that this slow process, already closely supported by the Netherlands, will eventually pay off by bringing the last remaining Burundian warlords in to the fold. Today, the issue of how to deal coercively with spoilers applies mainly to the DRC.

The need for new mechanisms

43. The problem for the DRC is that the only two mechanisms of coercion against spoilers, international peacekeeping forces or a strong national army, seem unlikely to work --and hence the prevailing pessimism about the future of the DRC peace. Indeed, it is highly unlikely there will ever be a sustained international troop presence in the Great Lakes of the sort we see today with NATO's intervention in Bosnia. MONUC is already the world's costliest current peacekeeping operation, and it is providing major support with DDRRR, but it has been unable (and initially not mandated) to coerce or destroy spoilers: the deployment of a full MONUC brigade in Ituri, for instance, has not made a significant security difference to populations living in rural areas. The number of international troops available is simply too small to police an area as vast as the DRC or even only the Kivus. One hears the idea of an African peacekeeping force bandied about -- African solutions to African problems -- but this is very far from reaching fruition in the Great Lakes.

44. The alternative mentioned is that the newly configured Congolese army will be able to provide local security and disarm spoilers. This too seems highly unlikely to occur in the near future. If Afghanistan is any model, military mergers of militias and warlords do not instantly become cohesive, effective fighting armies who forget their group interests overnight. In addition, the military effectiveness, professionalism, and esprit de corps of both the FAZ and the militia that are integrated into it range from low to abysmal: most seem to have been much better at looting civilians than at fighting war in an organized manner. The same would hold for the creation of a national police force composed of demobilized soldiers: apart from the problems of what it would take to train them and who would pay them, there exists widespread fear among Congolese that these young men would engage in the same sort of predatory behavior in which they engaged prior to being demobilized, and in which the Congolese army had been previously engaged for a long time. They have lived much of their lives in an environment where violence has been the sole means of authority. It may be overly optimistic to think just because they are now part of the state machinery they will protect the interests of communities to which they do not belong. More generally, a strong, efficient, state military machinery in a country like the DRC can not be created overnight -- it is a long-term endeavor, which, moreover, is of a political, and not a technical/military nature.

45. Hence, it seems the standard solutions to the spoiler problem in the DRC will not work, or at least will take a long time to work. Although both inclusion and coercion have been tried, both do not produce full results: the country is simply too weak, too endowed with natural resources easily accessible to spoilers, too neo-patrimonial, too subjected to outside intervention, and too internally divided. And yet, without security in the DRC, no sustainable progress will exist in the region. It is thus necessary to think further about the matter: can situations be created in which the cost-benefit analyses of spoilers move towards acquiescence with peace? Can incentive and disincentive structures be modified to induce an increasing numbers of spoilers to change their current behavior? (And also: how can communities be protected from predation in the meantime?)

46. The only ones who can truly get together to find the appropriate answer to this question and also provide local communities protection from those committed to violence are people with a stake in their own communities. But then, local actors have the same two choices available to them

as those confronting spoilers at the national level: they can either use negotiation with warlords to ensure their protection, or they can coerce these same actors through effective self-defense.

1.3.1 Support Community Conflict Resolution mechanisms

47. Community Conflict Resolution mechanisms continue to function, often successfully, throughout the DRC, and have significant potential in other Great Lakes countries as well (foremost Burundi and Uganda at this time).

48. Civil society has a first-hand interest in sustainable peace, stability and security. Very few civil society organizations profit from war and insecurity. In fact, most people do not. We are not romanticizing civil society or communities: certainly not all of them are at all times inclusive or representative, or indeed even non-violent. Yet, there is a major difference between them and warlords. For warlords, the dividends of war are themselves crucial -- they have an interest in perpetuating conflict. Civil society organizations, even in those instances where they are engaged in violence, have an interest in peace, albeit on their terms. This makes them more amenable to good-faith negotiation. Among civil society organizations, women's organizations have often a particular interest in peace, stability and security.

49. There are scores of examples of successful community-based mediation and conflict resolution initiatives in the Eastern Congo, the region that has been most hit by violence: the famous *Barza Inter-communautaire*, for example, in which "wise men" from all eight mutuals of "indigenous" communities in North Kivu are equally represented as a means to bring to an end the inter-communitarian clashes that have been ongoing since 1991. Together with other complementary initiatives in North Kivu, the Barza have been able to find peaceful and sustainable solutions to some conflicts and to promote peaceful coexistence. There has been no 'ethnic' violence in the Barza sphere of influence since 1997, despite regular attempts by one or another authority or armed group to spark new clashes. Moreover, partly as a result of the Barza work, there is now a trend among the displaced people to settle in multi-ethnic rather than mono-ethnic villages in North Kivu. Similarly, an international NGO, the Life and Peace Institute in Bukavu, has facilitated important dialogues between representatives (both traditional and modern civil society) from different ethnic groups, in which joint visions are created and follow-up action occurs. One criticism that is often heard about these initiatives is the usual absence of women in their midst. For instance, no woman is among the Barza "wise men," despite repeated requests by women's organizations. Refusals to comply with their demands are almost always made on the basis of "tradition": in tradition, conflict was not a subject females could address. Interestingly enough, many village-based initiatives to start discussions with warlords were launched by mothers who wanted their kidnapped daughters back, and many other initiatives involved women in information collection and in negotiations, with very positive results.

50. Supporting the organizations that facilitate such community conflict resolution work could be important, as well as the economic initiatives that come out of them. One example of the latter could be rapid-disbursement labor-intensive public work projects that allow combatants and other community members to ease the transition out of war economies. We present this more deeply in Annex 1.

1.3.2 Support Community-based self-defense apparatus

51. But community conflict resolution mechanisms may not be enough to solve the problem of spoilers. Bitter lessons learned in the past 10 years in Eastern DRC show that, if some spoilers may join the peace process as a result of negotiations, others only do so under coercion. Another lesson learned by the local people is that donors cannot do much about this: protection by the international community often comes too late (inquiries into disappearances or massacres do not change the fact of disappearance and massacre) and at the end of the day are rather toothless. The endangered community must thus rely on its own and add forceful actions to its negotiations. This is harder in every respect than the conflict resolution mechanism, but may be an alternative worth reflecting upon.

52. Under conditions of war such as those still prevailing in parts of the DRC, donors may then consider supporting systems of community-based self-defense – certainly not an a priori desirable solution but sometimes maybe the only possible one. When conflict resolution mechanisms fail, when violence is widely present, when warlords (and at times foreign armies) attack, communities might also need to become more engaged in self-defense, particularly when nobody is doing it for them (MONUC has come systematically too late in such cases, while the Congolese state will not be able to do it for a long time either, leaving communities at the mercy of spoilers). The problem, of course, is that communities often do not possess the knowledge, weapons, and perhaps willingness to defend themselves in such an insecure environment. Donors could consider helping local communities take security into their own hands (though on a different institutional basis than the warlords), not because it is easy to do, but because it may be the only solution in situations like the DRC.

53. How could donors work with civil society to help local communities defend themselves? One model may be the one developed by CREDAP in North Kivu, which has asserted that peace and security is foremost the business of the population concerned. CREDAP advises local communities take charge of protecting themselves through a combination of civilian and military action coordinated at local, national, and international levels, integrative of women and various ethnic groups. CREDAP realizes that local security can not be established by military action alone (by MONUC or anyone else), since there will always be areas left unprotected by armies which will be insecure. According to the CREDAP model, safe zones can be created by community-based self-defense apparatus together with MONUC, which are capable of facing and overcoming an attack. These zones must first be created by identifying pilot centers where the population is encouraged to take shelter from active fighting, usually in already relatively safe, accessible, well-endowed, inter-ethnic areas. The task sharing between MONUC and the self-defense system must be determined, but it is understood that MONUC could be responsible for training, coordinating, and also for the use of heavy arms. Once these pilot centers are established, little by little the zones are extended. Defense in the community apparatus is mostly provided by those who have the greatest interest in maintaining peace, namely those who would profit most from defending their homes (heads of families, women, etc.), instead of idle youths. CREDAP argues that such a defense apparatus could be more effective and accountable to the community than the usual local defense corps composed of idle youths, which have been very effective at times, but ineffective at others, in deterring attacks, and often turn against the very same community they are supposed to protect. The point here is not to put the CREPAD model forward as a panacea for eliminating insecurity in

the DRC. Rather, it stands as an example of an alternative method by local people for providing security which is more sustainable and at times more effective than relying on a shadow state structure or the wavering, insufficient support of the international community. Given the innovative nature of this work, we include a more complete outline of CREDAP's security approach in Annex 2.

54. There are risks with this strategy, of course (as with any other strategy in the region: there are no clean and easy solutions to most of the problems in the Great Lakes). Any time people have arms, they can turn against unarmed people, even if it is those who supplied them with the arms in the first place – especially in situations of desperate poverty and growing “anti-values,” which will be discussed more fully below. The experience with Uganda's Local Defense Units is instructive in this regard. Set up by an act of parliament in 1986, LDUs were not part of the regular army but were maintained by the various local councils (LC1s), theoretically under the supervision of the police. Originally intended to enforce security in areas that the local police force could not reach, LDUs originally proved extremely popular with local populations who largely knew by name local members and were grateful for the security they offered against local lawlessness. Since Uganda's stabilization, however, local people and government have lost interest in the force, allowing corruption and criminal activity to become rampant within the LDUs. Such problems can be avoided in the Congo if people with a long-term stake in their communities are selected (head of families and women instead of the young, unmarried young men, for example), and the institutional set up for the control of the defense system carefully thought through.

55. As for Proposition I.2, community-based self-defense apparatus will also need organizational capacity development, which refers to the third objective of the African policy that has been excluded from the Great Lakes regional policy. Nevertheless, it is necessary to re-include part of this objective in the regional program if this proposition is selected.

56. Finally, support to community-based self-defense apparatus in the DRC must take into account the Regional Conference process and outputs.

Complementary support to community initiatives (All Types)

57. Additional factors that may positively influence the issue of the spoilers problem, whether in the DRC or in Burundi include:

- decreased access to natural resources;
- well-funded and well-targeted DDRRR;
- arms embargoes;
- development of legislation “at home”;
- concerted diplomatic pressure on sponsoring states.

Let us discuss them briefly.

I.3.3 Decreased access to natural resources

58. The role of access to natural resources in the perpetuation of war is widely known and must be dealt with - and yet it has not until now. An appropriate strategy could make war-related

exploitation a lot harder, create incentives for warlords to switch to non-violent, legal exploitation, or preferably do both at the same time. We will deal with this in chapter II.

1.3.4 Well-funded and well-targeted DDRRR

59. The Great Lakes region is the terrain of the biggest DDRRR process in history: the MDRP is a giant multi-country initiative, with massive international support, including by the Netherlands. It is clearly an important part – although equally clearly only a *part* - of the process of bringing spoilers back in the peace process, as it undermines their military capacities, and we have little new to say about it. Lessons learned clearly show that a well-funded DDRRR program is a critical factor to post-conflict peace building success (the Mozambique case is a positive example of this, unfortunately followed by less positive example of badly funded DDRRR programs). However, an issue that has been raised by some people is the neglect of demobilized women in the whole process until now, as well as of children and their special needs. This could be a special niche occupied by the Netherlands in the DDRRR program.

1.3.5 Arms embargoes

60. Arms embargoes are intuitively appealing and popular with NGO campaigners: as arms seem to be an unmitigated bad and at the same time absolutely crucial for waging war and spoiling peace, reducing spoilers' access to arms seems like an evident solution. The problem is that this strategy is unlikely to work in the region, especially in the short term: there are simply way too many small arms already around, and the development of a tight system of control would be stunningly difficult to achieve. One key condition for its success is the involvement of local communities in monitoring such embargoes. This strategy risks being a lot of work for very meager results, but it does constitute a small step to a world with different rules of the game.

1.3.6 Development of “at home” legislation

61. The international community can also support communities in their struggle against warlords and predators through long-term, non-coercive, facilitative measures such as the development of legislation in the Netherlands, the EU, and the UN to deal with arms trafficking, the diamond trade, socially responsible practices abroad for public and private corporations, financial havens and dubious international financial transfers, and war crimes and crimes against humanity. These things will not affect issues on the ground rapidly - indeed, it will take many years - but they do also constitute small steps to a world with different rules of the game.

1.3.7 Diplomatic pressures on states sponsoring spoilers

62. Concerted diplomatic pressure on states sponsoring spoilers seems crucial; it is also, for understandable reasons, considered highly desirable by activists and NGO campaigners given that the main countries involved, Uganda and Rwanda for the DRC, Tanzania for Burundi, receive much of their revenue from Western foreign aid. Should not Western donors employ their leverage in a systematic and concerted manner to stop them from intervening through spoilers? And if donors fail to do so, are they not complicit with the war profiteering? Many argue that such pressure has been successful in the rare instances when it has been exerted, such as the sudden

withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC in 2002 following American and European pressure, through (among others) the IMF.

63. A policy of “*intense critical dialogue*” and diplomatic pressure is already a part of the Dutch regional strategy, but, in its more coercive variety, it is an extremely difficult tool to employ. As diplomats know well, conditionality and pressure do not produce easy, clear, direct results. Usually, donors differ in their assessments (what is the nature of Rwanda’s government since 1994? Is Uganda currently slowly progressing on regressing on the path to democracy?) and aims (the DRC elicits strong security and economic interests among some donors), so their pressure will be uncoordinated. Un-coordinated conditionality may act as a personal moral statement, but typically has little effect. But even coordinated pressure may simply not work, or create token compliance, or even create backlashes (a state coup by more radical elements, for example).

64. It is really only when there is significant domestic pressure in favor of change within a country that conditionality can gently nudge a process of change forward; it rarely manages to create it *ex nihilo*, however. Success of diplomatic pressures for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops in the DRC was partly due to the growing discontent in Rwandan civil society about this presence. On the other hand, diplomatic pressures unrelated to and unbalanced with the civil society capacity to handle the consequences may have negative effects on the people and can endanger an emerging civil society in its struggle for good governance. Diplomatic pressure should therefore be determined in coordination with the civil society actors struggling for good governance and withdrawal of support to neighboring spoilers.

65. The question of whether to employ coercive diplomacy requires a fine analysis by embassy people on the ground on the margins for maneuver, divisions within the ruling clique, support from within civil society, etc. Conditionality is an appealing tool for it seems to promise fast results and build on a sense of stark ethical choices: do we pressure for changes in bad policies or not? (Who could one answer “no” to that?) However, given that bad policies have long-standing and deeply-rooted structural causes, conditionality may produce little more than pyrrhic victories, particularly when there is little pressure from within. Better, than, to work with civil society to build up its capacity to produce such pressure – a much slower job, for sure, but ultimately a more promising one. This later issue will be developed in Chapter IV.

