**Tools of Change: Long-Term Inclusion in Peace Processes**

*Adan E. Suazo*

**Abstract**

The literature on conflict resolution has devoted a great deal of time and resources to the study of inclusion in peace processes. Yet concentration has focused mostly on inclusion within the framework of a peace agreement and has not paid sufficient attention to the long-term aspects of inclusion that affect sustainable peace after the implementation of the peace agreement. This study addresses this gap in knowledge by investigating the effects of long-term inclusive strategies on sustainable peace. To do so, this study makes a conceptual differentiation between short- and long-term inclusion, followed by a comparative analysis of three cases where a set of exploratory variables will help scrutinize the effects of long-term inclusion on sustainable peace. It concludes that long-term inclusion has an effect on sustainable peace, but that this effect differs based on the type of inclusive strategy an agreement proposes.

**Introduction**

Peace processes are difficult tasks, a reflection of the complexities that govern everyday human interactions and their surroundings. The existing conflict resolution literature, including such contributors as Stedman, Cunningham, Greenhill, Major, Blaydes, and De Maio, has approached the idea of inclusion and found no consensus in its findings. The literature is mostly focused on who should be included in a peace process, while it adopts a somewhat diluted approach to how parties should be included during and after the end of the process. In order to achieve a complete view of inclusion-related aspects of peace processes, we need to take into account this aspect of inclusion within post-conflict societies. This work addresses this gap by postulating the following research question: how does long-term inclusion affect sustainable peace?

The argument posited in this article is that the presence of long-term inclusive clauses in peace agreements gives warring parties an increased trust level in newly-

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instilled institutions, decreasing their incentives to retake arms and enhancing prospects for sustainable peace. This process is affected by the degree to which warring parties are able to pursue their interests in post-conflict political institutions.

**The presence of long-term inclusive clauses in peace agreements gives warring parties an increased trust level in newly-instilled institutions, decreasing their incentives to retake arms and enhancing prospects for sustainable peace.**

To display these ideas clearly, this work will be divided into four main sections. The first section will present the differences between short- and long-term inclusion. Drawing a conceptual line between these two types of inclusion is essential to arrive at a thorough understanding of peaceful coexistence after a conflict. The second section will describe the article’s research design. The third section will feature the study’s main analysis of the long-term inclusion clauses in the Chapultepec Peace Agreement in El Salvador, the Rome Peace Accords in Mozambique, and the Bicesse Accords in Angola. Finally, the fourth section will deliver the work’s final conclusions.

**Short- and Long-Term Inclusion: the Conceptual Difference**

Inclusion in the context of a peace process has thus far been approached by the peace literature as a means to allow former warring parties to take part in a negotiation process. In addition, the peace literature has been inclined to analyze the likelihood for sustainable peace as quantifiable by the number of participants in a peace process. In other words, participation levels dictate the outcome of peace. This study goes beyond the mathematical nature of the inclusion debate by analyzing warring parties’ levels of political participation after the timeframe of the peace process.

A portion of academia posits that a high level of numerical inclusion will lead to a higher likelihood of peace. This frame of thought is elegantly defended by Stedman, who argues that exclusive peace processes may lead to the emergence of “leaders and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their interests and who are willing to use violence to undermine it.”¹ These estranged leaders and factions are what Stedman calls spoilers, a term which can be further divided into inside or outside spoilers depending on their inclusion or exclusion from the process.² Particularly relevant to this work is the concept of an outside spoiler, defined by Stedman as “part[y] who [is] excluded from a peace process, or who exclude[s] [itself], and use[s] violence to attack the . . . process.”³ Whereas inside spoilers can use a peace process as a venue to have their demands and concerns heard, outside spoilers must find alternative ways to address their grievances. Oftentimes, these alternative ways of expression are violent. Stedman’s argument is echoed by Blaydes and De Maio, who find that an exclusive process “increases the likelihood of creating spoilers who have the potential to disrupt
In contrast with these arguments, Cunningham posits that an increased number of warring parties in a peace process makes its resolution harder and its duration longer. This, he continues, is caused by four factors: the reduction of the bargaining space, the increase of information asymmetry, the efforts of actors to maximize their own gains, and the ever-shifting formation of alliances. As in Stedman’s work, warring party participation is considered only during the lifetime of a peace process and their level of engagement in post-conflict society is not considered.

Building on Stedman’s spoiler model, Greenhill and Major argue that parties’ behavior in relation to a peace process is not driven by their intentions, but by the prevailing opportunity structure. Additionally, they argue that what pushes parties to negotiate is the process’s subsequent distribution of power. This argument bears the assumption that an increase in the number of participants within a peace process inevitably decreases the resources at stake. If the argument follows, then warring parties trying to negotiate a peace would likely try to exclude as many parties as possible in order to maximize their own share of the proceeds.

This work endeavors to move beyond the mathematical nature of inclusion discourse by contributing a typology of inclusion that will allow analysts and policymakers to both enhance the likelihood of sustainable peace and track conflict recurrence behaviors after the lifetime of a peace process. To effectively attain this goal, this work readdresses inclusion by proposing a typology centered, firstly, on the number of actors involved in a peace process, and secondly, on their participation in post-conflict societies. Inclusion will therefore be divided into two categories: short-term and long-term inclusion.

Short-term inclusion encompasses the hypothetical question of who to include in a peace process, and it adheres closely to the concept of inclusion as it is being studied by the literature thus far. As the name suggests, this type of inclusion is short-term in that it refers to participation by former warring parties only during the lifetime of a peace process. While additional aspects of inclusion, such as a party’s potential contribution to a peace process, may inform decisions to include or exclude certain groups, the model is not designed to identify recurrence patterns after the process is closed. In other words, focusing on short-term inclusion alone inhibits the study of sustainable peace due to its reduced potential to track conflict recurrence behavior.

