The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Holy Alliance For Central Asia?

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Introduction: A New Holy Alliance? 

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Emperor Francis of Austria, King Frederick William of Prussia and Tsar Alexander of Russia formed the Holy Alliance. While the three monarchs also sought to create a multilateral counter-pole to France, the dominant European power until Napoleon’s fall, the Holy Alliance was primarily inward-looking in nature. It was directed against non-state forces. Its key purpose was to preserve the conservative domestic order of its monarchic members against the ideological threats of democracy, human rights and nationalism emanating from the French Revolution.

At first glance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional intergovernmental organization composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, reminds one of this Holy Alliance. Five of its members are governed by authoritarian regimes with poor human rights records. The Russian Government under Vladimir Putin shows increasingly authoritarian tendencies. The SCO’s two principal member states, China and Russia, are struggling with ethnic Islamic self-determination movements in Xinjiang (Northwest China) and Chechnya respectively. Notwithstanding the fact that both the Uighur and the Chechen movement comprise of violent as well as of non-violent factions, China and Russia have relied for the most part on brute force to stifle all expressions of ethnic separatism. 

Against this factual backdrop it comes as no surprise that the SCO strongly emphasizes the principles of non-interference in internal affairs and territorial sovereignty. While nominally professing to respect human rights, the SCO heads of state have jointly expressed their dismay about “the use of double standards in questions of human rights and interference in the internal affairs of other states under the pretext of defending them.”

At the same time, the SCO has made it its foremost goal to fight the triad of what it calls “terrorism, extremism and separatism.” The SCO’s principal documents neither discriminate between violent and non-violent self-determination movements, nor between those striving for outright secession and those that only want increased regional autonomy. All are summarily regarded as separatists. In practice, SCO member states tolerate, or at times even support, when other members crush any other form of anti-government dissent.

After briefly outlining the historical evolution of the SCO this paper analyzes what its future path might be. Contrary to the initial fear of some, the SCO will not, and is in fact effectively unable to, transform itself into an alliance directed against Western (United States or NATO) interests. Instead, the SCO is likely to
remain an inward-looking alliance directed against armed non-state actors. In order to do this effectively, the SCO has to expand into South Asia by accepting Pakistan and India as members.

**From the Sino-Soviet Border Treaties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization**

The SCO has its origins in the Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) border negotiations of the early 1990s. Through treaties concluded in 1991 and 1994 the two countries de-lineated a border of 4,600 miles that had seen armed clashes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the three newly independent Central Asian states bordering China—Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—joined the ongoing border negotiations. In April 1996 the five states signed the Agreement on Confidence-building in the Border Area that imposed restrictions on military deployment and activity within a hundred-kilometer (62 mile) demilitarization zone along the border. Since the Agreement was concluded in Shanghai the five states where henceforth identified as the Shanghai Five.

Beginning with the 1998 Almaty Summit the Shanghai Five began to turn their focus on other threats to the security of their countries and regimes: religious extremism, ethnic separatism and terrorism. This focus has remained at the heart of the SCO’s activities ever since, while cooperation in other fields has not gone much beyond the rhetoric of summit declarations. On June 15, 2001 Uzbekistan, already an observer at the 2000 summit, joined the Shanghai Five. On the same day the now six Shanghai Five jointly declared to establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has since functioned as an inter-governmental forum for multi-level consultations in regular intervals. In the course of the same meeting, the SCO members also adopted the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism that establishes mechanisms for intelligence sharing.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 have raised serious questions about the viability of the organization. Despite the SCO’s early focus on terrorism, its member states did not manage to agree on a common policy response to the attacks. Instead, Central Asian countries rushed to offer their support to United States. Uzbekistan reportedly tendered its military bases to the U.S. without even consulting with its SCO partners. The SCO processes were only activated on January 7, 2002 when China insisted to host an extraordinary meeting of the SCO foreign ministers.

In the wake of this political default, the member states led by China have attempted to reinvigorate the SCO in the last two years. Within the SCO framework China and Kyrgyzstan conducted a cross-border anti-terrorist military maneuver in October 2002, a first for China. Ten months later all five of the original Shanghai Five states took part in a second joint anti-terrorism exercise. In the same year the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), now situated in Tashkent, finally became fully operational—more than five years after the member states first endorsed its creation. In January 2004 the SCO General-Secretariat in Beijing was opened and Zhang Deguang, a former Chinese ambassador to Russia, was appointed Secretary-General. For the moment both institutions have to subsist on a meager annual budget of US$ 4 million.