Proposition I.4 Cautiously engage in Security Sector Reform

66. The typical way donors try to create protective rather than predatory militaries is through security sector reform (SSR). If the military is not controlled by civilian powers and behaves unprofessionally, all SSR programs aim to establish a professional military that is answerable to legitimate civilian control. This sounds like the perfect solution to an important problem. SSR includes a host of activities aimed toward modeling national militaries on Western models in order to find the best way to manage national defense and ensure stable civilian-military relations. The goal is to create an a-political, professional, typically smaller (“right-sized”) army that is accountable to government and society. The idea here is that a reduction in military expenditure, besides being good in itself, frees up valuable resources to use for development and poverty alleviation. Training, technical assistance for organizational reform, provision of equipment and

even salary support may be directed to armed forces, intelligence services, police forces, and civilian defense forces. SSR also includes judicial and intelligence reform in many instances.

67. The weakness of SSR programs as they stand is that neither civilian oversight nor professionalism are to the interest of those who benefit from the status quo, *i.e.*, top brass and increasing parts of the lower ranks as well, who manage to use the military for their own economic and political gains and who fear that SSR may endanger these hidden benefits. And they are right: the aim of SSR is to end these abuses and to redistribute power. The problem is that *power is rarely redistributed through projects, but only through politics*. The military may go along with SSR projects, of course, for they do bring attention and resources, but those at the center of power will seek to make sure that at the end of the day, the key features of the status quo from which they benefit are maintained. They may be willing to let go of quite a few things that are not crucial to their personal benefits, such as decreasing the size of the army, participation in various forms of training, maybe even conversations with MPs, but they will not implement the reforms that will truly endanger their advantages. In this respect, SSR suffers from the same crucial defect as do structural adjustment programs, namely that they are to be implemented by the very same group that is hurt by them. Unsurprisingly, SSR is often implemented only partly, with token minimal compliance, close to the letter but as far as possible from the spirit of these programs.

68. Hence, a political analysis is required. What are the factors that may make military top brass accept (grudgingly, for sure) reform in the direction desired by SSRs? What could make SSRs work? Favorable environmental factors include:

- a stable security environment: it is hard to build coalitions for reform during active war or significant threat to state power (SSR program managers know this, which is why they only start when wars are over)
- a natural resource exploitation regime that makes control by military means difficult: if the costs of looting natural resources increases and the benefits decline, different calculations may apply to compliance with SSR programs and the benefits they bring (see our suggestions in the next chapter).
- military failure: when the military fails, it becomes discredited, both within society at large and, at least to some extent, within the army itself. Dovish military leaders may gain the upper hand over hawkish ones; corrupt ones may be marginalized by those who cherish a more professional military ethos. We believe that at this point in time, military solutions are increasingly becoming discredited in the Great Lakes region. There is a growing recognition, even within the highest realms of state power (and playing out in different ways, and for different reasons, in, say, Burundi than in, say, Uganda), that not every problem can be solved with military means.
- societal pressure: the increasing assertiveness, competence, and willingness of people and institutions to oversee military matters, the emergence and the spread of social norms in favor of oversight and professionalism, the growth of a political space in which these things can be discussed, the availability of information, etc. This, too, may be growing slowly within societies of the Great Lakes. Partly it is related to military failure: social groups who may have thought that their protection lies in a militaristic state are becoming increasingly disenchanted with it (Rwanda comes immediately to mind: many Tutsi may have initially shared a sense that the militaristic approach of the FPA/FPR regime is their sole protection, but are coming to realize that this is not necessarily a sustainable long-term strategy or, even stronger, that it is not working to their interest right now). These changes are slow and hotly contested. It takes a lot of

time for individuals and organizations to learn, change their minds, acquire the competency and knowledge to engage in these debates. This is where civil society support, freedom of press, and general improvement in democratic space are important. Clearly, we are only at the beginning here, and this is long term –which is why SSR will only achieve its fundamental objectives in the long term too.

69. The above factors are environmental because they cannot be not controlled by SSR programs. They may create, however, environments conducive to change, or resistance. Surveying the region in light of these factors, we believe that perceived military failure is present in the Great Lakes, and that societal pressure may be growing, albeit slowly. The security environment may be becoming more stable, especially if the Conference can lead to the development of a new regional security architecture. A regime to render natural resource exploitation by the military harder is crucial, but totally neglected until now (we deal with this issue in the next chapter).

70. What relevance does this have, then, to the Netherlands? The popularity of SSR is partly explained by its technical nature: having more professional and accountable militaries seems a straightforward good thing, and technical experts abound who are ready to go on expensive missions to produce nice reports. SSR is in reality, however, a deeply political enterprise, in which the margin for maneuver is extremely reduced and almost totally independent of the good intentions of donors. It is also risky, for it does amount, after all, to significant investment in institutions and people who have very bad track records of violence and human rights abuse. On the other hand, some of the broader environmental political factors seem promising at this time – if we had to wait for the perfect circumstances to emerge the Great Lakes region, we would never do a thing.

71. We are not sure if the Netherlands needs to be engaged in SSR programs in all countries of the region. After all, resources are limited, and other donors – the UK, the Belgians - already play a major role, and there might be little the Netherlands has to add. In addition, the pay-off of SSR is extremely uncertain, and the risks big. However, we suggest that, if the Netherlands wants to engage in this sector (beyond Burundi where it is already committed, and where the above discussed environmental factors seem the most propitious), it should do so:

- based on excellent and continuous political analysis
- realizing the limitations and the risks involved
- working simultaneously on the other relevant environmental variables (regional security architecture, civil society capacity, natural resources regime)
- ensure that the civilian, and particularly women, control part of the agenda is not lost (as it may easily be), but rather always prioritized

72. There is a final argument in favor of Dutch involvement in SSR. A major side benefit of being engaged in SSR is that it opens up channels of communication with the people who really matter. Indeed, if it is true, as we said earlier, that the real power in all four countries resides to a large extent in the hands of a few senior military people, then it is equally true that most people in the foreign policy and aid communities have very little access to some of the people that really matter. This means that relations of trust cannot be built, and exchanges of information and points of view – all that is necessary for sensitive work to proceed - do not take place. This suggests that the Netherlands should play some small role in SSR in all four countries, preferably with some

aspect that it is specifically in charge of -- rather than just funding an overall program but without operational involvement. It may be possible to find other ways of working with these people -- programs about HIV-AIDS in the military, for example.

CHAPTER II. EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE DRC

ABSTRACT

73. *There are two dimensions to the exploitation of natural resources and wealth of the DRC : illegality and violence. Although illegality has captured most of the international attention in the recent years, we believe that violence, unaccountability, in-equitability and neo-patrimonialism are the most important issues for peace and stability. We believe it is absolutely crucial that the natural resource issue is addressed immediately and thoroughly. Until now, however, no concrete international action has been taken.*

74. *One important characteristic of violent exploitation of natural resource in the DRC is that it started decades ago, long before the current war began. What has changed recently is simply that the modalities of exploitation have become more violent still, and foreigners have entered into the fray. The model, however, is largely unchanged. Another characteristic is that the resilience of the model is exemplary, no matter the amount of international aid donors poured in, nor the series of adjustment programs and political reforms international institutions have asked for more than 30 years. This tells us very important lessons that have to be taken into account to find a sustainable way out.*

75. *Propositions of possible Dutch interventions for sustainable solutions to violent exploitation of natural resource in the DRC are:*

II.1 Gradually integrate violent entrepreneurs in an acceptable exploitation regime (Type C)

II.2 Create local/regional development funds (Type C and A)

II.3 Create a fund management trusteeship: the External Compliance Monitoring Group (Type C and A)

ANALYSIS

Illegality and/or violence?

76. The facts are well-known, and have been superbly analyzed by Dutch experts working with the Clingendael Institute, for example. Two of the countries – the DRC and Burundi -- are characterized by war economies in the double sense of the term: they suffer profoundly from the effects of war, and their economic system currently provides benefits to warlords and elites of such a nature as to favor the continuation of war. Rwanda and Uganda (as well as other countries that are not in the Great Lakes region) are also becoming war economies, although the civil war in Rwanda is largely a thing of the past: their economic trends are deeply influenced by the war in the DRC (and rather positively on the average, as their economic and financial performance have received a major boost from the transit and sale of DRC resources); they too have elites who benefit from the continuation of the war in the Congo. In short, all the countries in the Great Lakes region (with the exception of Tanzania) can be characterized as war economies, all of which are linked through the central case of the DRC.

77. Illegality. This is the most broadly shared concern about natural resource exploitation in the DRC among international activists, NGO campaigners and the UN. And it is apparently what is considered as the main problem regarding natural resources in the Concept Note. But when looked at more closely, this issue is not an easy one to define: in the context of the DRC, what exactly makes the exploitation illegal? After all, in an environment in which transparent, rule-bound extraction has never taken place, and moreover where there is in effect no state at all, the border between legality and illegality is quite unclear. In addition, the current exploitation seems to be becoming more “legal” in many ways, and yet that seems hardly beneficial for peace, stability, security, equitable growth or governance. A number of questions thus immediately come to mind:

- Is illegal exploitation merely resource extraction carried out by foreigners? If so, what if these foreigners enter into joint ventures with nationals, as is happening now?
- Is illegal exploitation resource extraction carried out during a period of war? When the military is involved? When part of the proceeds are used to finance war?
- Is it somehow more legal if laws are followed and taxes paid -- but to whom? And which laws?
- Is it more legal if the profits go to institutions rather than individuals?
- Is it more legal if market-based mechanisms rather than violence are used to extract resources?

We therefore disagree with the analysis looking at illegality as the main problem regarding the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC.

78. Violence. The main issue, then, is not the illegality, but rather the violent, unaccountable, uncontrolled, inequitable and neo-patrimonial nature of the exploitation. Note that this violent and inequitable exploitation may persist even in a legalized situation, as was the case during colonization (cutting hands happened in the Congo under Leopold II a long time before it happened in Sierra Leone and Liberia). Most observers agree that violent exploitation in Congo, as in so many other parts of Africa, emerges out of a system of poverty; or more correctly a system of impoverishment and social exclusion. This is the source of the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC.

79. All of this by and large holds for the three other countries in the region as well, although, of course, in different ways. They too suffer from impoverishment and exclusion, rather than from poverty per se. In all of them, networks of power, controlled by military and political elites, are reproduced through privileged access to state and aid resources and to some extent private sector opportunities.

Violent exploitation: characteristics and lessons learned

80. One important characteristic of the economic disaster the Congolese now live in is that it started decades ago, long before the current war began. As an indicator, the DRC’s GNP per capita has decreased from \$1140 in 1962 to \$130 in 1997 (just shortly after the 1996 war) to \$70 in 2001. One could go even further and argue that Congo’s exploitative and violent predator economy is the continuation of a model begun under the early age of colonialism, or even engrained in the very definition of the Congo when it was created by Western countries at the 1885 Berlin conference. What has changed recently, then, is simply that, as a result of the total collapse of the Congolese state, the modalities of exploitation have become more violent still, and foreigners have entered into the fray. The model, however, is largely unchanged.

81. Another characteristic is that this slide to state collapse, violence, and predation happened no matter the amount of international aid donors poured in, nor the series of adjustment programs and political reforms international institutions launched over decades. The resilience of the model is exemplary.

82. This is of more than academic interest. It teaches us some important lessons:

- Rebuilding the economic system that preceded the war is of little use, for it will simply produce the same results again; getting the foreigners out of the business of exploiting natural resources, for example, will not end the exploitation – it will simply nationalize it again. As the World Bank Resident Country Manager in the DRC stated nicely: “how do we avoid Congo turning into a new Zaire in the long run?”
- If such a system of impoverishment and exclusion was only an aberration when it started (if it was not present, for instance, in the Berlin signatories’ mind when they created the Congo), the fact that it lasted so long and has resisted so many (external) attempts to change it means it has been since nurtured and fine-tuned by those who benefit from it. It is now a deliberate system, deeply engrained in institutional, political, and even social and psychological dynamics.
- The scale of resistance it took by those who profit from it in order to counter international attempts for change is an indication of the scale of the benefits they extract from the system: enormous.
- Changing that economic system for a peaceful, accountable and equitable one will thus require forceful actions.
- These forceful actions will not produce results if they are concentrated only on technical aspects, but need to change the rules of the game in order for a new system to emerge. Change will need to take place on all the variables mentioned above (institutional, political, etc.), and some will need to be rather dramatic.
- Changing the current system of violent exploitation of resources in the DRC will be a long-term endeavor.

83. The current way natural resources are exploited in the Congo by all parties, Congolese and foreign, is detrimental to peace, stability and development because it:

- weakens army command structures and ethos;
- further undermines civilian control over the army;
- finances war and violence, creating myriad incentives and opportunities for their continuation;
- undermines rational, sustainable, and locally beneficial exploitation of natural resources;
- strengthens neo-patrimonial, inefficient, un-accountable state systems and policies.

84. We believe it is absolutely crucial to regional peace and stability that the issue of violent resource exploitation is addressed immediately and thoroughly through forceful action. If not addressed, the ongoing peace process in the DRC is bound to fail since it will be undermined by power-holders or those who challenge their rule (internationally, nationally, or locally) who will use (self-financing) violence to increase their share of the pie. As it stands now, violent resource exploitation also undermines the possibilities for democratization throughout the region. It does this in the DRC by maintaining and reconstructing prevailing patterns of neo-patrimonialism and inequitable management. It does this in Rwanda and Uganda by making military elites less accountable to civilian rule.

85. Violent resource exploitation will not stop spontaneously, with time: the incentives are stacked for the continuation of the problem. Until now, however, no concrete international action has been taken. As International Peace Academy (IPA) correctly states:

“Despite accumulated evidence of the critical role played by illicit and violent exploitation of natural resources in the DRC conflict, neither the restoration of good governance over natural resources, nor the restoration of property rights, nor the pursuit of economic justice was a priority issue for negotiation. Quite obviously, the parties to the peace process had no interest in relinquishing their ill-gotten gains, nor did the international community have the political will to press them to do so. The consequences of this neglect may in fact be quite malign, as the scramble for control of the DRC’s resource wealth continues.”

Not only has no action been taken, though, little intellectual work has gone into solving the problem. Vague remarks about a new Kimberly process abound, or about the need to create greater gains from peace than from war, but nobody has made these strategies concrete or convincing. If violent resource exploitation will not stop spontaneously, then how could it be stopped?

PROPOSITIONS : Toward a new regime for the exploitation of natural resources

Limits of standard solutions

86. The standard options on the table to end violent exploitation of natural resource seem of limited applicability: their results are highly uncertain and they may take a very long time to come about:

- Kimberly-type certification regimes take many years to create, without certainty as to their effectiveness, even for diamonds; they are also extremely hard to create for coltan or gold. Such regimes may be important in the very long run, as consumption and production patterns change, but they will not help to end the war now. As a recent IPA report correctly states:

“To date, international policy efforts to address the economic dimensions of intra-state conflict have largely focused on curtailing resource flows to combatants through global control regimes. Yet, the creation of robust regulatory frameworks addressing the global traffic of resources that make armed conflict feasible is a long-term objective. While important for structural conflict prevention, this approach offers comparatively few practical insights for confronting the immediate challenges of transforming war-ravaged countries, in particular those whose lengthy conflict has distorted political and economic relationships in favor of the entrepreneurs of violence.”

