Interview with Dr. Shafiq Al-Ghabra, Former President of the American University of Kuwait
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Can you tell us where the inspiration for this article originated?

Yes, it is a challenge in 2008 to belong to a generation that formed its basic views of the world during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Growing up in Kuwait, Beirut, and then coming to the United States to study at the age of 18 in 1971 has, naturally, affected the way I have come to view the world. The premise of my generation was simple: old ways must be seen with new eyes; religion, tradition, and habit are not the only frameworks for examining the world. I was and still am the product of secularism, ranging from nationalism to Marxism to liberal democracy. Yet I am also a product of religious values incorporated in my society and family. Religion was never a formula to be applied but a set of moral values that guides our understanding of fairness, justice, respect and equality between human beings.

You mentioned that your views belong to an older generation. Can you expand on that?

The 1950s and 1960s were marked by youthful rebellion against convention and the past. In the Arab context this movement manifested itself in coups by young Arab officers, among them Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952, the Lebanese students who went to the streets in 1969, and a new generation of supporters and activists in the Palestinian movement in the mid and late 1960s. This state of affairs led Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, a young Arab scholar at the American University of Beirut, to write his unusual and critical thesis of religious thought in 1969. This era also produced troubling times in the world—including the reign of the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, the continuity of Stalinism, the Cultural Revolution in China under Mao—as well as xenophobic secular nationalism elsewhere. Arab nationalism dominated the Middle East during this period before beginning its dramatic retreat after the June 1967 War.

The violence and terrorism of the 1960s was more secular than that of recent years and today. Its practitioners had immediate reasons for its use, such as a hijacking to obtain the release of prisoners or to open political channels. The objective often was not the wanton spilling of blood. In fact, a number of Palestinian and Arab hijackers deliberately chose to avoid blood baths, instead focusing on demands that required political engagement of some sort.

In the 1960s and into the 1970s religion was limited primarily to the mosque; it played only a limited role in public life. More than any...
group in society, it was older men who went to
the mosques for prayers and socialization. In most
of the Arab world religiosity was in decline,
particularly among the young. Images of public
gatherings in the Arab world from the 1950s
through the 1970s reveal only a rare veiled or
covered woman.

Arabs of the 1960s fell principally into
two camps: supporters of the traditional
monarchies who sided with the West during the
Cold War and supporters of a semi-revolutionary
militant Arab nationalism led by Nasser who
advocated a socialist view of the world. The Arab
nationalists threatened the monarchies and were
closer to the Soviet Union than were the
traditionalists. The monarchies that remained in
power sought to contain Nasser and found in
Islam an identity to counter the Nasserist secular
vision.

What do you believe was the turning point in this
battle between the Nasserists and the Monarchists?

The monarchies’ unease and Israel’s
capture of East Jerusalem in 1967
provided the impetus for Saudi
Arabia’s King Faysal to work with
other leaders in establishing the
Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), which is
headquartered in Saudi Arabia; the
OIC in part was intended, among
Arab leaders, as a counterweight to
the Arab League, headquartered in
Cairo. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia
and other Persian Gulf states and
monarchies in the region hosted
members of the Muslim
Brotherhood who faced
imprisonment elsewhere, including Egypt, where
the organization was banned. The Muslim
Brothers, founded in Egypt in 1927 and
advocating a highly politicized reinterpretation of
Islam, benefited from growing support and
legitimacy in Gulf societies. In Saudi Arabia, the
expression of the Muslim Brothers found a
sympathetic ear in the strict Saudi interpretation
of Islam.

The Arabs’ shockingly swift and decisive
defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war struck a
blow to the heart of Arab nationalism, leading many to
question the legitimacy and efficacy of its leaders.
This loss in an area lacking strong traditions in
civil society, democratic thinking, and centrist
ideas opened the door for politicized religion to
fill the void left by the retreat of secular Arab
nationalism.

When do you believe there was a general religious
revival? What affect did this have on the population
and the local governments?

In the late 1970s, Islam returned with a
sense of vengeance against all after being
marginalized by the -isims: socialism, Nasserism,
communism, Baathism, Arab nationalism, and
even Zionism. As had occurred in the past with
other movements centered around religion, this
one brought with it a culture of absolutism.
Urbanization and other socioeconomic
developments also contributed in the 1980s and
1990s to opening the way for the steady rise of
religious revival across the Arab world.

The Islamist movement in the Arab world
had a secular dimension: It thrived on such
sociological elements as classes in distress and
feelings of powerlessness among cultures in the
midst of changing socioeconomic structures. It
provided a platform for communities seeking political
participation, security, and in
some cases resistance to
occupation without necessarily
being democratic in nature.
Similar religious expression was
simultaneously taking root in
communities in Eastern Europe
gearing up to face down
communist rule. In general,
religious activism has in the
past provided a foundation or
solace for people living in poverty or otherwise
anxious times. It should come as no surprise that
religion-based moral values returned to center
stage in the wake of what appeared to be
secularist indifference to morality and the failure
of class-based ideologies claiming to advance the
betterment of the weak.