In contrast, long-term inclusion acknowledges the need to account for warring
parties’ roles in post-conflict societies by considering their political participation after the peace process. Even though this type of inclusion only becomes tangible after the duration of a peace process, it is proposed and implemented during the peace process in question. Emphasizing long-term inclusion allows policymakers to envision ways in which former warring parties can advance their political agenda peacefully, which may take the form of clauses in peace agreements that will feasibly enable this to take place.

The difference between short- and long-term inclusion lies in their time-frame. Short-term inclusion occurs entirely within a peace process and endeavors to find channels to allow actors to consolidate their interests during negotiations. In this type of inclusion, the role of the participants lasts only as far as the implementation phase, or fulfillment of all clauses featured in a peace agreement allows,\(^9\) hence curtailing the ability to track actors’ behaviors after the implementation phase has concluded. Conversely, long-term inclusion concerns itself with ensuring actors in a peace process have their interests heard after the process has been closed. Long-term inclusion therefore exists both during and after a peace process, as opposed to its short-term counterpart, which sees its clout fade as the implementation phase comes to an end. Making these distinctions and understanding the nature of each type of inclusion is of extreme importance for the overall analysis of inclusion in peace processes.

**The Positive Effect of Long-Term Inclusion**

As mentioned above, inclusion as it is usually defined is directly associated with the number of parties included in a peace process, but not with the role these parties play in the administration of societies’ new rules. The argument presented in this work is that long-term inclusion has a positive effect on sustainable peace, and this thesis will be explored through the proposition of the following hypothetical statements:

*H1: Agreements that include provisions to transform rebel organizations into political parties will lessen their drive to use violence as a political tool.* This hypothesis operates on the assumption that giving a former rebel group the opportunity to affect the political system through legitimate and legal means will decrease their incentives to retake arms.

*H2: Agreements that include provisions to install inclusive electoral systems will discourage former warring parties from rejecting future electoral outcomes.* An electoral system is a vital part of a country’s democratic life. Former rebel organizations-turned political parties may enter the political arena in a disadvantageous position, for they carry the legacy of war on their shoulders. This, combined with the existence of an exclusive electoral system, may decrease their chances of becoming elected. In turn, exclusive electoral systems may increase the possibilities that these groups retake arms in order to pursue their political goals.

*H3: If a former rebel group-turned political party receives a mandate strong enough to advance its political agenda, it will have increased incentives to influence the political system through legal means.* The reason why a former rebel group decides to transform into a political party is the same reason that drove it to take arms in the
first place: a political agenda. As a political party, however, it has the newly-acquired advantage of gaining access to the system to further pursue its objectives. If a party is content with its electoral performance, it will use that mandate to influence the system through legal, rather than violent, means.

**Research Design**

This work is a comparative study that will analyze the effect of a series of long-term inclusion indicators on the outcome of sustainable peace. Directly related to the hypotheses described above, the dependent variable of this analysis will be “Sustainable Peace” and the independent variable will be “Long-Term Inclusion.”

“Sustainable Peace” is defined as a period of at least 10 years in which war recurrence behavior failed to resurface following a conflict, and in which former rebel groups have used political institutions as a means to achieve their goals. It has been a recurring standard in the literature to use the five-year rule as a threshold for peace. A 10-year time frame will be used for this study in order to better perceive the progression of some of the indicators whose effects will then be noted. A 10-year time frame is better suited for the purposes of this work because the standard five-year rule does not allow sufficient time to perceive post-conflict societies and the ongoing dynamics within their institutions.

“Long-Term Inclusion” will help explain the effect of long-term inclusive strategies on sustainable peace. In order to examine long-term inclusion in the case studies selected for this work, three indicators will be used: “Political Party Creation,” “Electoral System,” and “Share of Seats.” The first two indicators will be scrutinized within the peace agreements of each case, while the third indicator will be studied as of the first post-conflict election. These three indicators will provide different signals of the existence of long-term inclusion.

“Political Party Creation” will analyze whether a peace agreement includes provisions for the transformation of a rebel group into a legitimate political party. This indicator captures the willingness of a peace agreement’s signatories to enable the rebel group to pursue its political goals through the system, as well as the rebel organization’s willingness to stop its hostile actions in exchange for the opportunity to attain political leverage. This indicator is highly reliable because it is based solely on whether or not an agreement includes provisions for party creation. Determining the existence of party creation clauses in a peace agreement is a uniform, universalizable endeavor, applicable to all cases.

“Electoral System” is an indicator that captures clauses in peace agreements that create more inclusive electoral systems. Even if a rebel organization strives to become a real political party and decides to forego armed struggle in favor of embracing other peaceful means of power acquisition, it may still find its chances of attaining decision-making power lessened by the prevailing electoral system. Furthermore, the group’s transformation into a political party is accompanied by a complete overhaul
of its internal structure, and issues such as recruitment strategies and internal party organization can pose additional obstacles to their political transition. For this reason, it is important to examine whether a peace agreement mandates changes in the electoral system; a more representative system may increase the chances of former rebel organizations to acquire access to political institutions in post-conflict societies. According to Ergun, a country with a majoritarian electoral system runs the risk of over-representing the bigger parties, while smaller parties are usually left under-represented. This is important because former rebel organizations-turned political parties may enter the political arena as novices and therefore may benefit from changes in the electoral system to ensure that they will have a veritable chance of wielding power. Particularly noteworthy in this study will be provisions supporting the installation of proportional representation systems, which are seen as having higher representational values. Specifically, this indicator captures the implicit need to change particular parts of the electoral system that could lessen the possibility of a former rebel organization-turned political party attaining a desirable mandate. Similar to the “Party Creation” indicator, the values of the “Electoral System” indicator are easily perceived by scrutinizing a peace agreement’s terms, ensuring that results will be the same among cases. Additionally, this indicator allows observation of the willingness of a peace process to create a more inclusive political environment, hence closing the opportunity gap between long-established parties and newer institutions.