- Boycotts were originally pushed for by European NGOs, but are now recognized to have little impact and to impose costs on ordinary people. We agree with the International Crisis Group’s (ICG’s) conclusion that boycotts are impractical as well as irresponsible.
- Targeted (aid and trade) sanctions on the key offenders are discussed as well. They would clearly entail major political costs, which until now no donor has been willing to contemplate. Serious doubts also remain as to their effectiveness (although they may still possibly be useful at the level of symbolic politics).
- Many policy papers – from sources as mainstream as the IPA to the more progressive Oxfam -- outline the need to make the "peace dividend" more advantageous than the "war dividend." While this is a nice insight at a conceptual level, nobody seems to have much to say about *how* this will happen. It seems, implicitly, the only solution on people’s minds is the creation of a

well-functioning legal and administrative framework to manage Congolese resources, *i.e.*, the reconstruction of the Congolese state.

87. Reconstructing the Congolese state machinery underlies most current support already. The World Bank, for instance, is already financing an expert who is writing a Mining Code; many other donors, including the Netherlands, are pouring money into the Kinshasa administration. At least as far as dealing with the problem of natural resources exploitation, this strategy is bound to fail in the short and medium term since for many years to come there will not exist a competent, efficient, omni-present Congolese state devoted to people's interests. What is rather emerging is a dual system of predation:

- In the Western Congo, where many of the mineral and energy resources are located -- and which is more or less stable in comparison to the East -- mining is going on, profiting almost nobody except those directly involved, all of whom have an interest in maximizing their take, given the uncertainty surrounding it.
- While in the East, the situation is worse still, as anarchic, violent, and predatory exploitation continues to be the norm.

In short, the exploitation of natural resources throughout Congo is still predatory. The main difference between East and West is the amount of overt violence and chaos associated with it.

88. As mentioned before, changing the situation will require forceful action, for all those with power, inside and outside of the country, benefit from the status quo. Simply reconstructing the facade of a Weberian state will not work (although in the long run such a state is indeed a rather desirable outcome, if it can emerge from within -- see Chapter IV on governance). In short, we will need to think of other solutions to deal with this crucial issue of stopping the current type of exploitation of Congolese resources.

Framework for a short term and sustainable solution

89. What should be the aims of the international community regarding the exploitation of natural resources? In the short run, the overwhelming priority is to stop the capacity of natural resources to feed into the war. A second priority is to ensure that the exploitation of natural resources is more equitable, *i.e.*, produces more benefits to the population at large, and that it breaks through the system of neo-patrimonial exploitation that has prevailed until now. The latter is to some extent related to the former, although it is by no means identical.

90. Clearly, the short-term interest of the main current beneficiaries -- the "violent entrepreneurs", *i.e.* elites and warlords in the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda who benefit from the status quo - is to avoid change and regulation. As the violence finances itself (plus provides enormous profits), resistance to change is almost cost-free to them. What this means is that some method of coercion is required here, for most of those who profit from the current situation have an interest in its maintenance. At the same time, such forceful action should be used to develop something akin to a win-win situation -- a system creating incentives for all parties -- government and elites, corporations, current beneficiaries, and the population at large - to feel they can gain from the solution. It is only then -- if many parties can be co-opted into it, and others can be made to realize that the new system provides gains to them over time, while it is only a small minority

that needs to be dealt with truly forcefully - that a solution will be sustainable and may eventually become less dependent on international action.

91. Benefits on which a win-win solution could be based include:

- an environment of stability and predictability -- important for attracting serious corporations with significant know-how and capital; could also be attractive to some violent entrepreneurs and very desirable to local people
- guaranteed income flows--important for states, elites, and local communities
- the prospect of becoming recognized as legal, legitimate players for some violent entrepreneurs profiting from the current “illegal” system

But what could be the operational mechanisms of such a solution and how to implement it? It could be done in a threefold intervention, all three steps being executed in parallel.

Proposition II.1 Gradually integrate violent entrepreneurs in an acceptable exploitation regime (Type C)

92. The first step is to gradually integrate as many violent entrepreneurs as possible in a peaceful and sustainable regime for the exploitation of natural resources that will deliver short term peace and lay the groundwork for equitable exploitation. This integration could be obtained through a combination of negotiation (on the basis of possible gains they can get from turning legal and non-violent) and targeted pressures similar to those used against international terrorists (restrictions on freedom of circulation, freezing of foreign bank accounts, etc.) This integration process must be tailored to take into account that:

- the scale of exploitation in the DRC is vast, and the violent entrepreneurs are very much capable of fuelling continued violence.
- all violent entrepreneurs are not of the same breed: some are local while others are foreigners; some are warlords who passively take advantage of the current chaos but are ready to move to a more stable situation, while others are spoilers very reluctant to change the status quo; some are relatively autonomous entrepreneurs while others are controlled from the outside, with very little margin of manoeuvre with their sponsors; some control relatively small areas, while others control relatively large; some, as mentioned by Auty (1998) exploit “point resources” (mines, oil) which involve little labour input and are geographically concentrated, while others exploit “diffuse resources” (wood, plantations, cattle) that require a large amount of labour and are spread geographically; some, as mentioned by Mancur Olson (1996) “are “roving bandits” – who have no encompassing interest in preserving the state or its people but are simply intent on loot – while others are “stationary bandits” who take control of the state and seek to maximize their own profit by encouraging stability and growth in their new domain.”
- an important distinction is that some violent entrepreneurs inflict what local populations consider terrible and unacceptable sufferings for which locals expect a certain degree of justice, even if what they want foremost is peace (as many say now: they want “pas nécessairement une paix juste, mais juste la paix!”), while other violent entrepreneurs have caused sufferings local populations are ready to trade off against peace.

93. So some (but not all) violent entrepreneurs can be co-opted into such a process so long as exploitation stops and peace results, while others will have to be forced to change their violent behaviour. The line between the two is very fuzzy and must be constantly negotiated with the

local populations. A perfect solution to the satisfaction of all cannot be reached, obviously, and one must also not forget that impunity and justice evolve over time (note the Chilean and Argentinean cases, where initial amnesties were negated years later when the countries were more stable and secure).

94. Therefore, installing a regime for the exploitation of natural resources that will deliver short-term peace and lay the groundwork for equitable exploitation will have to take into account the following variables: the origins of the actors, type of exploitation, the scale of the resources, the sufferings they inflicted, and the balance between acceptable impunity and justice. There is no single model which can suffice for every situation over time. Like with all programs and policies, it must be adapted and finely tuned to the evolving situation on the ground. Such an intervention must be managed more or less the same way the smallpox eradication campaign was managed in the 1970's: with precise and evolving objectives, appropriate and evolving sets of incentives (positive and negative), constant intelligence, and a "leopard skin" strategy. For instance, a precise picture of who is exploiting what, who is connected with whom, who has done what where, could lead to the conclusion that we could first try somewhere to include top violent entrepreneurs in the deal (the smaller fish would then easily follow); elsewhere it may make more sense to begin with the small ones and gradually isolate the big, extremely violent ones (who could then be dealt with more forcefully).

Proposition II.2 Create local/regional development funds (Type C and A)

95. The next approach that we suggest for the DRC consists of the creation of a number of local and/or regional funds that multinational corporations and local entrepreneurs could feed into that would provide basic social and economic infrastructures which the state cannot provide. Christiane Kayser writes about this:

"If there is no taxation system on a national level which orientates revenue responsibly towards the common good, the UN, instead of prohibitive measures, should set up a development fund for exporting countries which allows private initiative to invest in business and pay taxes for the common good. Private Congolese traders in Butembo (Eastern Congo) are currently investing in an airport and several small-scale hydro-electric power stations. This encouraging initiative should be supported and not undermined by a short-sighted boycott. Building on this idea, the Pole Institute has suggested a Fund for Social and Economic Development for North and South Kivu, to be financed by coltan earnings. The question remains as to who should run such a fund: the representatives of the RCD are certainly not suitable, and neither are the governors of the two provinces. Kinshasa has neither the legitimacy nor the capacity to administer such a fund from 2000 kilometers away. Civil society is divided and in a process of restructuring. The multi-ethnic elders' council in North Kivu is highly regarded but would probably be overwhelmed by such a task, although it, as well as some other generally respected institutions such as schools and churches could probably participate in creating some sort of multi-party coordination mechanism. There is no easy answer, but a solution might be found in dialogue with the various civil forces and their representatives."

Contributing to such a fund should be part of the integration deal with violent entrepreneurs. Such funds could be fed by proceeds from resource extraction (5% or so going to the local community). Depending on the scale of the resource (small local or provincial and even trans-border), these funds could be created at the local, provincial or the regional level (hence the additional Type A classification). For large scale resources, it is also necessary to work with multinational corporations. Fresh infusions of foreign capital and know-how are desperately needed in the region, and it serves little purpose to condemn corporations out of hand, or to impose unnecessarily

harsh expectations on them. Could one, possibly through international institutions, create a set of guidelines by which corporations could invest a proportion of their income in local development funds? It may also be that MONUC's mandate will need to be extended after elections and demobilization are complete in order to protect such a regulatory system. MONUC's costs could be borne by the extraction of these same resources.

Proposition II.3 Create a fund management trusteeship: the External Compliance Monitoring Group (Type C and A)

96. But how to manage such development funds? Basically, it must be managed by multi-stakeholder boards involving the private sector, local government, and local civil society. In this respect, the World Bank's work on the Chad-Cameroon pipeline constitutes an interesting model. What is unique about this model is the formal negotiated structure outlining the use of the resulting local income, and the set of oversight mechanisms. In the words of the Bank Country Director for Chad:

“A stringent supervision mechanism was put in place: the External Compliance Monitoring Group was charged with supervising the implementation of all legal covenants regarding environmental and socioeconomic management through quarterly visits. The International Advisory Group, which visits Chad every six months, was created to advise the presidents of Chad and the Bank about maximizing the development impact of the project. Its reports are publicly available on the web. A unique feature of the Chadian model is the Petroleum Revenue Management Law of 1999. This law stipulates that all direct oil revenues have to go first to an offshore escrow account. From there, 10 percent is transferred into an account for the Future Generations Fund and the remainder is transferred to a special oil revenue account in Chad. The law specifies that 80 percent of the oil revenues must be used for additional expenditures in the four priority sectors for poverty reduction: health and social affairs, education, infrastructure, and rural development. Five percent of the royalties are to benefit the local communities in the oil producing region. The remainder can be used for general expenditures of the administration. A powerful local watchdog institution, the “Collège de Contrôle et Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières”, was also created that has to authorize all commitments and disbursements from the special oil revenue account and to certify that the budget presented to parliament conforms with the Petroleum Revenue Management Law. It has nine members as follows: four from civil society, two members of parliament, one member of the Supreme Court, the national director of the central bank, and the director of the treasury.”

97. The Chad-Cameroon system can be cost effective for large scale resources (oil, mines, large plantations, etc.), but less well suited for relatively small scale resources, which also fuel conflict. But similar models could be tested at the local level for small scale resources.

98. The Chad-Cameroon model came about as a result of some element of coercion. It is not, let's face it, a system the Chadian government itself asked for. And yet, once such a mechanism exists, it creates major benefits to all: the Chadian government got a major investment and resource flow it would otherwise not have received; the multinational corporations got international community financial and administrative support; the people of the region acquired jobs and investment in their communities, as well as environmental guidelines protecting them; and the citizens of Chad got some assurance of increased spending on matters of concern to them. Has Chad become paradise on Earth? Of course not. The willingness and capacity of the government to spend these resources for the people's well-being is still low. There will be cheating. The environment will suffer more than activists desire. And yet, it is a system that constitutes significant progress compared to the situation that would prevail without it.

Where to start?

99. The DRC needs such a threefold regulatory process immediately. We believe that some model along these lines may in fact reverse the conflict dynamics being fuelled by natural resource exploitation in the DRC. Some donor has to take the initiative, preferably a small country with minor direct stakes, a reputation of integrity, and a harmonious relationship between foreign policy (for diplomats will need to do much of the initial facilitation and later negotiation), development aid, and academia (for they will provide much of the knowledge on which to base this). Such a regime for the resources of the Congo could be a signature initiative for the Netherlands. Even if our trusteeship suggestion is not adopted, or fails, one should still seriously consider whether the development funds could be created.

100. It is imperative, though, that donor actions for the formulation and implementation of this regulatory mechanism be conducted in close partnership with the local populations, including women. This raises the question of the choice of the partners: which civil society's organizations can legitimately represent "the population" and have at least the good governance potential to be included in the process at the steering position? Not an easy question, particularly in the DRC where most civil society organizations are artificial, exclusive, clientelistic and without real popular base; and even more particularly since a lot of money will possibly be at stake (the development funds), triggering the kleptocrats' appetite. Appropriate choice of the partners is therefore one of the cornerstones for the success of this intervention.

101. It is also obvious that involvement of civil society actors and local authorities in such a regulatory mechanism will require organizational capacity development for both. Again, this calls for the inclusion of some aspects of the African policy third objective in the Regional program.

102. Finally, this threefold regulatory process could be discussed during the preparation of the Regional Conference and fine tuned during it. In our views, the Conference participants who could be most interested in developing and advocating for this process are to be found within civil society. If the Dutch decide to go ahead with this idea, it should rapidly get in touch with civil society actors involved in the Conference preparation.

CHAPTER III. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT

103. *The natural resources and environment of the Great Lakes is in such a degraded situation that, if not addressed immediately, it can jeopardize the results of current peace-building and stability initiatives, by decreasing access to fertile land for increasing numbers of people, thus aggravating the land conflicts that underlie so much violence in Burundi, Rwanda and Eastern Congo (the Zaire-Nile crest). Interestingly enough, there is a strong constituency and a dedicated budget line for environmental programs in the Dutch development policy. On this issue, civil society is by large ahead of authorities in the Great Lakes. But authorities are gradually stepping in, although more at the central state level than at the local level.*

104. *It most certainly makes sense to address the sustainable management of natural resources and the environment on a regional level, given the regional dimension of many environmental problems and the existence of regional institutions in this field. One must be wary, however, that purely environmental programs do not become substitutes for political and economic action to end conflict and create stability, even if appropriate environmental programs can certainly be a facilitating factor.*

105. *Propositions of possible Dutch interventions to protect natural resources and the environment are:*

III.1 Select environmental projects with the highest political pay-off

III.2 Anchor the regional environmental program in civil society

ANALYSIS

106. The natural resources and environment of the Great Lakes have suffered significantly from decades-old exploitation regimes and governance systems only seeking the satisfaction of short-term personal interests, as well as the successive wars that erupted over the past 15 years. The end result is that today protected areas have shrunk drastically, wood-energy is lacking, water level in some lakes is at a historical low, and environmentally-based tourism has slowed down significantly. Even if addressing the sustainable management of natural resources and the environment is difficult during conflicts and may not be considered as a priority by many peace-building actors, the situation is serious enough in the Great Lakes that it may jeopardize the results of current peace-building and stability initiatives. It is thus important to address this issue immediately. Interestingly enough, there is a strong constituency and a dedicated budget line for environmental programs in the Dutch development policy.