Supporting Islamic movements,
organizations, and leaders evolved as well as a
means for fearful rulers to counter socialist and
nationalist or leftist and communist influence or
ascendance in their countries. This dynamic stood
at the center of the financial and military
assistance given to the Islamic resistance in
Afghanistan by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, along with the United States, in the 1980s following the 1979 Soviet invasion. This support helped nurture a militant and extreme version of Islam that gave rise to the Taliban and to Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network.

The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran set the tone and paved the path for religious revival in the Middle East. The revolution transformed Iran into a theocracy governed by a class of clergy who interpreted and applied Islam to the political as well as social realms. The government imposed dress codes for men and women, banned alcohol, segregated the sexes wherever possible, and restricted speech, including writing and the arts. It was also the antitheses of the secular dictatorship of the Shah of Iran in every aspect. The Iranian new leadership compiled a list of enemies inside the country and beyond its borders. In the Iranian government, liberals, moderates, and centrists willing to be flexible in the implementation of religion and in politics were to be feared, though sometimes tolerated.

The success of the Iranian model soon sparked competition between the Sunnis and Shiites of Islam concerning the expansion of the realm of religion. Muslim Brothers (a Sunni group) could point out to the possible success of an Islamic revolution and government. This era witnessed the rise of Islamic political parties dedicated to the implementation of shari'a, Islamic law, irrespective of constitutions, public opinion, diversity, and the complexity involved in such an application.

Like other ideologies blending anger with a sense of messianic purpose, the Islamic revival intruded into private spaces, restricting personal choices, expression, and dress. While states restricted political freedom, allied Islamic groups targeted social and personal freedoms. Theater, film, music, publishing and personal interactions all suffered. These developments erected a detour away from the natural evolution of a secular era and instead directed traffic toward an extremely conservative one. The revival could have focused on modernity, efficiency, and productivity and attempted to reconcile tradition with development and moving forward, but this was not part of the agenda of religious revivalists. Rather, the emerging groups set out to change society by controlling personal and public spaces through strict interpretation and application of shari'a. Thus affected states simultaneously experienced the de-secularization and de-liberalization of their politics and societies at some level.

**Didn't the governments in the Middle East come under pressure to become more democratic?**

When governments came under pressure to open their political systems to allow broader participation, some religious groups dismissed electoral politics as a Western practice. After recognizing the opportunity elections had to offer, they organized to contest them, running for legislative seats where they could. Having secured seats, they proceeded to cast parliamentary votes against women's rights, lobbied successfully for more religious education in schools, advocated Islamic punishment for criminals, and in general sought to pass measures in line with their religion-tinted view of society. The religious revivalists' attacks on curricula undermined nationalist teachings in the classroom and respect for local nationalisms. Their fundamentalist and puritanical interpretations of shari'a took or threatened to take Arab and Islamic societies back centuries.

At the same time: religious groups in Parliaments focused on the apparent corruption and transparency in government, governance, and accountability. They also focused on limiting the impact of the Internet and globalization on Islamic values. They considered this to be part of the Islamic agenda.

Afghanistan and Sudan followed Iran in implementing shari'a. Several Arab societies, including Algeria, faced civil strife and war over the role of religion in the political arena. In Kuwait, attempts at implementing shari'a took place through the modification of existing laws. On the other hand in Saudi Arabia, religious resurgence bred a more rigid form of the state’s imposition of shari'a; the religionists in the kingdom were prepared for and eventually entered into battle with the government. Most regimes confronted by religious political
maneuvering have thus far managed nonetheless to protect their legitimacy and grip on power.

**How did these Islamic Parties go about achieving their goals?**

The majority believed that reaching its objective could be accomplished using political means; it therefore rejected violence without respect for diversity. Its supporters saw elections and democracy as a means to the end—Islamization of the state and society. In Kuwait, members of the parliamentary Islamist bloc did not argue for cutting off the hands of thieves; instead the focused mainly on segregating men and women in education and eliminating expressions of joy and celebration in the country found in many Arab countries such as UAE, Lebanon, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and Egypt. In 2008 they established a committee to address negative and foreign influences in the country. First on the committee’s agenda was to declare the gay and lesbian community an external influence. Committee members (according to other members of parliament and liberal writers in Kuwait) hope to bring about the passage of legislation to create religious police to monitor behavior. In the meantime, Kuwait is in dire need to update and develop its education, privatization, development, public health, and so on. These issues are of little or no importance to MP’s from the Islamic bloc.