Finally, the “Share of Seats” indicator relates the number of seats a former rebel organization receives in their national legislature as compared to the governing party. There is one assumption directly related to this indicator: all case studies, and therefore the electoral instances used to capture former rebel groups’ share of seats, must have featured fair elections over a period of at least 10 years. This indicator will be analyzed as of the first post-conflict election. The share of seats a former rebel organization receives is indicative of its newly-obtained influence in the system, and therefore the degree to which it is able to forward its political agenda. Specifically, this indicator captures three aspects of the nascent parties’ role in the legislature. First, it provides the ratio of seats in the case studies’ national legislatures during a 10-year period, which provides a good idea of the role former rebel groups play during each legislative period. Second, the overall share of seats helps to analyze the degree to which former rebel groups are able to further their political goals through the system, either alone or through coalition formation. Third, the indicator captures the groups’
overall support base in the general population. If a former rebel organization receives a satisfactory number of seats in the legislature, their drive to utilize their influence in parliament will increase and they will further continue pursuing their goals through legitimate and peaceful means. In terms of reliability, one is able to obtain a faithful account of the number of seats a party receives during a legislative election by accessing trustworthy archives and other official channels, making this measurement highly consistent. This indicator also allows for a broad observation of a party’s electoral performance during a given period of time, and its strength in the legislature relative to other parties. Furthermore, the number of seats that former rebel organizations receive is also indicative of how integrated their party has become in their country’s political institutions, an indication of successful long-term inclusion.

There are two specific considerations involved in the selection of cases for this study. First and foremost, the search for comparable case studies will start with cases of conflict over government. Wallensteen defines a conflict over government as a disagreement over “who should rule a particular state, [where] demands for change include the change of rulers.” Given that incumbent rulers “are not likely to abide by such a demand easily . . . an incompatibility exists.” Based on Wallensteen’s conceptual framework, a conflict over government may be induced by several different causes, such as ethnic divisions, ideological differences, corruption, and repression. The second case selection criterion is time-related. Ten years since an agreement’s implementation must have passed in order for a case to become eligible for the study. This rule is particularly important for the analysis of the “Share of Seats” indicator, for it provides the opportunity to map out the progressive electoral performance of former rebel organizations.

Based on the aforementioned criteria, three cases were drawn for this work: the Chapultepec Accords in El Salvador, the Rome General Peace Accords in Mozambique and the Bicesse Accords in Angola. The original plan for this work was to include three African case studies, but El Salvador’s Chapultepec Accords was ultimately chosen as the third case study to investigate the effect of the indicators in a different region. This work chose two successful cases and one unsuccessful case of sustainable peace in order to analyze the different effects of the indicators. The basis for the conflicts in these three countries were all the control of government, mostly driven by ideological lines, and at least 10 years have passed since the implementation of their respective peace agreements.

The empirical evidence for this work have been retrieved from different sources. First, the three peace agreements under scrutiny were retrieved from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of Uppsala University. Second, all the data (including graphs and tables) are based on data retrieved from the Political Database of the Americas (PDBA) of Georgetown University, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), and Psephos Election Archives.

El Salvador Chapultepec Accords (1992)
Political Party Creation

The Chapultepec Agreement of 1992 sought to bring peace to El Salvador after over a decade of conflict. The agreement put a strong emphasis on the complete civil reintegration of the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) in Salvadoran life. To this end, Chapter VI of the agreement deals entirely with the creation of the FMLN Party, particularly with the first steps needed to achieve its political status. The agreement emphasized that the transformation of the FMLN into a legal party had to be preceded by certain legal measures that would ensure its full political participation. By granting the FMLN members full civil and political rights as well as their freedom, the agreement guaranteed that the FMLN would not be hindered to participate fully as a normal political party. It further secured the FMLN’s compliance by providing protection to “those leaders who may require such protection,” with the National Commission for Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) supervising its implementation. The agreement officially stated the formal creation of the FMLN Party in Chapter VI, Article 6, which stipulates the “[l]egalization of FMLN as a political party, through the adoption of a legislative decree to that end.” Chapter VI, Article 7 finally conferred the FMLN with the necessary political rights as a party, including its right of assembly and mobilization, its recruitment of new members, and its purchase of media time for the purposes of advertising.

Electoral System

The Chapultepec Agreement includes provisions for the signatories to propose amendments to the Electoral Code of El Salvador. COPAZ was to appoint a commission to analyze suggestions from the signatories as well as those put forth by the Salvadoran electoral authority to reform the aforementioned code. These suggestions would then be presented to the National Assembly to be passed into law. Despite these measures, however, the agreement does not include provisions that would put in place a proportional representation system in El Salvador, as this system already existed.

Share of Seats

Since hostilities ceased in 1992, El Salvador has undergone six legislative elections, with the FMLN as a participant in each of them. Each election has been deemed fair by several electoral observers and scholars. El Salvador’s legislative branch, the National Assembly, is comprised of 84 members who are elected for a three-year term per Title VI, Chapter I, Article 124 of El Salvador’s constitution. The Constitution further stipulates that in order for a motion to pass it needs a simple majority of votes in favor (at least 43). During the elections immediately following the cessation of hostilities, the FMLN emerged as the party with the second largest number of seats in the National Assembly with 21 seats, with the governing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista ARENA party receiving 39, and the rest of seats distributed among the remainder of the Salvadoran parties. This election gave the FMLN a very strong mandate, as they were in a strong position to affect any legislative outcome. Furthermore, they were also able to propose their own motions and have them passed with the support of the parties.
that held the balance of power.