107. On the issue of protecting natural resources and the environment, civil society is by and large ahead of authorities in the Great Lakes: there are local NGOs dedicated to “good environmental governance” in all four countries, and some have taken the initiative as early as in 1999 (when ongoing wars were devastating DRC and Burundi) to create a regional network (REIE/PGL). There exists also a fair number of International NGOs renowned for their capacities in promoting the sustainable management of natural resources and the environment (CARE, Gorilla Fund, etc.)

108. If civil society has been ahead of the curve, state authorities are consistently becoming more aware of environmental issues and are stepping into the field, often as the result of civil society sensitization and international incentives and pressures. The DRC is already a member of the UINC while Rwanda and Burundi are in the process of becoming members; the DRC and Burundi signed in 2002 the convention of the “Conférence sur les Ecosystèmes de Forêts Denses et Humides d’Afrique Centrale” (SEFDHAC), while Rwanda is currently analyzing this convention; environment policies have recently been adopted by Rwanda, the DRC and Burundi as well, etc. Most of these policies have remained at the level of the central state, however, and have not made it down to local authorities.

109. It most certainly makes sense to address the protection of natural resources and the environment on a regional level. Many ecological problems, such as the issues of water, trans-border forests, and soil degradation, are by definition regional. In addition, in this field more than in all others discussed here, there already exists regional institutions in which to anchor Dutch programs, particularly among civil society. Finally, regional environmental projects, particularly for water and forests, have already been identified by civil society actors and are well known to the Dutch (such as the Virunga / Bwindi ecosystem project lying across the borders of Uganda, DRC, Rwanda and Burundi).

110. But in the general desire to protect the environment (among donors, NGOs, politicians, and the public alike), one must be wary that purely environmental programs do not become substitutes for political and economic action to end conflict and create stability. That said, there are some who do believe that appropriate natural resource and environmental management programs can possibly be a facilitating factor for peace and stability, if chosen, designed and implemented with the “peace and stability” factor in mind.

PROPOSITIONS

Since the Dutch are already well-engaged in the formulation of their environment components for bi-lateral and regional programs as well (a mission visited the Great Lakes in January – February 2004), we will focus our propositions on criteria to be taken into account rather than operational propositions.

Proposition III.1 Select environment projects with the highest political pay-off

111. Since purely environmental programs can not become substitutes for political and economic action to end conflict and create stability, and since the Great Lakes regional program goal is to promote peace and stability, it makes sense to initially select those projects that promise the highest and fastest *political* pay-off. Pay-off can be reached through a combination of appropriate identification (regarding location, objectives, interest of stakeholders, existing initiatives and institutions) and approaches (community based participatory approach, inclusiveness of all stakeholders, learning oriented projects). Pay-offs must take into account women’s needs, who are, for instance, acutely interested in energy issues.

112. We recommend choosing to fund those trans-border environmental projects that create win-win situations for a number of neighboring governments and their peoples. Trans-border

environmental projects, as trans-border economic projects presented in Annex 1, can be used to build relations of cooperation and trust around relatively neutral issues among elites and ordinary people that may eventually spread into other areas (the model that created the EU out of the European Union for Coal and Steel). This is of course no certainty – after all, many of the regional environmental initiatives mentioned in the Dutch Concept Note are already many years old, and that did not stop total war from taking place — but it still may be worth trying.

113. As for Proposition I.2 in Chapter I (Help build networks of people planning for peace), the fastest and highest political pay-off for trans-border projects could possibly be better realized if trans-border cooperation is sought at the local level rather than at the state level. Raising confidence between bordering communities could then spread in a coordinated way to highest levels and pave the way to state-to-state discussions. Of course, this does require at least official acquiescence with, if not positive support to, such projects.

Proposition III.2 Anchor the regional environment program in civil society

114. As for the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, local and international civil society seem to be the appropriate entry point for donor interventions on environment issues in the Great Lakes. There seems to be very dynamic civil society actors in the environmental sector, with a longer experience than among state authorities. But these organizations lack the “political weight” to be able to, say, invite ministers and be sure they will come; an invitation co-signed by a donor could give them the political clout they need to make things happen. It is important to keep in mind including women in the process, since they are often the first users of natural resources (water, wood for energy, etc.) and will thus have to cope with the consequences of protection measures.

115. This does not mean that authorities should not be included in the process. But authorities could be contacted and included through civil society initiatives instead of directly by donors. This approach would offer an important opportunity for civil society to gain influence on authorities in a relatively neutral area, allowing them in the future to move forward their claims for more sensitive issues like, say, governance. Correctly managed, environmental projects could be an entry point for governance improvement programs, one of the concrete but not so sensitive subjects about which civil society could ask for more transparency and more equitable development.

116. This holds for local authorities as well. Correctly managed environmental projects could be an opportunity for local authorities to gain policy capacities and political leverage on centralized authorities. This, in turn, may lay the ground for civil society to work for better governance, as we will develop in the next chapter.

117. Finally, like with the other components of this report, formulation of the environmental component of the regional program will have to take into account the Regional Conference process and results, since “sustainable development and environment” is one of the topics covered by the Conference.

CHAPTER IV: GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GOOD POLICY

ABSTRACT

118. *The Great lakes Policy Note states that all regimes of the Great Lakes share a similar condition of being “dysfunctional” (defined as undemocratic, biased, and exclusionary) with noticeable historical and political differences between them. This “disfunctionality” is a dynamic that has been decades in the making. Hence, current governance problems are not simply aberrations that will automatically be solved when the wars are over. Rather, they are the result of deeply ingrained, structural factors, expected and internalized by all. Those who profit from such systems will resist change towards good governance, and sustainable change towards good governance can only come from within the country, not from outside pressures.*

119. *Working with civil society ought to be the basis for a governance strategy in the region. While governance is national in nature, working with civil society can be done in a regional manner. The role of international actors is to assist local civil societies to find their own way, help them establish regional networks, create conditions favorable to the emergence of a genuine civil society, and contribute to containing autocrats’ and warlords’ capacities for wielding unmitigated and often violent power against society.*

120. *Another key issue in the region is the lack of rule of law at the level of daily life. Western interventions to improve rule of law are informed by a vision of a competent, efficient, predictable, and transparent state. Even if this vision is laudable, it is of little effectiveness in the Great Lakes. Creative thinking about how to change this is urgently needed.*

121. *Therefore, propositions of possible Dutch interventions to improve governance in the region are:*

- IV.1 Promote alternatives to rapid elections following conflict (Type C)*
- IV.2 Conduct a long-term regional project to strengthen civil society (Type C)*
- IV.3 Create local conditions propitious to the emergence of a stronger civil society (Type C)*
- IV.4 Create donors’ conditions propitious to the emergence of a stronger civil society (Type C)*
- IV.5 Provide diplomatic pressures (Type C)*
- IV.6 Conduct a regional action-research to improve Rule of Law (Type C)*
- IV.7 Conduct a regional action-research on minority rights (Type B)*

ANALYSIS

122. *The Concept Note states that “promoting good governance and good policy” is integral to Dutch policy: it is the only aim that can be found both in the bilateral policy toward the two partner countries and the overall regional policy. The Concept Note also mentions dysfunctional states (defined as namely undemocratic, biased, and exclusionary) as the primary cause of the region’s problems.*

123. In the international system we work in today, public governance is an inherently national issue rather than a regional one. As a result, in none of the sectors discussed in this paper is the need for locally grown solutions as important as with governance: relevant and sustainable change can only come from within each country. How can an inherently national issues be included and operationalized in a regional policy? The main path clearly lies in Type C actions, based on networking and learning across borders.

The state of governance in the Great Lakes

124. As mentioned before, the Great Lakes Concept Note indicates that all regimes of the Great Lakes share a similar condition of being “*dysfunctional*,”. People and organizations at the grassroots would add that these states are undemocratic even when they comply with the ritual of general elections; are by and large unaccountable to their populations; are managed by arbitrary rule rather than rule of law; are highly centralized (even when weak such as in the DRC); are controlled by small circles of mostly male leaders with strong militaristic reflexes; and are extremely distant from the population.

125. At the same time, we should be aware when making statements such as the previous paragraph that

- we often use our own, Western standards in making such judgments, and we should do our best to listen to the perspectives of local people – and not only those in the capital;
- we are glossing over subtle but important differences every time we make such categorical and judgments at a regional level -- often the important stuff lies in the details.

126. For instance, although we have been making generalizations about the general state of dissatisfaction people in the Great Lakes have with their leadership, a high-quality survey performed in 2000 by the Afrobarometer project (www.afrobarometer.org) shows that Uganda is considered by a vast majority of Ugandans (93%) as being well-governed by its current leaders -- way above the average of the 12 surveyed countries (64%). In a 2002 re-survey, “Ugandans continue to display a considerable degree of satisfaction with both their political and economic systems.” One can only assume that Ugandans’ sense of where they come from and where they are going must underlie these judgments. It is important to take that seriously.

127. Furthermore, good governance cannot mean the same in countries at war (the DRC, Burundi and Uganda) as in a post-conflict country recovering from genocide (Rwanda), or in a relatively stable one (Tanzania). In Rwanda, for example, people are deeply distrustful of democracy; this was indeed a social fact, and not some cover-up by the elite. Even if Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi, and Uganda may all be judged to be undemocratic, citizens work within various degrees of political space in each of these societies. Various changes are going on, and these changes are carried out by different social groups and political actors. Finally, another major difference between the states in the region is that some are “weak” -- this applies to the DRC and Burundi (for the moment), while others are much stronger (Rwanda and Uganda). Therefore, when one considers governance in these four countries of the Great Lakes, one must differentiate clearly and precisely between countries and in time. It is important to keep these differences in mind when designing a regional governance program.

The dynamic of governance in the Great lakes

128. The centralized, militarized, clientelistic, distant central state has decades-long antecedents. Too often, analysts do not look back more than a few years. To understand the crisis in the Eastern Congo, for example, few analyses go back before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and even fewer to the 1991 National Conference. Yet, the weakness of the central state, the violence in the East, or the predatory exploitation of natural resources have all been ongoing, in different ways, for decades. Similarly, the modalities of governance prevailing in Rwanda today are amazingly similar to the ones that existed decades ago: it is testimony to the persistence of this pattern of governance that not even an event as destructive and extreme as the genocide, along with a major change in regime, as well as warfare in the DRC, has modified it – and yet, almost nobody working in the country now seems to have the faintest idea of that! It is no exaggeration to say that some major dynamics in these countries were triggered by events beginning as long ago as the 1885 Berlin agreement and before.

129. These decades-long dynamics have systematically and repeatedly produced states and leaders of a similar profile: autocratic, exclusive, violent, kleptocratic, protective of very small groups of interests. Democratic, moderate, inclusive, upright and dedicated organizations and leaders have been systematically and repeatedly neutralized and excluded. Being a political moderate has for a long time been a dangerous position in the Great Lakes. Over and over again, it seems as if, even if the extremists fight each other, they all share a desire to forcefully sideline those forces of change that can mobilize people around positive visions of social change, that can create other forms of legitimacy, that work on ways of creating more inclusive societies. Hence, current governance problems are not simply aberrations that will automatically be solved when the wars are over. Rather, they are deeply ingrained, structural factors, expected and internalized by all.

130. This dreadful observation leads to several conclusions when considering the possibility of promoting good governance and good policy in the region:

- Rebuilding the governance system that existed before the wars should be avoided (and yet it is what spontaneously seems to happen, time and time again).
- The political class in these countries (including, often the opposition) originates and benefits from a system that denies good governance and has few incentives to change.
- Current leaders will thus resist moving to better governance by all means, especially in a context of widespread insecurity and poverty. They will move to better governance only if a change in the balance of power forces them to conclude that it is now in their interest to do so.
- Sustainable change in the balance of power can theoretically be imposed from the outside or from within. But, beside exceptional historical examples (such as with governance reform imposed by the US in Japan after WWII), changes from within is the way sustainable change has taken place in all countries of the world. One clear example of this in the Great Lakes region is how internal factors vastly dominated external ones in the improvement of the situation for women in Rwandan laws and political institutions; this was clearly a victory for Rwandan women after the genocide, when years of Western pressures on the Rwandan government had no significant effect. After decades of doing things for people or imposing solutions on them, we must realize that only changes that are carried from within will endure.

- Civil society has a first-hand interest in good governance. This does not mean civil society is always good or right -- far from it -- but rather that in its diversity, independence, and local anchoring, it a) has an objective interest in some key features of good governance (basic freedoms, transparency, accountability of the state, etc.); and b) it acts as a source of innovation and policy reform. Indeed, civil society is often the nursery of innovation in the fields of social change, human and social rights, good governance, etc; in rich countries, for example, most existing social policies were first tested and advocated by civil society, before being taken over by the state. Again, this was also the case with women situation in post-genocide Rwanda: initiatives to improve the women's situation came from women's organizations shortly after the genocide, when authorities were very reluctant to move this issue up on the agenda, arguing that other matters were more urgent. It took seven years of constant pressures from women's group on the authorities to win their case.
- Sustainable good governance will not occur without changing the economic and social system from one that generates and rewards autocracy, violence, and kleptocracy to a system that generates and rewards democracy, moderation, and inclusiveness. Liberalization of the economy helps, but it is often judged solely in terms of its impact on macro-economic aggregates rather than on its equally, if not more important, political and social impact.

131. Working with civil society thus ought to be the basis for a governance strategy in the region. While governance is national in nature, this work can be done in a regional manner. Indeed, civil societies in the region can improve their performance by creating regional networks for sharing experiences, mutual capacity building, and increasing their impact by pushing for change at regional levels. As solutions need to be locally grounded, it is important people learn from each other rather than always from Western donors. As outsiders often do not grasp the fine political details of current and past situations and dynamics, it is important to let local people and organizations be in the driver's seat. The fact that beneath their similarities there are also major differences between the countries in the region actually strengthens the case for a regional exchange strategy: people can learn most from each other when they have both commonalities and differences. Finally, if regional organizations with some clout are coming into being, it is good to have a civil society ready and capable for working at that level as well. In short, a civil society strengthening strategy can at least in part be conceived of within a regional perspective.

132. The role of international actors is not to invest in governance as a product (the institutions of a well-governed state) but rather to invest in governance as a process, which means foremost helping civil society organizations acquire the strategic and technical capacities that will enable them to play a role in claiming/promoting good governance. International actors' role is to assist local civil societies to find their own way, help them establish regional networks, create conditions favorable to the emergence of a genuine civil society and contribute to containing autocrats' and warlords' capacities for wielding unmitigated and often violent power against civil society.