**Mutual Accommodation in the Great Game**

It has become fashionable to invoke Rudyard Kipling’s notion of the ‘Great Game’ to describe the renewed political and economic interest in Central Asia. Essentially, this game is played for two prizes. The tangible prizes are the immense energy resources of the Caspian Sea and the possibility to transport them via pipeline to the markets of South and East Asia, instead of moving them westward. The Caspian Sea has proven oil reserves of up to 32.8 billion barrels and a potential of up to 218.8 billion barrels. With 232 trillion cubic feet, its proven gas reserves are comparable to those of Saudi Arabia.

The intangible prize lies in Southeast Asia’s geo-strategic significance. Even in the information age, geographic proximity remains relevant to
project power. Central Asia’s position makes it possible to project power into the Greater Middle East, Europe, South Asia and East Asia leading one analyst to conclude that “the globalization for Central Asia is not merely an economic phenomenon, but possibly or even primarily a strategic one.”

In view of China’s ongoing ascendency to economic and military super-power status and Russia’s simultaneous decline, many had thought that China would try to replace Russia as the dominant power in this strategic hub. However, quite the contrary occurred. China more or less supported the status quo. It calculated that continued Russian pre-eminence in Central Asia would function as a bulwark against growing radical Islamic and American influence while ensuring that China had a role in the region’s economic development. The Chinese-led Shanghai Process is a consequence of this strategy. It fixes Russia’s acceptance that China has a major role in Central Asia, while demonstrating that Beijing prefers to work with Russia and not against it.

Three reasons motivate China to strike this bargain of mutual accommodation with Russia rather than to challenge the incumbent regional hegemon. First, Central Asia’s energy resources can help satisfy China’s ever-growing energy needs. A benign Russian posture makes it easier for China to pursue the active energy diplomacy in Central Asia that it has begun several years ago.

Secondly, Central Asia’s geo-strategic significance has not been lost on Islamic armed non-state actors either. These groups are establishing a network of mutual support (e.g. for training, arms procurement, and intelligence) in order to more effectively challenge governments from the Caucasus to South Asia. China is currently experiencing this in Xinjiang, where it is confronted with an Islamic self-determination movement. What is today Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has only become part of China in 1884 when Qing Dynasty troops finally overcame the fierce resistance of the Uighurs living in what was then East Turkestan. Since 1949, the Chinese government has systematically resettled ethnic Han Chinese to Xinjiang in order to gradually incorporate it into the Chinese heartland. This strategy has only exacerbated tensions resulting in an upward-spinning spiral of Uighur separatist violence countered by Chinese repression. If the Uighurs managed to secede from China they would not only take one-sixth of China’s territory with them, but also China’s bridge to the energy resources of Central Asia, its nuclear testing grounds and the oil reserves that Xinjiang itself is presumed to harbor.

Third, stability in Central Asia combined with secured access to the region allows China to concentrate on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Incidentally, good political relations with Russia also facilitate purchases of modern Russian arms that China needs to project military power beyond its shores. In addition, the SCO framework entrenches a bargain China struck with the Central Asian autocracies. In exchange for recognition of the “One China” principle, China promised not to interfere in their internal affairs.

The Birth of an Anti-Western Alliance? Not So

As the Shanghai Process gathered momentum, many analysts began to wonder, whether they were seeing the birth of an anti-Western, or more specifically anti-American, alliance led by China and Russia. These suspicions were fuelled by Boris Yeltsin’s and Jiang Zemin’s announcement of a “strategic partnership” and the subsequent joint Sino-Russian condemnations of Western security policies such as NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo or the American plans for a Ballistic Missile Defense. The SCO itself has been sending mixed messages. On one hand, its leaders have expressly declared that the SCO is not an alliance directed against any other states or region. On the other hand, they have voiced their opposition to Western hegemony by jointly speaking out for
a multi-polar world, for the primacy of the U.N. Security Council and, as mentioned above, against humanitarian intervention.

Since September 11, 2001 China and Russia have been plagued by the fear that the United States or NATO will expand their traditional spheres of influence under the pretext of the war on terror. Recent developments in Central Asia arguably confirm this fear. The United States has manifested its strategic interest in Central Asia by continuing to operate military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which it used during the Afghanistan campaign.

It is likely that the United States will maintain a permanent military presence in Central Asia, notwithstanding China’s and Russia’s expectation to the contrary. The Euro-Atlantic Part-nership Council (EAPC), born out of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, formally links NATO with the countries of Central Asia. In 2002, NATO expressly declared that it considers the Caucasus and Central Asia to be “strategically important.”

The pertinent question of the day is therefore whether Russia and China will try to transform the SCO into a vehicle to oppose this increasing Western influence in Central Asia. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov has hinted at this possibility when he stated that the SCO could “play the role of one of the key supports in a multipolar world order.” His Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing rejected this notion in a 2004 article, reiterating that the SCO is “not directed against other countries” but aims at “maintaining a good surrounding environment and promoting China’s modernization drive.”