The elections of 1994 were the starting point of a steadfast growth in the FMLN’s electoral performance. A graph summarizing the FMLN’s electoral performance vis-à-vis ARENA between 1994 and 2009 is shown below. The only period in which the FMLN did not display an increase in its seat allotment was during the 2003 election, where they managed to keep the same number of seats as in the 2000 election. Regardless of the generally positive performance of the FMLN during the 1994-2009 period, one factor has remained a constant: the FMLN has had a proportion of seats significant enough to propose and pass legislation with the support of other parties, making the FMLN an important political force in El Salvador.

![Graph showing electoral performance of FMLN and ARENA between 1994 and 2009.](image)

**Discussion**

The Chapultepec Accords are very concise in describing the legal mechanisms necessary to allow former rebels to reintegrate into society. Furthermore, the agreement includes an explicit clause for the insertion of the FMLN into El Salvador’s political life by conferring on it the status of political party, along with the rights and responsibilities inherent to such an organization. The evidence presented above suggests that the FMLN had an incentive to utilize its newfound status as a platform from which to advance its political agenda.

A superficial analysis of the “Electoral System” indicator would lead one to disprove H2, as the agreement did not include provisions for a proportional representation system. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the electoral system that governed Salvadoran elections prior to the signing of the Chapultepec Accords already bore stipulations aimed at distributing seats in the National Assembly via proportional representation rules as per Chapter III, Article 79 of El Salvador’s constitution. With this in mind, one needs to readdress H2, for it has not been fully disproven. In the Salvadoran case, proportional representation provisions were already in place by the time the agreement was signed, which made it unnecessary for the negotiators to call for such a clause. Inclusive electoral systems may still play a significant role in the likelihood that a newly-created party be elected into a power-wielding institution, but their insertion into an agreement is only sought after if such a provision does not exist in the active electoral law.
In addressing H3, one arrives at the conclusion that the FMLN’s electoral performance since their initial participation was satisfactory, for the party was conferred a significant amount of decision-making power in the Assembly. In its debut electoral involvement, the FMLN captured 25 percent of the Assembly’s seats and became the official opposition to the governing ARENA party. Regardless of the simple majority requirement that the Constitution demands for resolutions to pass in the Assembly, the FMLN could still manage to pass their own initiatives with the support of the other parties, who held the remaining 24 seats. The FMLN’s ability to push their political agenda leads one to conclude that the party was satisfied with the post-conflict status quo. This power in turn may have strengthened the FMLN’s incentives to continue their political agenda through the legal and political tools to which they had access and to dismiss violence as a viable option.

**Mozambique Rome General Peace Accords (1992)**

**Political Party Creation**

The transformation of a rebel organization into a political party must first be preceded by the creation of a system in which such a transformation may take place. In the Mozambican case the *a priori* step that needed to be put in place was the creation of a multi-party political system. Since the birth of independent Mozambique, its political institutions were predominantly controlled by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) party, and a multi-party system was non-existent in Mozambique prior to the signing of the Rome Accords. The Rome Accords deal with the creation of a multi-party democracy in its Protocol II, from articles 1 through 5. These articles lay out the rules governing the creation, administration, and regulation of political parties, as well as their rights and responsibilities. Immediately following Article 5, the Accords include Article 6, sub-section A, where the creation of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) party becomes official upon signature of the Protocol, leaving the submission of the necessary registration documents for a later time.

**Electoral System**

The Rome Accords include a clause for the installation of a proportional representation system for Mozambique’s legislature in protocol III, article 5, sub-section b. It is noteworthy to mention that prior to the signing of the Rome Accords, the Mozambican Constitution did not have any provisions for proportional representation principles in the election of the National Assembly. The non-existence of such clauses may have pushed the leadership of RENAMO to suggest that such changes be made in the electoral code. These changes may have also been triggered by the democratic transition Mozambique was already undergoing before and during the signing of the Rome Accords, for the change towards a multi-party system had only been instituted with the enactment of the 1990 Constitution, and had not yet been put into practice in direct elections. This might have given RENAMO further incentives to ensure they would have a credible chance of election by the time such elections took place.
Share of Seats

Since the signing of the Rome Accords in 1992, Mozambique has had four legislative elections, which were deemed free and legitimate by international observers and scholars. RENAMO’s electoral record from 1994-2009 is shown below. During the elections immediately following the signing of the Accords, RENAMO received 37.78 percent of the popular vote, 6.55 points below FRELIMO. After the distribution of seats, RENAMO received a total of 112 seats in the Assembly, 17 fewer than FRELIMO, with the total number of seats in the chamber amounting to 250. In order for decisions to be made in the Assembly, they need to be supported by a simple majority of the members present. In this case, RENAMO did not receive enough seats to ensure they could pass their own legislative initiatives. It is nonetheless worth noting that RENAMO’s electoral mandate was very strong, which could have informed their decision to continue pursuing political life as a means to an end.