The rule of law

133. Another key issue in the region is the lack of rule of law at the level of daily life. Instances of control of and redress for the many small and large abuses of power, instances of corruption and the like that people suffer from are very weak. Countries in the Great Lakes region will not soon -- nor can they necessarily be expected to -- be pluralist democracies, but at least the trend should be one in

which the rule of law increasingly prevails, where redress exists for ordinary citizens, where institutions function in objective and increasingly predictable ways.

134. The international community has been motivated in part by a vision of rule of law, as represented in the World Bank's good governance work and the PRSP/MTEF-type of work. Both of these are informed by a vision of a competent, efficient, predictable, and transparent state -- a notion similar to rule of law. This work is to be lauded. It suffers from three limitations, however:

- it is focused too much only on the institutions of the (western) state in isolation of civil society;
- it has a limited understanding of particular local factors;
- it focuses mainly on economics and economic policy, neglecting social and political dimensions.

135. As a result, there currently exists a disjuncture in countries like Rwanda and Uganda between a state superstructure that at the top level displays parts of a "developmental state" model (with competent, well-trained, hard-working and well-paid people producing quality documents in an atmosphere of growing predictability and good data), and the rest of life, where, at the lower reaches of state-society relations as well as intra-society relations, clientelism, arbitrariness, and exclusion continue to prevail. As the large majority of the international community has not the faintest idea of what really happens in these countries outside of the top level of the state, it is likely that this disjuncture will only continue to grow. Creative thinking about how to change this is urgently needed.

Minority rights

136. Minority rights is a major governance issue in the Great Lakes: all four countries have to deal with this issue. Although it is particularly appropriate for the Great Lakes' current predicament, the field of minority rights is a little-understood part of the human rights movement, less individualistic in its outlook. Yet, there exists solid international and domestic law in this field, as well as an enormous reservoir of on-the-ground experience, especially in Central Europe and the Caucasus -- troubled regions historically known for longstanding dynamics of division and violence. The international law leaves sufficient margin for maneuver to adapt itself to local conditions and power relations; what matters, then, is the process by which minority rights come into being.

PROPOSITIONS

Proposition IV.1 Promote alternatives to rapid elections following conflict (Type C)

137. Fostering good governance is not the same as holding elections, especially not for desperately poor and divided post-conflict societies such as almost all those in the Great Lakes region. In a context of regional violence, the danger with general elections is twofold. First, if elections come too soon after a conflict in which ethnicity is a salient variable, they may encourage the mobilization of the population along ethnic lines, preparing the ground for future violent conflicts. Second, election will often not be fair, since the dominant warring party or parties will likely take control over the election process, eliminating any real possibility of challenge by other groups (particularly the unarmed ones), and use the election as a way to legitimate its ruling position. The resulting resentment may create disenchantment about democracy, and worse, lay the groundwork for future violent conflicts.

138. Peacebuilding actors must therefore move away from the almost Pavlovian reflex of calling for quick general elections, and must be creative about the possible ways of moving out of a conflict into a legitimate state governed by rule of law. Such a strategy must combine several elements:

- An acceptance of a long transition (10 years or so).
- During that transition:
 - A willingness by international actors to act as a counter-power in the absence of an organized pluralist political system during such a transition, thus creating the space for civil society to claim and gain some measure of good governance in the meantime. Evidently, such counter-power should be established on the most solid grounds possible: fine political analysis, broad-based listening to civil society, general principles of human rights, systematic search for advice from all sides, etc. It is clear that the exercise of such counter-power is extremely difficult and must be limited to only a few crucial elements on which agreement within the international community can be maintained.
 - Implement of a coherent, long-term strategy for civil society strengthening.
 - Create conditions favorable to the emergence of civil society.
 - Work on rule of law, flexible and adapted to local circumstances.

The latter three propositions are detailed below.

Proposition IV.2 Conduct a long-term regional project to strengthen civil society (Type C)

139. A coherent, long-term, and regional project for strengthening civil society's capacities to play a role in promoting good governance is possible. It is not easy, however, and certainly far removed from mainstream donor practice of supporting a few favorite NGOs. It requires a clear vision of where one wishes to go over a 10 year period, as well as a willingness to let go of some control. It is something some Dutch NGOs have quite some experience with (albeit not fully and not at an explicitly regional level) and that fits with general Dutch democratic values. It works in three steps:

- Begin strengthening organizations at the national level.
- Assist organizations to build links across borders.
- Ensure that umbrella structures are controlled by the members.

Let us discuss each of these steps in some more detail.

A. Begin strengthening organizations at the national level

140. A regional project for strengthening civil society must start nationally, albeit in all the countries of the region. It is not possible to skip this step, or else the weight of the regional superstructure risks crushing the national organizations. Start with a limited number of civil society organizations and/or leaders who have the potential to gain democratic and strategic capacities and to influence the rest of civil society. The key issue is to identify the most promising elements. Women's organizations and leaders are of particular interest here: the problems they face and the answers they seek are more often than average of a cross-cutting nature., i.e., they can bridge groups across ethnic, economic, religious, cultural and political divides. This can be important for a wider pro-peace strategy.

141. Create capacity-building programs that will not corrupt or kill these organizations. Offer opportunities for other civil society organizations to join the club. The challenges here are both internal to the organizations (increasing internal democracy and transparency, improving management, creating learning, strengthening capacity for strategic and risks analysis) and external (building relations and networks with other organizations, designing effective advocacy campaigns and policy proposals). Do this through long-term, light collaboration that is respectful of internal rhythms. In this respect, the Netherlands possesses some experience already in the form of the program approach adopted by NGOs such as NOVIB.

142. Part of this first step is also a deliberate creating of relations and interactions between civil society and national institutions (political, administrative, judicial, and even military). Involving the government and parliamentarians in good governance discussions, panels, and exchanges may result in declarations civil society can use afterwards to support their claims for good governance and gain progress towards it. It may also decrease distrust between both sides.

143. The originality of this first step is twofold:

- It is not the fact of working with a few selected CSOs; after all, that is what almost all civil society sector programs do. Rather, it is that in this approach the initial group of organizations is not necessarily limited to traditional development NGOs, but includes often less well-known, more informal, emerging grassroots organizations and associations that possess the required dynamism and potential, such as women's associations. The difficulty of this approach is to recognize these organizations, to look beyond the usual coterie of organizations who know how to walk the walk and especially talk the talk of donors. This requires fine analysis and flexibility, as well as a willingness to work on a long-term basis in a partnership mode, and at the same time, a willingness to learn, and to abandon some of them if necessary (but not after some ridiculously short project-determined time frame).
- It also lies in the fact that the capacity building efforts are mainly geared at the broad political challenges facing civil society organizations such as strategic and risk analysis, internal democracy and transparency, advocacy campaigns and policy proposals. Current "civil society strengthening" practice is mainly focused on technical and managerial capacities, and take place through expensive short-term technical assistance such as the supply of some computers and vehicles, training in managerial techniques to satisfy the administrative requirements of donors, etc.

B- Strengthening networks, first at the national level, then at the regional level

144. In a second phase, begin shifting the focus from national organization to the regional level. This is where one begins building links between these organizations from different countries, according to their own agendas and rhythm. To build relations and networks, one needs to adopt a three-phase strategy in which support programs first create opportunities and incentives for this first group of civil society organizations to develop informal coordination and dialogue within itself; then extend this from the first circle to other interested civil society organizations of the same country; and finally, extend this to organizations from neighboring countries (the latter two phases can be done in parallel), thus favoring the slow emergence of civil society regional networks.

145. The above approach has not been designed from scratch, but rather, has been used in Burundi, Rwanda and eastern DRC for the past 5 years in the Canadian funded regional projects PADD – ACIPA (with a budget of approximately \$1 million/year), the oldest regional civil society strengthening program in the Great Lakes. Having started with five organizations in each country, it now has a solid network of scores of organizations in all three countries, which is maybe the most active element preparing for the upcoming International Conference through the « Initiative de concertation de la société civile pour la Conférence Régionale ». ACIPA’s current phase is due to end in 2006.

C- Ensure that umbrella structures are controlled by the members

146. Once donors begin to support networks of civil society organizations, many often wish to create umbrella organizations, first at the national level, then at a regional level. While this evolution is natural and this wish legitimate, support to the implementation of these umbrella organisations must nevertheless avoid three major pitfalls:

- the first danger is to create these umbrella organisations too quickly. There is a tendency among the Great Lakes civil society activists to push for the creation of umbrellas. This is partly due to a justified sense that umbrella organizations offer the potential of increased power and impact (“eendracht is macht”), and partly because of their close contacts with the aid business, for which it is much simpler to deal with one umbrella organization than a myriad of grassroots ones. The end result of this tendency in the Great Lakes is that most existing umbrella organisations (often called “collectives”) are artificial ones, with no real felt need for it. Resisting the rapid creation of umbrella organisations is a good civil society strengthening practice.
- when it is sound to create an umbrella organisation, the second pitfall is to formalize it too fast. This tendency is partly due to the secret expectation of urban intellectual activists that a formal organization will create jobs, but also, again, to their (too) close contacts with the practices of the aid business, for which any serious organisation must be a “professional” one, *i.e.*, with a permanent office and staff, vehicles and so on. This has induced over time a conception that “serious” civil society organisations must be controlled by professional staff rather than by voluntary activists, and this mindset is now so deeply integrated in most activist minds that they have problems stepping out of it. Resisting too rapid a formalizing of umbrella organisations is of good civil society strengthening practice. Even when the need for an umbrella organization is really felt, ad hoc ones can be a lot more effective than formal ones, and they do not become donor dependant.
- when it is sound to formalize umbrella organizations, the last, and probably most important, pitfall is to fund them directly. A better practice is to fund them through their membership. Donor practice though has always been not only to push for the creation of umbrellas, but also to fund them directly. Experience of the past 20 years of such practice in the Great Lakes repeatedly shows the same end result: umbrellas become and stay totally donor dependant, even after decades, and focus on how to please their donors (for renewed financing) instead of how to serve their members. Control over the umbrellas is rapidly shifted from the members to the permanent staff and becomes poorly rooted; they then start to compete with their members on their own turf (such as doing field work, instead of supporting their members to do field work), which weakens their grassroots members instead of strengthening them. Donors act this way because it is more convenient for them, but they create a patron-client relationship that is poorly rooted in local society and easily captured by government officials.

150. It is thus imperative that, when umbrella organisations need to be funded by donors, the usual downward flow of money from donors to these umbrellas is reversed to an upward flow from grassroots members to umbrella organizations. This is the only way to structurally keep the umbrella under control of its members. Upward funded umbrellas will not have the choice but to serve their members. Doing this is not easy, since grassroots organisations do not often have the financial means to support such umbrellas. In a report regarding the support by 11.11.11 to Rwandan human rights umbrellas, Andre Bourque has suggested an innovative solution to this problem, *e.g.*, to add a matching grant to the grassroots organizations' contributions to the umbrella (a multiple of five perhaps, or ten), *provided that this grassroots contribution is significant in their eyes*. It is important that the contribution of members to an organisation "hurts" them enough to keep them aware of the relevance of their organisation. The day they feel they do not need the umbrella anymore, they stop paying, leading to the eventual disappearance of the organization. What is most important is that the flow of money goes upward, the members control the umbrella, and thus the umbrella satisfies its members needs before those of donors.

Where to start?

147. If the Dutch decide to get involved in such a Civil Society Strengthening project, it must be harmonized with ACIPA. This can be done either by financing a future phase, or by extending the current project to, say, the rest of the DRC and Uganda. Whichever way the Dutch decide to go, they should profit from the lessons learned by ACIPA before launching its own project, and establish a strong collaboration link during its implementation.

148. Other entry points could be : support civil groups interested in networking that are less covered by the current networks (youth, universities, labor unions, Initiative de Genève – see Annex 3 for a list of existing initiatives); support the « Initiative de concertation de la société civile pour la Conférence Régionale » for its preparation and follow up of the Regional Conference; etc.

149. Launching such a project must be based on important stakes, so that there is an incentive for the organizations to work their way through the difficulties such a process is bound to raise. Such stake could be governance issues themselves (democracy, rule of law, etc.), if interests are already high on these matters and a critical mass of civil society leaders ready to work on it. But it can also be socio-economic issues that have a high potential of governance improvement, such as, in the case of the DRC, the implementation of the regulatory mechanism to stop violent exploitation of natural resources presented in Chapter II. It could also be done, though to a much lesser extend, through environmental projects if they are correctly chosen and designed. Indeed, working on such concrete issues create the incentive for civil society's actors to spend the energy to be strengthened at strategic level (policy development, strategic analysis, advocacy, networking, etc.) and to create umbrella organizations that will rely on them alone. But, even if such indirect issues are chosen to start strengthening civil society, governance issues must clearly be included up front in the project as stakes towards which the project will be evaluated to avoid project capture.

Proposition IV.3 Work with States to create incentives for collective action (Type C)

The strategy described above has been based on working with selected (albeit broad, and growing) number of existing organizations, assisting them in strengthening their capacities for strategic

impacts at the national and the regional level, allowing them to network and learn from each other. This strategy must be complemented by another one, however, that seeks to create conditions propitious to the emergence of a stronger civil society. This necessarily means working with the state, at the central and local level.

150. As we mentioned above, building a genuine civil society cannot be limited to working only with a set of “good” NGOs and CSOs (even if these organizations could somehow be objectively proven to be the “best” money can buy). The kind of civil society that eventually can create rights and democracy grows out of the engagement of people at all levels of society, as they interact with each other and with the state in ways that affect and promote the public good. This requires people to engage in collective action, to build trust and confidence in their own capacities and the actions of others, to develop the ability to oppose and negotiate and ally themselves with other groups within civil society and with government as need requires. What we are describing here amounts to a transition from a set of highly personalized relationships between society and the state (as well as within society), in which individuals and organizations seek access to ad hoc benefits as clients (of the state, of local elites, *and of the development aid system* as well! We come back to this last point later), to much more institutionalized relationships governed by predictable, transparent rules, in which individuals and groups are able to demand access to rights as citizens

151. Aid agencies can assist this process by creating incentives and support for people to organize at the local level, initially in all likelihood around urgent livelihood interests. Such work will be medium-term and structural, rather than limited to direct support for CSOs; it will cut across all fields of development cooperation, not only civil society sector work; it will focus as much on the state as on existing civil society organizations; and program design will be crucial. The focus should be on helping design programs (or fund these if they already exist) in such a way as to promote collective action, particularly by poor people and women, since they are in the majority, and are most disadvantaged when it comes to getting their voices heard.. Anuradha Jodhi and Mick Moore (2000, 7) make correctly argue that “the environment in which poor people and external organizations interact is frequently inimical to collective action by the poor. It is characterized by so much uncertainty and arbitrariness that investment in collective action is not worthwhile.” External agencies should concentrate more on creating incentives for collective action, above all by removing the obstacles that they themselves create.