Lack of Cohesion Within the SCO and Common Ground With the West

In the short-term to medium-term, the SCO will not transform itself from a counter-terrorist to an anti-Western alliance. There is still a profound lack of cohesion within the group and all members have an interest in not antagonizing the West at this point and time. In spite of their rapprochement in recent years, significant sources of irritation remain present in Sino-Russians relations that make a firm alliance improbable. Russia fears losing control over the vast Russian Far East, which constitutes one third of Russia’s territory (6 million square kilometers), but is only home to a dwindling 6.7 million Russians. Even with the borders now delineated, Moscow remains afraid of losing its factual grip on the region as illegal migrants from China (and elsewhere) stream into the territory. The policies of both countries also clash with regard to South Asia. Whereas China maintains good relations with Pakistan, Russia is close with India.

Furthermore, SCO members have concluded that they stand to benefit more from a cooperative, or at least accommodating posture, towards the West, while they are pushing for much needed economic growth. With the possible exception of the Taiwan question, China has decided not to challenge the United States at this juncture. The Chinese strategy is to concentrate on economic reform and growth, while maintaining peace relations with global leaders and normalizing relations with its neighbors. Former President Jiang Zemin reportedly summarized the policy approach as “sheathing the sword and cultivating humility”, while building up “overall state might.” Economically, China has a lot more to gain from the United States and the West than from Russia. China’s trade with the United States and also with Japan is each worth well over US$ 100 billion annually, whereas the annual trade with Russia has never exceeded 11 billion. Moreover, China and the Transatlantic Alliance are now facing interlinked security threats from non-state actors. The perception of common threats may be one reason why China requested a formal dialog with NATO in October 2002.

Russia also shares a lot of common ground with the West, and its leaders are aware of that. In 2003, the Russian State Council’s Working Group on International Issues proposed a similar strategy of temporary cooperation until Russia has caught up with the West. The Working Group recommended to work together with the U.S. on
global security issues such as international terrorism, while building constructive partnerships with NATO and the European Union in the West and with China and the SCO in the East. Russia’s exclusively rhetorical response to the 2004 NATO expansion demonstrates that it is neither able nor willing to pursue any other strategy than accommodation.

The Central Asian SCO members do not want to antagonize the West either. Their region is a so-called shatterbelt, i.e. a strategically important but politically fragmented area of competition between the continental and maritime powers. Realizing that, they do not choose one great power over the other. Instead, each country tries to play the competing great powers off against one another, while jockeying for position in the region. For this reason, they all rushed to offer their broad support to the American counter-terrorism campaign pushing their own agendas over that of the SCO.

**The Expansion Question**

The SCO will not become an effective anti-Western Alliance in the medium and long-term either. Instead it will be faced with a crucial choice of either expanding into South Asia or to become irrelevant. Both India and Pakistan have let it be known that they wish to join the SCO. Troubled by Islamic extremist groups as well, India has strong strategic interests in creating stability in Central Asia and it wants its burgeoning population to have secure access to Central Asia’s energy resources. Naturally, Pakistan would not like to be barred from a regional club to which India is a member. The result of both countries’ accession would be an organization embracing three out of the world’s six billion inhabitants. Counter-intuitively perhaps, the added weight would make the SCO a more likely strategic partner than competitor of the West. The divergence of geopolitical viewpoints within an enlarged SCO would make a coordinated opposition impossible. The SCO would have to concentrate instead on fighting common non-state security threats and on coordinating Central Asia’s development.

The present SCO members have signaled however, that they currently do not intend to admit new members “until [the SCO] stands on its own feet.” The true reason lies in the diametrically opposed policies Russia and China have adopted towards South Asia. India and Russia have an excellent relationship going back to a remarkable 1971 treaty that linked democratic India to the Communist Soviet Union. Up to this day Russia continues to be India’s principal supplier of arms. Conversely, Russia conceived Pakistan as a threat prior to September 11, 2001 fearing that Pakistan would support Islamic extremism on the territory of the former Soviet Union just like it had done in Afghanistan. With Pakistan’s participation in the global coalition against terror this perception seems to have changed. President Musharraf’s 2002 visit to Moscow marked the first official visit by a Pakistani Head of State in more than thirty years. Russia might therefore be willing to support Pakistan’s membership bid, if India can also join.