The 1994 elections were one of two pivotal points in RENAMO’s political existence, for it gave the party a mandate strong enough to become the official opposition at the Assembly. This newfound political power may have kept them from engaging in violence, giving them further incentives to continue their pursuit of political power peacefully. This would certainly become a reality during the 1999 elections, when RENAMO received 117 seats in the Assembly, a slight but nevertheless higher increase than that of FRELIMO. Until the 2004 legislative elections, RENAMO received unswervingly increasing support, and its electoral performance is a reflection of this. As mentioned above, RENAMO underwent a second pivotal moment: the 2004 elections. After the 2004 legislative elections, RENAMO ceased its incremental gain and plummeted in the polls, receiving only 90 seats. RENAMO’s electoral debacle would only worsen during the 2009 elections, where their mandate was severely reduced to 51 seats. Regardless of RENAMO’s varying electoral record, it is important to note that as of 1999, FRELIMO and RENAMO have been the sole parties to receive enough votes to enter the Assembly.
Discussion

In relation to the “Political Party Creation” indicator, the Rome General Peace Accords did include provisions for the transformation of RENAMO into a legal political party. The Accords were also successful in laying out the rules governing the newly-instilled multi-party system, essential for the inclusion of RENAMO as a political party. Since the signing of the Accords in 1992, RENAMO has not retaken arms against FRELIMO and has chosen to undertake its political endeavors through its new political status. This suggests that the political party transformation clauses in the Rome General Peace Accords may have helped to inform RENAMO’s decision to forego violence.

H2 is also supported by the findings shown in the previous section. A proportional representation system was necessary due to the one-party political tradition Mozambique had experienced since its independence. Adopting a proportional representation system prior to the 1994 elections may have served as a way for FRELIMO to signal its embrace of multi-party democracy and its willingness to provide the opposition parties a real chance at election to the Assembly. This in turn may have increased RENAMO’s perception that the political route was a veritable way to power, driving them to forego armed struggle.

Support for H3 is mixed. In analyzing the 1994-2004 timeframe of Mozambique’s electoral record, RENAMO received increasingly stronger mandates in the Assembly. This situation reversed in 2004, when RENAMO’s number of seats plummeted, which would worsen during the 2009 elections. RENAMO has not retaken arms since 1992, choosing the political route to further their goals. Out of their 19 years as a political entity, 10 of them were undertaken with a strong presence in the Assembly and nine in a critically weaker position. H3 helps explain why RENAMO refused to retake arms during its first 10 years of existence as a party, but its application becomes somewhat blurred during the 2004-2009 period, for it is hard to envision a scenario where RENAMO would have been satisfied with such a critical drop in their seat allotment.

There are however several environmental factors that are not captured by the “Share of Seats” indicator. Since the 1999 legislative election, Mozambique became a de facto two-party system when the third party that had received seats in the Assembly, the Democratic Union, failed to win enough votes to overcome the threshold to access the Assembly. This situation not only made RENAMO the official opposition against FRELIMO, but also the latter’s only opposition in the Assembly, making the option of retaking arms an extremely costly one. In this case, satisfaction with the electoral outcome went beyond the total vote tally. Even though RENAMO’s mandate was severely diminished after
2004, it still managed to retain its status as the Assembly’s opposition. This automatically made RENAMO one of the most important political actors in Mozambique.

Another factor that may have influenced RENAMO’s aversion toward undertaking armed struggle is time. Ten years had passed before RENAMO’s electoral record fell, and 12 years since they had become a political party. This amount of time may have allowed the RENAMO membership to embrace their new role within the party and society, which in turn may have influenced their decision to accept their unfavorable performance since 2004. This idea is further reinforced by the fact that RENAMO was successful during their first two electoral campaigns, which may have given their membership a strong sense of the leverage they could attain through legitimate means without having to risk their lives.

Readdressing H3 with the aforementioned factors suggests that RENAMO received two consecutive strong mandates in a time span of 10 years, which allowed its membership to adjust to their newly-attained roles and responsibilities in society, increasing their trust in Mozambique’s institutions. These roles and responsibilities in turn made it difficult for war recurrence to materialize once their electoral performance weakened. Even though it is hard to envision RENAMO being content with its newly-conferred mandate, it was nonetheless accompanied by a strong political role in Mozambique. Furthermore, RENAMO’s membership was already aware of the extent to which they could attain power based on their first two elections, which may have informed their decision to continue to pursue their goals through the political system.

**Angola Bicesse Accords (1991)**

**Political Party Creation**

The Bicesse Accords include provisions for the transformation of União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) into a political party in three different places in the document. Under Point 2 of Attachment II of the Accords in question, UNITA would receive the “right to conduct and freely participate in political activities,” a clause that would come into force along with the cease-fire. The exact same clause is present in Attachment III, which displays the issues that still needed to be resolved. Finally, in Point IV, Sub-section 1 (a-h) of the Accords’ Estoril Protocol, UNITA is conferred its full rights as a political entity.
Electoral System

Elections were the first point included in the Estoril Protocol of the Bicesse Accords. In this, the parties laid out the rules that should govern all aspects pertaining to Angola’s first ever multi-party elections. Among these rules was the installation of a proportional representation system for the election of the National Assembly. Aside from this clause, this section primarily concentrates on the parties’ political rights, while leaving issues such as the length of the electoral campaign and the election date for a later time.\(^{30}\)

Share of Seats

Angola’s first multi-party elections took place on September 29, 1992 with the active participation of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MLPA), UNITA, and 16 smaller parties in the contest to fill the Angolan National Assembly’s 220 seats. The subsequent seat distribution saw the MPLA receive a majority of the seats (129), while UNITA received 70. The recently-amended Angolan Constitution stated that in order for decisions to pass, they needed the support of a simple majority of the members in the Assembly, or 111 votes.\(^{31}\) Based on the results of the election, the MPLA held a strong majority in the Assembly, leaving UNITA and the other parties with a combined 91 seats, a number far below the required minimum to pass a piece of legislation. Had the MPLA’s mandate been weaker, UNITA and the other parties could have formed a coalition under article 103, which allowed groups to be formed among elected members.\(^{32}\) However, the final seat distribution ensured that such a union would have proven ineffective.