152. In the context of Rwanda, Sue Unsworth and Peter Uvin applied this to its ongoing decentralization policy (ongoing in other Great Lakes region countries as well), arguing that donor support should not be traditionally project-based, but rather “predictable, pooled, locally accountable, and facilitated.” Predictable refers to long-term fixed commitments –better fewer funds but long-term than more but short-term. Throughout the world, there are plenty of examples of small groups of people getting together to get access to the relatively short term benefits offered by project funding, but all too often those arrangements collapse when the project ends. More predictable funding allows people to acquire the experience to plan for, manage, and monitor resources, to learn from mistakes, to gain confidence in their capacities, and to pass through elections and learn that they can change those people who did not do their jobs well. All this contributes to stronger and more “institutionalized” collective action. None of this can happen unless donors are willing to pool their funds and channel them in an equitable manner to decentralised structures. This is so not only for obvious ethical reasons (why should one district

receive vastly more funds than the neighbouring one?), but because of the distorted incentives separately funded projects create that undermine collective action. If some districts, sectors, or cells receive vastly more support than neighbouring ones for the simple reason that they were lucky enough to be covered by the an outside NGO or bilateral agency, the international community is reinforcing exactly the kind of clientelist system to which it so strongly objects when states engage in it. This is a system in which personal contacts, ideology, negotiations between remote powerful actors (donors carving up the territory into their own fiefdoms) –all processes outside the control of the vast majority of ordinary people—can bring about vast flows of money – or nothing. Such projects increase the power of those intermediaries that can access the foreign money – typically people belonging to elite groups that have entries into the international community.

153. Another possible entry point to create predictable, transparent rules that would help civil society emergence would be to support an action-research dynamics on the subject of “decentralization and legitimacy”, based on the experience on the emergence of “centers of legitimacy” and other decentralization processes in the region. It could also be to support the ongoing experience conducted by Pole on the emergence of legitimate local institution in Eastern DRC (in conjunction with the installation of community defence apparatus, for instance).

Proposition IV.4 Render donor behavior more propitious to the emergence of a stronger civil society (Type C)

154. Donors can also help move from a highly personalized relationships to more institutionalized ones by wiping in front of their own door. They can do this by developing a code of conduct, not necessarily to refuse all corruption, but to create full transparency about all costs of all project inputs, to allow feedback and input from parties affected, ... Donors must also change their aid practices from ones which contributed to nurture the conflict dynamics into ones that favour the emergence of genuine civil society organisations and that counter client relationship induce by the flow of money, as it was mentioned above with the umbrella organisations. The Dutch could take leadership in designing and implementing a donor code of honor and new aid practices.

Proposition IV.5 Provide diplomatic pressures (Type C)

155. It has been mentioned before that current leaders who benefit from a system that denies good governance will resist moving to better governance by all means. Looking at the historical evidence, we see how the forces of moderation and compromise within the region are always the first ones to be killed, to disappear, to be silenced. An emerging civil society struggling to improve public governance is not strong enough to contain these violent assaults from autocrats, warlords and spoilers. It needs some defence from the outside until it can deal with the situation on its own.

156. Beside assisting local civil societies to find their own way and establish regional networks, international actors’ role is to, and contribute to containing autocrats’ and warlords’ capacities for wielding unmitigated and often violent power against an emerging civil society. A policy of “*intense critical dialogue*” and diplomatic pressures regarding cases of murder and disappearance of civil society actors working for good governance is imperative, although is not easy. This is one of the few areas – outright murder of political moderates - where we would suggest a heavy-handed,

confrontational approach, similar to the one proposed with violent entrepreneurs in Chapter II, from restrictions on freedom of circulation, freeze of foreign bank accounts ... up to pending international suit.

157. However, a clear difference must be made between “diplomatic pressures” and “diplomatic protection”, the former consisting of pressures applied by foreign countries on a government to unknot a situation (of murder, of disappearance, etc.), the later consisting of shelter provided by foreign countries to individuals who feel endangered. If there is no question about the necessity of the first one, one has to be cautious about the second one because of its possible hijack by so called activists with hidden agenda.

158. In a world of poverty and anti-value as the Great Lakes one, it has been repeatedly observed that individuals become civil society activists only as a springboard for a western country. Everything happens as if their main goal is to use their position as a channel through which they will have access to their “ticket to freedom”. The recipe is quite simple:

- First, one has to become member of a civil society organization (or, preferably, create his own) and head for presidency or secretary general.
- Then, one has to become champion, in the eye of at least one donor, on one of the sector that is relished by western countries and that generates a certain amount of personal risk (such as democracy, human rights, etc.).
- Then, the manoeuvre becomes delicate: it consists of taking enough risks (through public declarations and other sorts of pressures on the authorities applauded by the donor), to trigger a threatening reaction from the authorities, strong enough to be taken seriously by the sponsor, but not enough to be really in danger.
- When the sponsor is convinced that his champion is in real danger, then it is time to ask for asylum, which is swiftly procured by the sponsor, with a one way air-ticket.
- With such individuals, they usually cease all activism shortly after they have secure their position in their host country.

Cynical? The Great Lakes have plenty of examples. Which, of course, does not mean all call for asylum was a long time and cynical plan. But it exists.

159. The effects of such cynical behavior are deterrent on civil society. Not only these so called activists profit from strengthening programs in place of real activists, which capacities are lost when they leave. They above all put whole organizations and real activists in danger with their risk taking initiatives that are not based on sound strategic and risk analysis from the point of view of organizational interests and capacities to manage the effects of these initiatives, but from a personal hidden interest instead.

160. This is one of the reason it is so important for donors to design their governance program and use conditionalities from the point of view of capacity of whole organizations (not only the president) to locally and sustainably manage the risks induced by these interventions.

Proposition IV.6 Conduct a regional action-research to improve Rule of Law (Type C)

161. Moving forwards on rule of law is in part a matter of the judicial sector – and hence legal advice and judicial reform are important - but it is by no means limited to that. Indeed, under the

current circumstances, it is doubtful if investments in the formal justice sector alone can deliver much in terms of rule of law. So, original thinking will need to go towards parallel and alternative mechanisms.

162. The Netherlands could bring together people from different walks of life, including women, and trying to reflect with them on the different dimensions of, and paths to, rule of law. Creative thinking is required here: honestly assessing current constraints (which will be different between the DRC on one extreme and Tanzania on the other); analyze the feasibility of alternative mechanisms, including the creation of ombudsmen, whistle-blowers, and other administrative and social mechanisms that multiply channels of information and redress, traditional authorities and other alternative instances of governance. etc; learning from other countries; seeking successful experiences elsewhere, at both the local and national level.

163. Given its experience in these sectors in Rwanda and Uganda, the Netherlands has a good basis to begin with, and to extend the process to other countries in the region. This does not require an enormous financial commitment to the non-partner countries, although some investment in selected areas there would be welcome. Rather, it is about a willingness to create a network of regional actors involved in a learning process, to represent the insights gained from this in for where the Dutch voice counts (EU, national coordination meetings, the Bretton Woods institutions etc.), and to manage the partner-country programs in an action-research, learning mode. The Dutch could go one step further and engage in similar types of rule of law programs in all countries in the region, thus creating even stronger opportunities for regional learning (and, by the way, also creating some internal economies of scale in terms of competencies and procedures).

Proposition IV.7 Conduct a regional action-research on minority rights (Type B)

164. Given the importance of the minority rights issue in the Great Lakes, it might be opportune to launch a process of regional action-research about minority rights.

165. A first part of such a process could be to inform key people in civil societies and governments (and, even the donor community, which rather needs it as well) of the current body of thought and experience on the subject. Following this, there is a need for exchanges between countries in the region, dialogues between people and scholars, exchanges with people from outside the region, information and discussion campaigns, support to local research and dialogues, learning from ongoing initiatives which could be fed into policy.

166. This is eminently something where small country like the Netherlands could make a difference – and, indeed, historically, leadership roles in the minority rights movement have been all held by small states (the OSCE’s High Commissioner on Minority Rights was of course Max van der Stoel, a Dutch citizen). In addition, the Netherlands has a world-class international law community which could be brought into this work as well. Some people in the Netherlands and Canada are at this moment discussing how to learn from the experience of the Office of the High Commissioner of Minorities – starting work in the Great Lakes region could be crucial.

167. We end on this topic because in many ways, minority rights is about the future of the Great Lakes region. Once the active fighting has stopped and some modicum of stability and good

governance has arrived, it will be time to start thinking about the bigger structural issues which are the ultimate sources of violent conflict at the local level. These are not subjects that experts alone can address. Minority rights, for instance, is not something to which only constitutional experts hold the keys. Local and regional networks of civil society will have to come together to think about what the Great Lakes should look like in one or two generations down the road. Perhaps the time to address these issues is fast approaching. The Netherlands should keep its ears open to see if it has in fact arrived, and if so, it should support regional endeavors of this sort.

CHAPTER V: INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE NEXT STEPS

INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

168. Until now, we have presented a multitude of possible paths for to develop a regional strategy. We realize the Dutch could not implement all of these: the aim was to present a menu of options, and a particular way of looking at the current challenges of peace, economics, and governance in the region. In this last section, we will briefly outline the sort of organizational changes required to adopt a regional strategy, whatever the specific substantive choices made by the Netherlands.

169. Adjusting institutional ways of doing to a new situation is a task that needs in depth knowledge of the institution's values, culture, procedures, managerial opportunities and contingencies, etc. These are all things we could of course not get a deep understanding of in the course of this mandate. The following comments must therefore be seen as a checklist of requirements that should be addressed by the Dutch decision makers before launching the regional program, rather than concrete propositions about these requirements.

170. The Great Lakes region will remain fragile, unpredictable, and rapidly changing for years to come. The regional dynamics at work are very complex to understand and follow up. Sustainable solution to the security problem, the inequitable exploitation of resources, or to ill governance will take time. Adopting a regional strategy in a crisis-affected zone entails challenges for the Dutch government itself: internal institutional processes, procedures, and mechanisms must be adapted to such a zone.

Cohesion

171. The Great Lakes region is among the two priority regions of the Netherlands African Policy. Countries of the Great Lakes do not have the same status for the Netherlands, only two of them being "partner countries". As partner countries are higher in the priority scale than the others, it can affect the regional program cohesion, even more if different status implies different procedures. As country programs are expected to complement the regional program, how to have cohesive regional policy in a priority area (the Great Lakes) when only two of the countries involved are priority countries? One possible innovative avenue could be that the Great Lakes region as a whole is given the status of a priority area, a "partner region".

172. Cohesion will also be reached by common assessment; regional planning and decision making, regional coordination; and regional communication, learning and institutional memory.

Common assessment and regular updating

173. In crisis-affected zones, agencies of the same organization have a tendency to develop different assessments of the situation when acting with different protagonists, sometimes to the point where dialogue between agencies is almost impossible. Failure to reach a common assessment and to share it through the whole intervention pipeline can neutralize the effectiveness of a response, for instance in designing integrated approaches/programs and in reacting appropriately to the changing situation because key persons in different areas do not share the same understanding of strategic issues. While a complete consensus on all things regional is not

required to make it work, a regional strategy does require that the embassies and aid offices concerned:

- jointly accept the importance of having a regional policy;
- jointly accept to use that policy as a regular tool in their program management cycle;
- share a joint assessment of at least those areas where joint actions shall take place. The assessment must regularly be updated and shared.

Regional planning and decision making

174. Integration of regional and national programs requires that their planning cycles be closely linked, which, in turns, require that all national program management cycles in the region be synchronized. Once the programs synchronized, their common planning is helped by a joint assessment process.

175. The ministry must also determine where will lie the decision-making power related to the regional program and how it will be performed. Will political decisions be centralized at the regional desk, or will it lie with the four or five relevant embassies, who would then work by consensus? Where would lie the operational management?

Regional coordination

176. Regional coordination is a crucial factor of success of a regional program. Coordination of an integrated regional program implies harmonization and synchronization of both interventions of different nature (Track-1, Track-2 and Track-3) at the regional level, and of the regional program with the national ones. This may also require the synchronization of the efforts of human resources that are now geographically and institutionally dispersed. This requires some person or desk that is actually in charge of making this happen, for, if it depends on the goodwill of over-burdened people to voluntarily add more work to their agendas, it will simply not happen. A regional program thus needs a regional coordinator.

177. This being stated, it must be clarified if coordinating this program needs full time or part time coordination, where it will be based (in The Hague or in an embassy? and if the latter: which one?), which line of command that person will answer to, with whom to establish functional lines, which status will be given to that function in the hierarchy, etc.

Regional communication / learning

178. As stated above, joint assessment must be performed by embassies and aid services in the region. This joint assessment will then have to be regularly updated. If the political decision power lies in the embassies, shared information will be needed to build consensus between them, including the program managers if they are installed in the embassies. Not only must information feed into decision-making, but learning must also occur from the field to the regional level to adjust programs to results and trends on the ground. Appropriate communication mechanisms must be designed and implemented to properly feed these various functions.

179. Assuring a proper flow of information will be under the coordinator's responsibility. This does not mean this person is the only channel through which the information should flow. Regular information sharing meetings between the program managers, and between them and the ambassadors will be needed, probably facilitated by the coordinator. For instance, having a

discussion every 3, 4, or 6 months would create occasions to mentally step from the national to the regional level, update current regional strategies, create joint understanding of trends (for people in different countries may not be aware of certain impacts, or may view them differently), etc. To prepare for these meetings, a tool like the one we proposed for the questionnaire at the beginning of this assignment may help – a simple and light tool for reflection on recent trends and their impact beyond borders. This kind of tool is used since years by the regional program APICA for its own meeting with its agents.

Institutional memory

180. In crisis-affected zones, donors are finding it difficult to build up an institutional memory in the field, which can limit their capacity to respond appropriately to an ever-changing situation while keeping long term vision and breath. The main cause of this difficulty is the high turnover of embassies' staff (except the ambassadors) in crisis-affected countries: most embassies' staff are young, often on their first assignment, usually stay for 2 years, and have difficulty providing information on either the region or their employer's past interventions going back more than two or three years. This lack of institutional memory can have serious consequences when coping with complex crisis that has lasted for decades. The reason most often given by donors for this lack of senior professionals (who have precedence over junior staff in the choice of assignments) is the lack of incentives for them to choose a post in a fragile country.

181. In this context, building up an institutional memory is difficult, and must rely not only on individuals but also on systems. The Ministry should develop incentives to attract and retain senior professionals in the region, and implement an appropriate institutional memory system.

Regional program implementation

182. It has been stated above that all national program management cycles in the region be synchronized with the regional one. However, this doesn't mean that implementation must be standardized. On the contrary, to respond to local specificities requires differences in the rhythm of program execution. Such a modulated response is only possible with an administrative flexibility that would permit, for instance, the same component to be executed at a different pace in different locations depending on changes in each situation, or which would allow funds to be reallocated from one component to another within a national program.

183. Given that the regional program will probably consist of interventions of the three kinds (regional, multi-national, national but with regional exchange), a decision needs to be made where the implementation responsibilities for each kind of action will reside: at the regional desk or within the regular country delegations?