The monolithic social agenda of the Islamist movement must be challenged by civil society and by the state in order to create an evolution in its ranks. The movement does not yet see personal freedoms and diversity of life styles as basic to civic culture and development. They also do not view politics, the state, and education as separates entities from their interpretation of Islam.

The other Islamist school, the minority, is represented by al-Qaeda and similar groups. They have no qualms about employing violence to bring about the immediate application of shari’ā. These armed groups have a heightened sense of urgency compared to those willing to follow a purely political path. The Puritanism of these groups is of the highest order; their understanding of shari’ā is strict to the point of suspecting the Muslim Brothers and similar groups of selling out. Its adherents are willing to kill others, whom they have dehumanized, and sacrifice their own lives in pursuit of their vision.

**Where and when will this struggle between Islamists and secularists end?**

The trail of religious violence across the Arab world cannot be missed. Religious zealots have committed almost innumerable acts of violence against the state—for example, assassinating Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and society—for instance, bombing resorts, attacking religious minorities, tourists, and local populations. The violence and terrorism of religious extremists has become a fact of life in the Middle East and has reached out to touch other parts of the world.

Rising and ongoing conflict between government and mosque compromise the integrity of the state. Only a minority of zealots is fighting this war, but the net result is their slow empowerment, as the silent majority is neutralized under the rule of the authoritarian states and the religious right across the region.

Efforts to avoid religion-based violence have the ironic ability to empower religionists by making the relatively moderate religious center appear to be the salvaging element in the equation. To protect against radical violent groups, some societies may find themselves accepting of the implementation of mainstream shari’ā, which is nonetheless religious law and not constitutional law. The conservative right seeking to implement the shari’ā in stages in some ways has the upper hand vis-à-vis the government because of its mastery of cultural language, the impression that it will act to calm tensions, and its control of the symbols of religion and religiosity. In the middle stand those torn between state and religious groups depending on the issues and situation. This is how a state like Kuwait could fail until 2006 to push for women’s right to vote or...
run for office. This is how countries acquiesce to the segregation of men and women in education and clubs to ostensibly ameliorate situations irrespective of the negative effects of such practices on development and future well being. Sometimes, the state attempts to appropriate the symbols of religion to undermine moderate and extremist Islamists and in the end injects religion in education and *shari'a* in other social sectors.

In the midst of these struggle, the state views civil society, NGOs, and freedom of expression of all kinds as challenges. In choosing between religious groups and liberalizing forces, governments have tended to favor the religious, often mistakenly believing that they can control the outcome. Middle Eastern states’ suspicions and fear of local (and international) NGOs, human rights organizations, and independent expression have resulted in weak civil societies and strengthened, sometimes inadvertently, religious groups. In short, the states see in centrist and civil society groups a long-term threat that undermines their power by seeking to lay the foundation for democracy. This lies at the root of the weakness of most governments of predominantly Islamic societies in dealing with the challenge of the religionists. At the end of the day, the states, in assessing what is best for them, have in essence created a situation in which the only choice is between the radical implementation of *shari'a* and the supposedly moderate implementation of *shari'a*. A centrist middle is missing because the state and the religious groups have decided that such a center—liberal, democratic, and secular—is counter to both their long-term objectives.

**What do you see is the future for change in the relationship between state and religion in the Middle East?**

The development of the nation-state in modern world history established, for the most part, that sovereignty belongs to the state, not to religion and that politics is a secular and a temporal activity. Challenging a state, when government is in the hands of an Islamic party that claims representation of the divine, is not equivalent to confronting a secular government. The separation of state and mosque or church or synagogue will continue to be an important achievement in all cultures, but the struggle between them will continue and will be reflected in laws and culture. Are the two one authority because an interpreter of Islam says there must be no separation or do societies create separation in addition to coeducational learning environments because they lend themselves to better education, benefit males and females in the workplace in a globalize economy, and contribute to building more equitable societies in general? Should laws and regulations be constructed on the basis of the daily needs of society or based on religious text? Whose interpretation of the world of God is the correct interpretation? The challenge is how to maintain levels of separation without sparking an extremist religionist reaction.

The relationship between religion and state in the Middle East has the potential to follow a number of paths, some of which are already being trodden. First is the surrender of the state to religion or religious zealots as in Afghanistan or Iran. Second is the total defeat of religion where secular authoritarian governments prevails, as in Egypt and Syria. Third is the continuity of a state of violence and religionist pressure where the state continues to resist implementation of *shari'a* as demanded by religionists, but submits to no middle path. This is apparent in Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Finally there is the path where a compromise between state and religion with a focus on development and citizenship rights exists. States agree to further accommodate religion as long as it respects the rights of all groups and communities within society, including liberals, women, and religions and other minorities.

The key to this last model is economic development and prosperity and the creation of democracy and a civil society. The key...
policies. The challenge is how to move in the direction of civil society and democracy while maintaining state neutrality and economic development.

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