UNITA’s satisfaction over the final electoral result was extremely low, mainly due to its poor standing in the polls and in the subsequent seat distribution in the Assembly. However, UNITA still had the opportunity to win the presidential seat in an electoral second round because the MPLA had not managed to secure a majority. As Roque notes, this second round would never take place, and Angola would not have another election until 2008, when the MPLA succeeded in securing a strong mandate in the assembly, with 191 seats, leaving UNITA with only 16.\(^{33}\)

Discussion

Before one tries to assess support, or lack thereof, for this work’s hypotheses, it is imperative to take note of a key shortcoming in the Bicesse Accords, which may have outweighed the long-term inclusive clauses it proposed. The agreement failed to account for the dynamics of the international political environment at the time. According to Fortna, the Bicesse Accords had been formulated and carried out in the belief that Savimbi, UNITA’s presidential candidate, would win a democratic election.\(^{34}\) This, combined with Pereira’s argument that the 1992 elections were a highly divisive process that would have inevitably led to one side being relegated from power,\(^{35}\) may have informed UNITA’s decision to retake arms upon Savimbi’s eventual defeat. Bicesse seemed to function on the belief that there was an equal balance of military power between the MPLA and UNITA. The real military imbalance, which favored UNITA, led international actors to assume that UNITA would be the victor.
if elections were called, which made the Accords focus more on the elections than on other procedural matters such as the enforcement of existing arms embargoes in Angola. These embargoes were ultimately violated, and up to $100 million in weapons were delivered during the lifetime of the Accords.36

**Results: Case Studies in Contrast**

The relationship between the three previous cases and the indicators is shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party Creation</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Share of Seats (Favourable)</th>
<th>Sustainable Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes; First 10 years No; Last 7 years</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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There are three observations that can be derived from these results. Firstly, party creation clauses are effective insofar as the existing electoral system allows a credible chance at ensuring political leverage. This observation provides mixed support for H1 because provisions to transform rebel groups into political parties alone do not guarantee the latter’s adherence to social order. Party creation provisions nonetheless provide a legal channel through which former rebel groups may fulfil their political goals, but the attainment of such goals may be hindered by components of the political system that reflect the former social order. The Chapultepec Accords, the Rome General Peace Accords, and the Bicesse Accords have the commonality of containing provisions for the transformation of rebel organizations into political parties. Out of these three cases, only Angola displayed recurrence behaviour.

The inclusion of party creation clauses in these documents was driven by the need to find a legitimate way for rebel organizations to address their political interests and concerns. Incurring further deaths was no longer a viable option for either party, and defanging the rebel organizations’ means of violence was addressed by seeking to remove their reasons to attempt armed conflict. Arranging for a rehabilitated social status for the rebel groups proved useful for the purposes of furthering their political goals legally and peacefully, but these goals could still be thwarted by the prevailing electoral system. Like any other newly-created political party, former rebel organizations enter the political field as neophytes, with the added disadvantage of having the past of war weigh heavily on issues such as public opinion, legal party financing, and membership recruitment. The conversion of these groups into political organizations indeed bestows upon them the opportunity to attain power, but is this opportunity truly within their reach?

Manning argues that even elections that are free and fair “do not necessarily create a competitive environment for political parties.”37 This, she argues, is due to the
“extreme polarization of the political arena [which] mitigates the expected effects of electoral competition.” The feasibility of attaining power was undoubtedly an issue of concern in the peace processes under consideration. In Angola and Mozambique, former rebel groups were aware of their political disadvantage as compared to their former rivals’ established political wings and knew that becoming a legal political party was not directly equivalent to achieving power. This drove UNITA and RENAMO to propose changes to the electoral systems of the time, in an attempt to overcome these political constraints. Putting in place a proportional representation system widened the chances for Angola and Mozambique’s newly-created parties to obtain seats in their respective legislatures. These provisions were not necessary in El Salvador for the electoral system in place already contained a proportional representation system for the election of deputies to the National Assembly.

A second observation that can be derived from the aforementioned results is that electoral reform provisions are effective insofar as their enactment enables parties to pursue their political agenda successfully. This observation also provides mixed support for H2, as provisions to install a proportional representation system were not shown to be directly related to sustainable peace. The installation of a proportional representation system in a peace agreement is useful as long as it helps to improve a former rebel group’s chances of gaining strong representation in parliament. As mentioned above, the Chapultepec Accords in El Salvador did not have provisions for proportional representation rules, yet they still managed to achieve sustainable peace. The Bicesse Accords in Angola included such provisions yet failed to bring about a sustainable cessation of hostilities. Given these results, H2 could be disproven, but such an assessment would prove premature unless certain circumstantial considerations are accounted for. By the time the Chapultepec Accords were signed, El Salvador already had a proportional representation system in place, which meant that such an inclusion would have been neither useful nor detrimental for the purposes of peace. On the other hand, the Bicesse Accords failed in the attempt to achieve peace not because of their newly-installed electoral system, but because UNITA did not manage to receive a mandate strong enough to forward its political agenda.

Similar to stipulations for party creation, proportional representation clauses can be seen as tools intended to widen the possibilities of a small party (such as a former rebel group) to gain representation in parliament. These considerations may also reflect the government’s willingness to embrace higher degrees of political discourse and ideological diversity in state institutions. The enactment of these provisions, however, does not necessarily mean that the system will ensure a satisfactory electoral outcome. In the cases of El Salvador and Mozambique, the existence of a proportional representation system was an enabling factor for a satisfactory electoral result for FMLN and RENAMO respectively. This was true in the Mozambican case up to the 2004 legislative elections, when RENAMO’s mandate fell drastically due to the growth of FRELIMO’s seat apportionment. This fall, however, was not due to any constraint presented by the electoral system; it was rather caused by the electoral supremacy
The same is true of the Angolan case during the 1992 elections, with the difference that the latter’s case drew UNITA to the immediate conclusion that their electoral performance was not strong enough to forward their political agenda, while RENAMO had the opportunity of receiving a relatively positive mandate during the span of 10 years prior to its consequent fall in the polls.