The ball is now in China’s field. China has to overcome its historic suspicion of India and link a strategic competitor to a region, in which China itself is just establishing a presence. Yet, there are sound reasons for expanding the SCO into South Asia, even from the Chinese perspective. Without it the organization’s principal raison d’être—the effective suppression of terrorism, separatism and extremism—is called into question. If the operating theatre of the armed non-state actor network the SCO intends to fight spans into South Asia, it makes sense to expand the SCO’s reach. Moreover, the SCO is in dire need to differentiate itself from two post-Soviet entities that seek to deal with non-state threats. In 2000, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) created an Anti-Terrorist Centre in Moscow with a branch office in Bishkek. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (ODKB, Organizatsiya Dogovora o Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti), which is composed of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, has already established a 1,500 men strong Collective Rapid Deployment Force. Vladimir Putin has clarified that the ODKB and its instruments are
directed against international terrorism and not against other states. In the field of trade and economics the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) is staking out its turf. The existence of this parallel network of post-Soviet institutions will tend to keep China out of the decision-making loop, unless it can offer enough money or military assistance to keep the other SCO members interested. The obvious solution to this problem of asymmetry is to expand the SCO from a group of former Soviet republics plus one to a larger regional entity. This larger entity could also help manage the political competition relating to the region’s major energy and transport infrastructure projects and channel it into multilateral dispute resolution processes.

If India and Pakistan are snubbed for membership on the other hand, they can be expected to engage in the shatterbelt game. They will seek to pull some of the Central Asian countries into their camp in order to undermine the SCO, prevent Chinese dominance in Central Asia and secure their access to the Caspian Sea’s energy resources. India, for instance, has already strong ties with Tajikistan harking back to the two countries’ joint efforts to assist the late Ahmad Shah Masood and the Afghan Northern Alliance. It even operates an airforce base in Aini, Tajikistan. India has also already secured a formal expression of support for its SCO membership from Kazakhstan. These ties should be strengthened and woven into the existing institutional framework rather than letting them tear the SCO apart.

Conclusion

Compared to the level of international attention it has received, the SCO has achieved very little in substantive terms. It chose to concentrate on one substantive area, fighting terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Yet, it failed to adequately respond to the most important terrorist attack in modern history. Interest in the SCO nevertheless persists because it would fulfill pressing needs, if it would ever become politically effective. Central and South Asia are home to numerous interlinked extremist groups. Yet, there is no regional organization with a geographical ambit that is congruent with this transnational threat. Moreover, there is no organization that can politically coordinate the extensive transnational infrastructure projects the region will see in the years to come.

Fears that the SCO might be an anti-Western alliance in waiting are misplaced. In the short-term to medium-term its members are neither interested nor able to launch a coordinated opposition to NATO or U.S. interests. In the medium- to long-run it has to expand into South Asia or become insignificant. If western-friendly India and Pakistan are members, the smallest common political denominator in the SCO does not go beyond a common enmity towards Islamic extremism and terrorism.

A final word of caution needs to be added. The Holy Alliance of 1815 ultimately failed because it could not simultaneously suppress the forces of ethnic separatism and the struggle for individual liberty. Any Central Asian security grouping may experience the same fate, if its leaders do not learn to distinguish between incorrigible extremists and the moderates who strive for no more than individual liberty and, in some cases, adequate recognition of their ethnic group’s minority status.

The views and opinions expressed in articles are strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and Editorial Boards, or the Program on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher School.

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6 Joint Statement of Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan on the Almaty Meeting, July 3, 1998, http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/joint-statement980703.html, para. 5: “Parties are unanimous in their opinion that any forms of manifestation of national separatism, ethnic intolerance and religious extremism are inadmissible.” The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, June 16, 2001, http://www.unionlawyers.ru/journal/journal.pdf, defines separatism as: “any deed aimed at breach of the territorial integrity of a state, including at separation of a part of its territory or disintegration of the state committed by violence, … “ The definition logically implies that acts can be of a separatist nature even if they are non-violent or aim only at increased regional autonomy.

7 The Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was formally adopted one year later on 10 June 2002.


10 Figures according to United States Energy Information Administration, Caspian Sea Region: Key Oil and Gas Statistics (August 2003), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspstats.html.


15 Having recently surpassed Japan, China is now the second biggest oil importer in the world after the U.S. See BBC, China fears over Siberia pipeline, February 24, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3516129.stm.

16 In 1997, for instance, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought 60% of Kazakhstan’s Ak-tyubinsk Oil Company for US$ 4.3 billion. In 2003 both countries signed an agreement to build a pipeline of 3000 km linking Kazakhstan and Xinjiang. See Jing-Dong Yuan, “China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Anti-Terrorism and Beijing’s Central Asian Policy, Politologiske Studier 6, No. 2 (2003):


18 Ibid, 130.

19 It is, for instance, widely believed that China is buying Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with anti-ship missiles that might prevent a the U.S. from intervening in an operation against Taiwan. See Denny Roy, “China’s Reaction to American Predominance,” Survival 45, No. 3 (2003): 62.


Weitz, “Why Russia and China have not formed an anti-American alliance,” 45-47.


Blank, “Central Asia and the Transformation,” 340-341


On January 3, 2001 Pakistan formally requested observer status to the SCO. India-friendly Tajikistan opposed this and despite strong Chinese lobbying the request was not granted. See Bakshi, “SCO Before and After Sep-tember 11.”