184. Also, it must be decided which program interventions will be conducted directly by the Ministry staff, and which ones will be transferred to executing agencies (international or national NGOs, private firms ...). If interventions are transferred, the status of these agencies in the institutional set up must be defined: will they participate in the meetings? Will they relate directly to the coordinator or to program managers? etc.

Reaction time, cautiousness and flexibility

185. Experience has shown that crisis resolution processes are marked by successive stages of progress and setbacks. Nevertheless, such a process must take advantage of windows of opportunity that appear, rather than wait for ideal conditions, which may never happen, or be reversed before they happen. Donors need to reconcile the need to respond rapidly to a window of opportunity with the need to be cautious in order to avoid possible setbacks. A short reaction time is an important factor to the success of a program in a fragile zone and also a positive factor for raising visibility. Indeed, donors with a reputation of rapid reaction are regularly perceived by other donors and beneficiaries as being more important than reality may warrant. The Netherlands is frequently mentioned by beneficiaries and other donors in the DRC as being very quick to adapt its programs or grants; it is an asset it should protect carefully and capitalize on in its regional program.

186. The main factors that contribute to rapid reaction are decentralized decision mechanisms and procedural flexibility / simplicity. As far as procedural flexibility is concerned, a progressive and revolving program cycle better meets the challenge of managing a regional program in a crisis-affected region than the classic detailed and linear planning. For example: programming cycle on objectives / results should be long to assure breath and vision; while the cycle on activities should be short to assure adaptation to a changing situation. Implementing a regional program may offer the opportunity to revise and improve decision mechanisms and procedures, even if they are already effective, so as to further increase their effectiveness in terms of reaction time and flexibility.

Time frame and commitment

187. As stated above, sustainable solutions to the problems of insecurity, the inequitable exploitation of resources, or widespread ill governance will take time, much more time than the usual donor time frame. Fortunately, the Netherlands, together with Denmark, already adopted long term commitment for their partner countries. It should be possible for the Netherlands to adopt similar commitment for its regional program.

Strategies and approaches

188. As mentioned in this paper, standard interventions in peace and security, economic development and good governance may not be sufficient to correctly address the problems in the Great Lakes. The challenge is therefore to broaden these standard strategies and approaches, taking into account the linkages between the global framework and local circumstances.

189. Also, it is now generally accepted (and has been repeatedly mentioned in this paper) that local ownership is a critical factor in ensuring peace and development, that sustainable and equitable solutions to a crisis cannot come from the outside. The donor community therefore needs to play a supportive rather than a leadership role in defining problems and identifying solutions, and often focus on process instead of content. Nevertheless, donors may find this difficult for a number of reasons, such as the difficulty for genuine local solutions to emerge in a very degraded situation (as the one in the DRC), lack of local or regional institutional capacity, pressures from international and national interests to rapidly produce “results,” etc. More generally, working in a true supportive role is not an easy task, and in a fragile situation it is definitely a challenge even for skilled professionals; in addition, supportive strategies and approaches are not widely mastered by professionals in the development business, whose performance is often appreciated in “moving the

money” terms. To move from product dominated strategies to a true supportive role may need to implement capacity development activities for program officers and adapt human resources systems so they match the new requirements.

Human resources and human resource management systems

190. The ever-changing and complex situation in the region might need the appointment of a regional political adviser. He or she could be tasked with providing program staff with regular monitoring reports about the Great Lakes situation and the evolution of the program in every country of the region. This exact profile of this post and the recruitment procedure would need to be developed.

191. Needs for additional human resources should be assessed based on the program load. However, for a donor to play a long-term supportive role with substantial funds, to respond rapidly but with caution, and to maintain flexibility will undoubtedly strain human resources. All human resources systems (e.g. workload assessment, recruitment, incentives, performance evaluation etc) should be adapted to ensure that the most appropriate professionals are recruited and retained. All personnel assigned to the region should receive special training relevant to the situation, such as the framework of analysis, stress management in a conflict-affected situation, negotiating skills, security procedures, etc.

192. Given the necessity for specialized human resource for the program, the question we posed earlier is once again relevant: will they be based at the regional desk or in several embassies? If the latter, will they be dedicated resources or shared between national and regional programs?

Material resources

193. It is clear that having significant financial resources at the regional level is the best way to create attention to regional matters by all –nothing makes things happen more than access to money. While designing the financial set up of the this regional program between the different funds (Security fund, Great Lakes fund ...), it should be taken into account to format it in a way, among other things, to facilitate collaboration and coordination. For instance, the Great Lakes fund would come partly by drawing on the current budgets for each of the 4 countries (say, 15% would move upwards over a 3-year period) and by augmenting this by matching funds from The Hague (say, the equivalent amount), so as to create an incentive for all to participate.

THE NEXT STEPS :

194. There is still a long way to go from this paper to the real start up of the Great Lakes regional program:

- discussions must continue within the Dutch actors until decisions are taken about the components of the program, its interventions, its geographic and sector distribution and its financial envelope;
- then the programming phase will start, probably by performing more detailed feasibility studies and assessments about the chosen components and interventions, followed by the first integrated programming cycle. In parallel, the institutional challenges presented above must be addressed, solutions to the forecast key bottlenecks designed, and the institutional set up decided. In the meantime, country programs could be revised with the perspective of harmonizing them with the regional program orientations decided at the end of the previous phase.

- then we move to the installation phase, during which the regional program institutional set up is installed and staff recruited and appointed, while implementing the administrative procedures and decision mechanisms.
- the regional program will finally be ready for kick off.

To start the first phase off, clearly some form of regional workshop is required, and, indeed, planned: this document, as well as other inputs, could constitute the basis for the adoption of a set of jointly agreed upon actions.

ANNEX 1: PRO-POOR GROWTH PROPOSITIONS

Proposition 1 Work on trans-border economic projects (Type A)

A few simple and evident ideas are:

- Prioritize the reconstruction of key trans-border trade infrastructures (roads, markets)
- Work on crucial trans-border power projects. This requires regional planning, preferably through a regional institution, but in its absence can be done by donors with the governments concerned. Examples include the restoration of the electrical plant on the Rusisi river (useful for Burundi, Rwanda, DRC); funding the Power Development and Transmission Program proposed by the Nile Basin Initiative; or, more difficult still, tapping into the trans-border oil and gas resources that exist between the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda.

We recommend funding trans-border projects that promise the highest and fastest *political* pay-off together with its economic impact, i.e., that create win-win situations for a number of neighboring governments and their peoples, and build relations of cooperation and trust around relatively neutral issues among elites and ordinary people.

Proposition 2 Support a fair debate about pro-poor regional trade and investment agreements (Type A)

Free trade within the Great Lakes has major historical precedents. Regional trade is also one of *the* things that can produce immediate and tangible benefits to both elites and ordinary people in all the countries of the region. While in recent years, some of the regional trade has had very ill effects, promoting regional trade and investment is absolutely necessary for the future.

At first sight, it seems as if a small country like the Netherlands cannot contribute much in this domain: the power here lies with the Bretton Woods institutions and the governments of the region. The main Dutch contribution, we believe, could be to work together with other donors and local civil society organizations to ensure that the debate about liberalization of trade and investment takes place in a context where divergent and local ideas are heard as well – and not only those coming from Washington. Indeed, while regional free trade is generally a good thing, the speed of opening up, for example, is certainly a matter of some debate especially when it comes to including countries from outside the region such as Kenya, South Africa, or the EU and the US.

There are strong, and possibly justified fears that given the economic and technological advantage of these countries over those in the region, they will be able to flood the Great Lakes with cheaper products, or to buy up all the profitable enterprises. While neo-liberal economic theory has no problem with such a course of events (since consumers are suppose to benefit after all, and nationality hardly matters -- only efficiency does), it may be politically and even socially dangerous, especially in zones that are economically and politically weak. Yet, these nuances are under-debated. Currently, the Bretton Woods institutions hold almost full sway over such macro-level policies. They are intellectually and operationally un-challenged by everyone: the rich countries share this overall thrust and do not get engaged in the details, while the poor ones' voices count for little, so all they can do is drag their feet on policy implementation.

There is a great need for these debates to occur at a higher level. The Netherlands could help contribute by adding a measure of non-ideological pragmatism, of carefulness, and of grounding in a broader range of local actors, to the generally beneficial move towards free trade in the region. It could do so by:

- 2.1 *Linking up with others*, such as the UK, to do more research that brings together local actors with good economists (Oxfam has done great work in the region, but more is needed)
- 2.2 *Strengthening the capacities of civil society's actors*, such as labor unions, farmers' syndicates, and research-action initiatives to express themselves on these matters
- 2.3 *Bringing some of the resulting information to the table in high-level policy-making*, including in those instances (such as the Board of Directors of the Bank and the IMF) where their voices have much more weight. This requires channels of communication between people on the ground and those who sit on delegations to the boards of the Bretton Woods institutions – channels which in most countries hardly exist, as it is the Ministry of Finance that fulfills the latter function, totally detached from the embassies and aid agencies on the ground.

This is not very expensive, and it can be done even in countries that are not partner countries; much of it can also happen in partnership with Dutch NGOs, think-tanks, and trade unions. It can also be hoped that one outcome of the upcoming Conference will be a deepening of regional economic integration.

Proposition 3 Launch Labor-intensive employment programs (Type C)

The World Bank's "Burundi Interim Strategy paper 1999-2001" pleads for the creation, immediately after the war, of labor-intensive employment programs. The aim of such programs is not only to rehabilitate infrastructure but also to "boost purchasing power and give a broad segment of the population an economic stake in reconciliation." This may help "address the socioeconomic pressures expected when youth militia members are demobilized under the peace process." Highly labor-intensive public works in Burundi and the DRC, as well as Rwanda, can indeed be not useful in revitalizing rural areas and in creating immediate jobs for demobilized soldiers (and freed prisoners, in the case of Rwanda). It seems ideal to execute these especially in areas where conflict is most prevalent: not only has more infrastructure been destroyed, but also the challenges are greatest for reintegration and creating peace dividends. There are two main problems though with such programs:

- Traditionally, the creation of labor-intensive employment programs has taken a long time. In Rwanda, for example, such a program is only starting now, ten years after the genocide. This is much too late to have any impact on peace dynamics, and, indeed, poverty dynamics.
- These programs seem most difficult to implement in those areas that need them most, i.e., those areas with destroyed infrastructure on account of severe and recent conflict. This is where the state is the weakest and delivery and management structures are usually absent.

It is imperative to start such labor-intensive employment programs immediately following the end of war, and partner with organizations outside of central state structures. Donors can achieve this by sub-contracting to local organizations so long as the latter's main goal is the promotion of peace and demobilization. In other words (at least in Burundi and the DRC), donors should not decide a priori whether such programs should be managed through NGOs, local government, or the central

state. They must be open to whatever has the best chance of working in a particular situation. There are local initiatives normally overlooked by donors which have survived extremely tough situations of war and impoverishment. Many of these are idiosyncratic: they may have evolved around religious leaders, traditional authorities, remaining government structures, or innovative NGOs. Donors need to be able to recognize such initiatives and partner with them immediately and flexibly, rather than waiting for a central state capable of serving as an implementing partner.

Support for such partners could take two forms:

- financial, in terms of rapid-disbursement mechanisms for labor-intensive public works (with financial aid of course vastly preferred to food aid, although there may be exceptional circumstances allowing for the latter);
- technical, in terms of support for planning, management, and supervision (which again falls under the excluded Objective 3). Again flexibility would be necessary here as well. A team of facilitators could cover a decent-sized region, initially investing rather heavily to help the initiators prepare the lightest and most locally-grounded possible technical, financial, and managerial plan; and then occasionally returning for spot checks.

Proposition 4 Provide Block grants to highly decentralized partners

Another type of program that is rather similar and that may have major pay-offs if managed in a flexible, intelligent, learning-oriented way, consists of block grants to highly decentralized partners. Engaging in this type of grant-making on a large scale and as rapidly as possible is deeply appreciated by the population for a number of reasons :

- Money flows down to the lowest level, to ordinary people, where so little typically goes once the reconstruction of the state begins.
- It does so directly, without layers of costs and control in between.
- It leaves people free to decide and organize, which is all too rare.

Such projects typically have two types of aims. Their immediate aims are to inject money in poor areas and create new infrastructures, using a flexible and participatory method of identification of projects and organizations to work with. Yet, their “real” objectives are of a more indirect order, as they seek to promote collective action, conflict resolution, and social solidarity. Ordinary people participate in them for the former reasons, but the latter may come about in the process.

Possibly one of the most fascinating case of such an approach is the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) in Indonesia. The originality of the KDP lies in the broad diversity of mechanisms for combating corruption and exclusion it puts into place. “The strategy developed in KDP to deal with corruption rested on three main themes: 1) eliminate complexity; 2) shine a bright light on every financial transaction; and 3) respond quickly to complaints. The ‘shine a bright light’ component of the anti-corruption strategy relied on ensuring transparency in three arenas. First, all financial information in the project is public and publicly displayed within villages. For example, instead of submitting sealed bids, contractors must read bids aloud during public meetings. Signboards in villages post labor and material costs, all financial transactions require at least three signatures, and an elected committee manages bookkeeping. Second, a number of groups, including local NGOs, non-elected committee members, and independent journalist associations, have access to KDP documents and are expected to monitor the KDP process. Finally, steps are

taken at the national level to insure transparency. KDP sends its audit summaries to civil society oversight groups. NGO monitors are given leeway to share all findings, and independent journalists are not subject to prior review.

Ultimately, it is this sort of innovation that may have the highest pay-off for people in the long run. Clearly, this will require engagement for the long run as well, for none of these effects will occur rapidly or across the board; they can only occur as people learn and gain confidence.

ANNEX 2. CREDAP'S VILLAGE BASED SECURITY APPROACH

The village committees should be created or reinforced (if they already exist) around concrete responsibilities, such as managing a local defense apparatus (as in the following example):

- Raise awareness in the population of the chosen site of the importance of taking local responsibility for local security.
- If the population desires to act, design with them a security apparatus adapted to their situation. By "security apparatus" (or "system"), we mean operational and institutional measures taken by the population to ensure their own peace and security. Operational measures rely at the same time on civilian initiatives (awareness raising, training, negotiation ...) and military initiatives. Military measures include joint operations of regular troops and local defense corps.
- Decide with the population how to reward (salary, compensation) those who will devote themselves to the security system (peacemakers, self-defence, soldiers, local authorities, elders...).
- Put in place the system (recruitment, technical and ethical training, equipment necessary for the system...).

Notes:

- Security awareness raising in the population should be initiated by civil society; it should be supported by existing initiatives for peacemaking and should encourage their coordination.
- The composition of this Committee remains to be decided, but the population of the site must have control in one way or another (so that it is not transformed into a war lord system that turns against the population).
- The Committee and the different elements of the security apparatus should depend upon those who have the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace, and who would most profit from defending their home (heads of families, women, productive people who have been assisted to relaunch their activities, young people chosen for their physical, intellectual and moral qualities...).
- Ethical training must first be given to all those who are involved in security. Its content should be adjusted according to the causes of the crisis and the insecurity. Its content must also be integrated into all levels of training (technical training for those who make up the security system, schooling, adult education ...). This training must first be modeled by the leaders behavior (who should then be chosen and accountable) and then passed on through "citizenship" teaching (which should go beyond membership of an ethnic group), as well as moral and spiritual teaching.