The reason why UNITA decided to retake arms seems to be related to its electoral dissatisfaction, which raises the question of why RENAMO decided to forego the option of recurrence once its standing in the polls diminished. Addressing this question leads to this work’s third and final observation: the longer a former rebel group-turned political party receives a mandate strong enough to pursue its political agenda in legislatures, the less likely they are to retake arms. This is caused by the party’s increase of trust in the system and the political institutions’ viable channels for power attainment, a trust that is subsequently reinforced as time progresses. This observation derives from the electoral record of the three former rebel groups and is a more refined version of H3, which did not originally take into account the duration of electoral mandates.

In the case of El Salvador, the FMLN’s electoral record was highly satisfactory, for it always managed to obtain at least the status of official opposition party. Furthermore, its electoral record shows that the FMLN’s performance always improved, with the exception of the 2003 elections, when it maintained the same number of seats. The case of RENAMO follows a similar pattern, in which it received a strong mandate during the 1994 election and succeeded in getting a slightly stronger one in 1999, but sank in the polls as of 2004. These two cases illustrate the time-related factors connected with long-term inclusion. The FMLN’s increasingly-stronger mandates drove it to continue the pursuit of power through legal means while renouncing the idea of armed struggle as an attractive option. Similarly, RENAMO saw in its steady electoral improvement an opportunity to continue that same pattern in future elections.

As the passage of time sees newly-created parties become cemented institutions in society, the levels of trust they place in their political capabilities increases. This in turn makes it harder for former rebel groups-turned political parties to retake arms. Conversely, if a party’s mandate is limited to a short period of time, they may develop distrust in the system as a viable channel for political participation, increasing the likelihood of war recurrence. This scenario came to pass with UNITA in Angola. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi’s idea of a strong mandate was strongly connected to becoming elected as president during the 1992 elections, pushing aside the priority of a legislative victory, one that UNITA nonetheless failed to obtain. Once the presidential electoral
results were broadcasted and revealed the victory of the MPLA, it was clear that UNITA would be unable to obtain the strong mandate it sought.

Does Long-Term Inclusion Affect Sustainable Peace?

The previous section described how different long-term inclusion mechanisms have different functions for and effects on the attainment of sustainable peace. Allowing for a successful transformation of a rebel group into a political party opens avenues of understanding and spaces for dialogue with which former rebel groups can forward their political agenda. However, these types of provisions are limited and do not necessarily ensure that former rebel groups will have a reasonable chance to attain power through their newly-acquired political status.

Clauses for the enactment of proportional representation systems have a two-fold, long-term function. The first one has to do with proportional representation systems’ “potential . . . to give a permanent balance of power to pivotal small parties” that widens the margin of probability of power attainment. Secondly, clauses calling for proportional representation systems have the added function of signalling the government’s willingness to provide a political environment that allows for increased political discourse, leading to a more diverse ideological mosaic. Ultimately, the inclusion of electoral reforms in peace agreements is need-based and is fixed upon providing an opportunity that previously did not exist in the system. If a country already has in place an inclusive electoral system, the need to include provisions for their enactment becomes null.

Thus far, there has been fair support for the argument that long-term inclusion has an effect on sustainable peace, but the nature of this effect needs further attention. Why was sustainable peace not readily achieved in Angola, given that long-term inclusion clauses were successfully implemented? Following the results from the previous section, and as Fortna points out, UNITA retook arms due to its failed electoral attempt to obtain Angola’s presidency during the 1992 elections. The transformation of UNITA into a party and the MPLA’s willingness to change the electoral system to allow UNITA a fair chance to wield power both resulted in the latter’s active and peaceful participation during these elections. However, UNITA’s unyielding interest in obtaining the Angolan presidency saw the aforementioned long-term inclusive measures ill-equipped to provide them with the only feasible means they saw fit to pursue their political agenda. It is undeniable that the Bicesse Accords were successful in party transformation and electoral reform, but these measures were mostly focused on enhancing UNITA’s chances to obtain power, and not on automatically conferring such power.

Levels of Long-Term Inclusion Mechanisms

In view of UNITA’s recurrence behavior, it is useful to distinguish two levels of long-term inclusion that help explain such an occurrence: Levels 1 and 2. Level 1 long-term
inclusion mechanisms concentrate on those measures that broaden a former rebel group’s ability to advance their political goals legally and on a long-term basis. What is important about these mechanisms is that they do not ensure the attainment of power. Rather, their raison d’être is to allow a former rebel group’s active and fair political participation which would otherwise not have been possible. The political engagement of the FMLN, RENAMO, and UNITA would not have been a reality had their respective peace agreements not included clauses for their transformation into political entities. The fairness of this engagement was further increased by the agreements’ inclusion of provisions for the creation of more accessible electoral systems. In other words, level 1 long-term inclusion mechanisms allow the possibility of power attainment, but do not ensure its procurement.

Power procurement is the purpose of long-term inclusion’s second degree of application: level 2 mechanisms. Level 2 long-term inclusion mechanisms influence the degree to which a former rebel group can actually influence the system legally. In the cases of El Salvador and Mozambique, level 2 mechanisms were successful, for the parties’ political agendas could be advanced through their newly-obtained mandates. Consequently, strong level 2 mechanisms provided the parties with an increased opportunity to influence the system, and they deemed it an effective channel through which they could pursue their political goals. This was not a reality in Angola, where UNITA’s electoral performance did not help advance its political objectives. As a result, UNITA’s legislative participation was severely reduced, and this was further aggravated by its failure to obtain the Angolan presidency. In the case studies considered for this article, level 2 mechanisms were vital for the eventual outcomes of each electoral process. Overall, the long-term inclusion mechanisms put in place in the peace agreements in question did not directly confer parties with any power. There are, however, long-term mechanisms that can prove useful, as shown in the Angolan case.

Because the presidential elections played a more important role in Angola than the other two cases, an MPLA victory proved to be a sufficient reason for UNITA to retake arms. This, Pereira argues, could have been resolved by putting in place a power-sharing formula conferring each side with responsibilities in government or by installing a federalization formula allowing the MPLA and UNITA the ability to govern over their occupied territories. The idea of power-sharing governments and institutionalizing federalism as solutions for the Angolan case are good examples of long-term inclusive strategies with high level 2 capabilities. Whether the executive branch was divided amongst the MPLA and UNITA or the Angolan territory divided into sub-state constituencies under the control of either party, it would have automatically given UNITA a pre-defined level of power.
In this work’s case studies the political leverage derived from the collective support of society, combined with repeated electoral successes in a sustained length of time have an effect on sustainable peace. A party’s share of seats indicates its mandate relative to the other parties and helps explain the degree to which it is capable of influencing political institutions. Additionally, the hope that a favorable electoral performance may result in a stronger mandate in subsequent elections pushes parties to continue interactions with the system.

Conclusions
This article focused on studying the effects of long-term inclusion on sustainable peace. In order to do this, it was necessary to make a conceptual difference between short- and long-term inclusion. Once these differences were clear, the presence of long-term inclusive clauses was studied in three peace agreements: the Chapultepec Accords, the Rome General Peace Accords, and the Bicesse Accords. To facilitate the analysis, three long-term indicators were used to scrutinize long-term inclusion’s effect on sustainable peace within each case study: “Political Party Creation,” “Electoral System,” and “Share of Seats.”

Evidence in this work suggests that long-term inclusion has an effect on sustainable peace, but that this effect differs based on the type of inclusive strategy an agreement proposes. Clauses for the transformation of rebel groups into political parties prove useful in allowing legal access and use of a country’s political institutions as a way to further the group’s political goals. Additionally, calls for the enactment of a proportional representation system tackle the innate challenges of newly-formed political parties, for these systems broaden the chances of political representation in power-wielding institutions. While these clauses are effective to increase fair political participation, they are not sufficient to ensure that a former rebel group will fully renounce the option of war as a channel toward power attainment. This leads to the idea of long-term inclusion’s level 1 and 2 mechanisms. Level 1 mechanisms allow former rebel groups to attain power through the legitimate use of the political system, but they do not automatically confer power. These mechanisms open channels for increased political involvement, enabling former rebel groups to pursue their goals peacefully. Level 1 long-term inclusion mechanisms bear a significant shortcoming: they do not ensure that a rebel group will achieve power. If a rebel organization perceives that their newly-obtained political status is not sufficient to have a strong say in political institutions, they may decide to retake arms.
Level 2 long-term inclusion mechanisms are therefore essential to understand the full impact of an inclusive strategy on sustainable peace. Level 2 mechanisms encompass practices that automatically confer power to a former rebel group, although they differ between cases. In the case of El Salvador and Mozambique, party creation and electoral reform clauses were representative examples of level 1 long-term inclusion mechanisms that greatly enhanced FMLN and RENAMO’s chances to obtain power, but they were insufficient to deliver equal results in the Angolan case. War recurrence behavior in Angola came as a result of UNITA’s inability to obtain the electoral victories that, in their view, constituted the only feasible way to forward their political objectives.

If a rebel group-turned political party perceives that a given electoral performance is tied to a veritable chance to forward its political projects, it will start to regard the system as a legitimate power-procurement tool. This work also noted that a former rebel group may continue to develop trust in the system as it maintains or improves its political mandate after a certain period of time. The cases of Mozambique and Angola illustrate this logic; in Mozambique, RENAMO was able to achieve two consecutive strong mandates in a time frame of 10 years, a period that allowed RENAMO’s membership to develop trust in Mozambique’s institutions. Once RENAMO’s mandate was severely reduced, war recurrence did not resurface, for its membership may have already been accustomed to their role in political life and trusted their institutions as being legitimate. This in turn shied them away from retaking arms. Conversely, UNITA was immediately dissatisfied with its newly-attained mandate in Angola, which cut short its time with a satisfactory mandate. In Angola’s case, UNITA’s membership did not have sufficient time to develop trust in Angola’s institutions, which made the possibility of war recurrence easily obtainable.

The propositions in this work are highly applicable to the spoiler management debate. Peace processes may be better equipped to deal with spoiler behavior by expanding the participation ratio through the use of long-term inclusion with strong level 2 capabilities.

This work’s findings open space for future research on inclusion, particularly on the effect of long-term inclusive strategies with high level 2 capabilities such as power-sharing agreements, partition, and federalization strategies. These strategies go beyond enabling fair political participation, to the extent of automatically conferring a certain amount of power to former warring parties. Questions such as whether level 2 capabilities alone are sufficient criteria to obtain sustainable peace are open for further scrutiny and should be addressed accordingly.

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**Endnotes**

* This work is dedicated to the life, work, and legacy of Dr. Thomas Ohlson.

1 Stephen John, Stedman, “Peace Processes and the Challenges of Violence” in *Contempo*


3 Ibid.


6 Ibid.


8 Ibid.


12 Ibid.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


18 Ibid.


20 Graphs in this work were created with data retrieved from the Psephos Election Archive, available online at <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/>; Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University & Organization of American States, available online at <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/ElSal/elsal.html>; and the Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE database, available online at <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2099_arc.htm>.


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
36 Cristopher Cramer, Civil War is not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries (London: Hurst & Company, 2006), 20.
38 Ibid.