ANNEX 3. RELEVANT PROJECTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Some existing civil society regional networks / organisations / initiatives

PREFED.

Regional NGO, of Swiss law, founded ± 1988. Individual members. Regional headquarter in Bujumbura, with local antennas in Bujumbura, Kigali, Bukavu and Kinshasa. Mission is to strengthen local NGOs and grassroots organisations. Organizes some regional network activities with its partners. Funded by several INGOs. Have been experiencing repeated internal crises and difficulties for the past 7 years, which make donors gradually take their distance. Very unequal dynamism within the antennas: headquarters has been dormant for the past 4 months.

SERACOB.

A regional non profit consulting firm “dedicated” to civil society reinforcement. Founded in ????. Based in Kigali with antennas in Bukavu and Kinshasa. Conducted consultation in good governance related issues.

Fédérations des églises d’Afrique centrale.

Christian umbrella organization (catholic and protestant churches), founded ± 5 years ago and covering Central Africa (from Cameroun to Tanzania). Based in Nairobi..

LDGL

Human Rights umbrella organisation, founded in 1993 by HR organisations in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. Based in Kigali with recently created local antennas in Burundi and DRC. Funded by several INGOs. Have known several ups and downs since its foundation. Its General Secretary left the organisation and the Great Lakes in December 2003.

Comité pour la liberté d’expression et de communication.

Media umbrella organisation founded ± 5 years ago, based in Kigali with membership in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. Have been experiencing repeated crises and internal difficulties since its foundation, with its general secretaries fleeing with the cash, which ended in donors’ withdrawal. Is dormant since the last crisis in 2002.

FERFAP

Women network covering Central Africa, founded in ????. Headquarter in Kigali, with individual members.

Pole Institute

Research-action centre based in Goma, founded in 1997. Mission is to promote tolerance and dialogue between communities of the Great Lakes, but concretely working only in the Eastern provinces of DRC South and North Kivu, Ituri). Funded by GTZ, NOVIB and International Alert. Have been working on the emergence of new centres of legitimacy for the past 3 years.

COCAFEM

Women network which members are national umbrella organizations and networks from Burundi, the Kivus and Rwanda. Founded in 2001 in the wake of the “Marche mondiale des femmes” and

has been working since. Is a “flexible” network in the sense that it doesn’t have permanent staff and office, is results oriented and meets on specific issues. Lightly funded by the CECI (Canada). Initiative de concertation de la société civile pour la Conférence Régionale

Civil society network for the preparation of the Great Lakes Regional Conference
 Founded in Goma in November 2003 following a 3 months dialogue between more than 60 civil society organisations from Rwanda, Burundi, North and South Kivu. Flexible network. Lightly funded by the CECI (Canada).

INICA

Central Africa network of individuals and organisations dedicated to “development”. Founded recently and funded by OCDE and bilateral aid (including the Netherlands). Very media-savvy and well connected general secretary. Its main activity so far is to try to organize another Great Lakes regional conference.

The Geneva initiative.

Regional network of ± 20 “intermediate leaders” of (and living in) Rwanda, Burundi and East DRC. Founded in April 2003 in Geneva after a workshop on peace and ethnicity in the Great Lakes. Adopted a regional approach as the only way to realise peace in the Great Lakes. Is in the process of launching small interventions (cooperation between universities, repatriation of young diaspora ...) and getting organized.

Donors initiatives in civil society strengthening

Development interventions

ACIPA (Action Citoyenne pour la Paix).

This is the oldest regional civil society reinforcement programme in the Great Lakes. Funded by the Canadian government (± USD 1 Meg / year) and executed by the Canadian NGO CECI, is the continuation of a previous 4 years regional project, the PADD, which ended in 2001. ACIPA will end in 2006. PADD and ACIPA had been working with ± 20 civil society organisations in Rwanda, Burundi, North and South Kivu. These partner organisations are the initiators and at the heart of the COCAFEM and the Initiative de concertation de la société civile pour la Conférence Régionale.

CCFD.

Adopted a regional approach in 2002, which basically consists so far of inciting its Congolese partners to invite Rwandans and Burundians to their Congolese seminars.

UNIFEM.

Adopted a regional approach, mainly consisting of creating and funding FERFAP.

OCDE.

Main INICA donor.

International NGOs and bilateral donors.

Many international NGOs (including NOVIB), mainly financed by bilateral donors, have a civil society reinforcement component in their country programmes. However, apparently none, beside CECI, is working with the aim to help civil society play its role for the promotion of good governance. These reinforcement programmes are thus usually focused on managerial and technical capacities, with very little emphasis on strategic capacities.

Bilateral and multilateral donors.

Many bi-lateral and multilateral donors involved in “good governance” programme, which consist of supporting the central or decentralized administration (training, equipment ...).

Diplomatic interventions

Governance conditionalities .

Current Donor Activity in Great Lakes, according to AiDA

DRC (incomplete)

Government Administration

IDA, Economic Recovery Credit Project, 2002-03, \$450 million US

Mineral Resources and Mining

IDA, Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project, planned, \$82.5 million

Multi-sector

IDA, Emergency Early Recovery Project, 2001-04, \$50 million

Burundi

Civil Society and Democracy

32 ongoing projects, most below \$100,000 with the following exceptions:

--\$4.5 million, USAID, Foundation for a Peaceful Transition in Burundi Established Democracy (politically active civil society)

--\$790,000 Appui Gouvernance

--\$535k, Programme Cadre d'Assistance aux Communautés

--\$365,000 BDI Negociation de Paix au Burundi (elections)

--\$222,000 AWEPA Reconciliation par Parlementaires et Femmes

--\$200k, UK, DFID, Support to Community Based Participatory Development, To strengthen community organisations through promoting and supporting participatory approaches so that the communities with which they work may have greater control over the development processes affecting them and play an active role on them.

Government Administration

27 ongoing projects, many between \$100k and \$300k with the following exceptions:

--\$54 million, IDA, Economic Rehabilitation Credit Project... will help build the foundation for a) the improvement of public service delivery, and basic social services, through promotion of

accountability, and transparency in the use of public funds, including external assistance; b) the Government's efforts to deepen institutional, and structural reforms for sustained economic recovery, and poverty reduction; and, c) the establishment of a track record for early access to relief, under the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. By focusing on public expenditure management, rural development, private sector development, and pro-poor sectoral policies, it is expected the project will help move the poverty reduction agenda forward. Nonetheless, main risk factors include the internal conflict, the Great Lakes regional conflict, the uncertainty of the transition Government's capacity, and readiness to implement reforms, and fund the transition process, as well as the remaining uncertainty regarding the amounts, and timing of inflows of international assistance. These risks will be mitigated largely by the project design, which emphasizes donor coordination, and policies that support national reconciliation, to facilitate progress towards a cease-fire.

--\$2.1 million, EC, Appui à l'Ordonnateur National

--\$920k, Renforcement des Capacités de Gestion

--\$820k, Sweden, SIDA, Parliamentary Support BDI

--\$560k, France, economic development planning

--\$400k, Belgium, BDI: Justice Pour Tous au Burundi (legal/judicial dvlp)

Environment

32 programs, including some big ones:

--\$10 million, Canada, CIDA, Nile Environment--The Nile Environment Project.... Additional countries: Congo, Dem Rep. (10%), Egypt (10%), Eritrea (10%), Ethiopia (10%), Kenya (10%), Rwanda (10%), Sudan (10%), Tanzania, Un Rep (10%), Uganda (10%).

--\$1.1 million, Appui Restauration, Gestion Environnement

--\$230k, McArthur, MACA, For the Creation of Trans-Boundary Protected Areas in the African Great Lakes Region (over 4 years) -- resource preservation, wildlife protection

Peacebuilding

Information on 5 ongoing projects:

--\$51 million, EC, Programme de Rehabilitation

--\$3.6 million, Germany, GTZ, Unterstutzung des Programms Zur Wiedereingliederung

--\$1.4 million, Germany, GTZ, Foerderung des Friedensprozesses

--\$450k, Finland, FIMF, International Alert Burundi

--\$50k, Norway, Reconciliation and Good Governance

Rwanda

Government Administration

96 ongoing, many big ones:

--\$100 million, IDA, institutional reform credit project... Over the next three years, the Government intends to reinforce its poverty reduction efforts with public and institutional measures to strengthen the budget process, improve public sector capacity and governance, promote private sector investment, production and employment creation, and develop human resources. This project's main components are public expenditure reform, including the strengthening of financial accountability, private sector development including the financial sector, and privatization of state-owned enterprises and human development including gender reforms. The

Credit will be disbursed in three tranches Expected benefits include: 1) improving public social and other key services; 2) increasing rural production and incomes through enhanced security of land tenure, improved incentives for producers of coffee and tea and a sustainable framework for distribution and marketing of agricultural inputs; 3) stimulating private sector activity; and 4) improving economic opportunities and incomes in order to reinforce efforts for national reconciliation

--\$93 million, UK, DFID, Promoting peace, reconciliation, poverty reduction

--\$10 million or so from Sweden and DFID on revenue collection

--\$8 million or so, US, USAID, Rule of Law/Transparency

--\$4 million UNDP trust fund, Public sector financial management

--\$3.4 million, Canada, CIDA, Court Administration Support, to enhance the ability of the judiciary to manage the court system more efficiently, by strengthening its physical managerial capacity and administrative structures.

--\$2.5 million, African Development Bank, Renforcement des Capacités au CEPEX

--\$2.1 million, Appui Coordination aux Programmes d'Aide au Développement

--\$1.1 million, France, FACO, Fonds Déconcentrés/Fonds Social de Développement

--\$770k, UK, DFID, Civil Service Reform Phase II, Support to implementation of the Civil Service Policy Framework Paper by delivering a fully costed CSR Program proposal to the Government of Rwanda, and development of human resources to support the new Statute for the Civil Service

Civil Society and Democracy

58 ongoing, many small, below 100k (Norway funds a few small capacity building, Germany a few elections/democracy programs a bit larger), except..

--\$6.6 million, EC, Rule of law/HR/governance

--\$5.5 million, UK, DFID, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee

--\$730k, Germany, GTZ, Unterstutzung der Wahlkommission

--\$650k, DFID, Rwandan elections

--\$600k, USAID, Rule of Law/Transparency

--\$485k, Preparatory Assistance to governance,

--\$350k, Switzerland, SADC, decentralization

Peacebuilding

9 ongoing projects, a number focused on de-mining, most in \$300k range, a few big ones:

--\$1.4 million, Germany, GTZ, DDRRR

--\$1.1 million, USAID

--\$750k, Dos Nadr

Uganda

Government Administration

120 ongoing or planned projects, many in millions, some in tens of millions, focusing on gov't decentralization, anti-corruption, anti-poverty, civil service reform, etc:

--\$150 million, IDA, Poverty Reduction Support Credit Program

--\$125 million, IDA, Local Government Development Project (Planned)

--\$115 million, DFID, Poverty Eradication Support

- \$80.9 million, IDA, Local Government Development Project
- \$52.3 million, Africa Development Bank, Poverty Reduction Support Loan
- \$34 million, IDA, Financial Management Project
- \$25.4 million, IDA, Credit for SAP
- \$17.8 million, UCAP, District Development Project Pilot... The focus of the project in all the five pilot districts is the eradication of poverty. It proposes to address the problem of poverty through making the development process and, in particular, the delivery of public goods and services, more inclusive, efficient, effective and sustainable. To that end, the project provides technical assistance and financial resources to enable the definition, testing and application of a range of participatory planning, allocation and investment management procedures in ways that empower local governments and communities to identify, deliver and sustain locally determined investment priorities for public goods and services; and provide practically tested lessons from experience and contribute to national policy and procedures concerned with decentralization.
- \$5.5 million, Netherlands, DGIS, Public Sector Financial Management
- \$5.5 million, DFID, tax collection
- \$4.4 million, DFID, Civil Service Reform

Civil Society and Democracy

87 ongoing projects, many on issues of HIV, women, HR, decentralization, many over \$100k... some big ones:

- \$3.7 million, EC, Support to HR/Democratization
- \$2.8 million, UGA Phase II UWESO FBS/FIDA, strengthening civil society
- \$1.6 million, Denmark, District-based Disability Org,
- \$1.2 million, DFID, Implementation of Beijing Platform of Action (women/HR)
- \$1.1 million, Sweden, SIDA, Human Rights Fund
- \$1.1 million, Vorhaben des Zivilen Friedensdienstes (ZFD) (AGEH), HR/gov
- \$920k, EC, Support to civic education and monitoring

Environment

39 ongoing, some big money being spent, including:

- \$35 million, IDA, Protected Areas Management/Sustainable Use... The Protected Areas Management and Sustainable Use Project will ensure the effective, long-term conservation of Uganda's biodiversity, through a sustainable, and cost-effective management of its wildlife, and cultural resources T
- \$22 million, World Bank, Environmental Management Capacity Project.... The Second Environmental Management and Capacity Building Project will sustain environmental management at the national, district, and community levels, and assist the Government of Uganda (GOU) in the implementation of the National Environmental Action Plan, related National Environment Statute, and the Local Government Act Project components are as follows 1) The local government, and communities environmental capacity building component, will provide support to enable the fulfillment of statutory roles in decentralized environmental management Logistical support will be provided, to build, and strengthen capacities in environmental planning, and, redress key environmental issues The component will complement the GOU efforts to eradicate poverty, and improve living standards within the country 2) The capacity building component will strengthen partnerships with lead agencies, within sectoral mandates as required by the National Environment Statute (1995) Critical actions, and policies by lead agencies will be

identified, and, logistical support, skills development, knowledge support will be provided to enable integrated environmental policies, plans, and programs 3) The component will consolidate the institutional structure of the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), ensure that capacities in regulation, and compliance are built, and promote sustainable development through awareness campaigns

--\$16.6 million, IDA, Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project

--\$8 million or so, USAID, Conserve Critical Ecosystems to Preserve Biological Diversity, comprised of different projects

--\$2.3 million, Germany GTZ, Conservation/Wildlife protection Murchison Falls National Park

--\$2 million, World Bank, Biodiversity Conservation Outside Protected Areas Project

--\$1.4 million, Germany GTZ, Beratung der Wildlife Authority

Mineral Resources

3 ongoing, largest is:

--\$3.5 million USAID, Eco-Systems Conserved for Bio-Diversity and Benefits for Society

NGO Support

10 projects, many above \$100k..

--\$1.1 million, Sweden, SIDA, Ugandan HR Commission

--\$320k, DFID, Acord NGO Project, capacity building

--\$260k, DFID, NGO Community Network Building