



Processing Democracy: Turkey and the Kurds

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The European Union's (EU) final decision to permit Turkey's accession talks in October 2005 ushered in a new period of hope, prosperity, and democracy for Turkey's diverse multiethnic population. Since 1999 when Turkey was finally approved as an applicant country to the EU after several decades of waiting, it has embarked on an ambitious program to harmonize its policies and institutions with those of the *Acquis Communautaire* and the Copenhagen Criteria necessary for full EU membership. In particular, Turkey has passed and adopted numerous new measures that will ultimately lead to a stronger democracy, greater freedom of expression, a more dynamic civil society, and increased governmental transparency. After six short years, positive effects of such reform in Turkey are beginning to appear and affect such important ethnic groups as the Kurds. Turkish society and its Kurdish minority, approximately 20 percent out of 70 million in Turkey,¹ must overcome troubled relations of the twentieth century before Turkey can be fully accepted into the EU.

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However, with a new wave of democratic reforms and outside assistance from the European Union in the past five years, the Turkish government and its Kurdish population have slowly initiated a process of reconciliation and greater acceptance. A final reconciliation between Turkish society and the Kurds must surmount many obstacles, but the new prospect of an EU membership adds incentive for improved future relations.

The Evolution of Turkey and its Kurdish Question

The Economist aptly begins this analysis by assessing the recent transformation of ethnicity and culture in Turkish society:

Turkey is more like a tree, with roots in many different cultures and ethnicities. In its early years it was pruned and trained to grow strictly in one direction: Turkish. Now, in its maturity, its branches tend to go their own way, seeking their own kind of light.²

With the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, rose to power and fought for the establishment of a secular and modern republic. From 1919 to 1922, the Turks and Kurds united under the umbrella of Islam and fought for the

establishment of a new Turkish republic in the War of Liberation. Under the Ottoman system, the Turks and Kurds fell under the same *millet* and united to combat the rise in nationalist sentiment among the various non-Muslim minority groups of the former Ottoman Empire.³

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Moreover, during the Ottoman period the primary element of identity was Islam; ethnic identities among the Muslim population were not of great importance beyond the linguistic and cultural.⁴

The unity between the Turks and Kurds of the early 1920s degenerated with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and formation of the Republic

of Turkey. The new national identity that emerged by the mid-1920s was based on the Turkish language: "For Atatürk, the nation to which Turks were to belong was a political and social entity composed of citizens tied together by a common language, culture, and collective consciousness and ideals."⁵ Additionally, the constitution of 1924 defined a "Turk" as anyone living within the borders of Turkey and connected to Turkey by a union of citizenship. The problem arose, however, when the members of the new national assembly defined 'real' citizens of Turkey as being Turkish speaking *Hanafi* Muslims. Such a definition excluded non-Turkish speaking Kurds belonging to the devout *Shafi* branch of Sunni Islam.⁶ In 1924 Atatürk further divided society and ostracized devout Muslim Kurds by abolishing the Islamic caliphate.

During Turkey's state formation of the 1920s, the Kurds, who were traditionally led by local tribal chieftains or *aghas*, had to submit themselves for the first time to centralized state regulations such as taxation, military conscription, and local public administrative policies. As a result of this new centralized nation-building process, the Turkish government experienced

strong resistance in the Kurdish provinces and between 1924 and 1938 the Turkish government put down seventeen different rebellions in Kurdish communities across Turkey.⁷

In the 1920s and 1930s the government and military denied the existence of its Kurdish population as they attempted to establish a new "Turkish" identity. In this environment of accelerated Kurdish assimilation into Turkish society, the Kurds also grew more aware of their own ethnic identity, ultimately leading to increased tensions between the two groups for the remainder of the century.⁸ Additionally, Kurdish national identity had been spurred on after an explicit reference by the Allies in the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 for the formation of a Kurdish nation-state.

To further heighten the tension between Kurds and Turks in a post-Atatürk era, the military largely controlled the rights and freedoms of Kurds in the 1940s and 1950s in what became an increasingly normalized discrimination. Kurds, for example, were permitted to participate in politics under the condition that ethnic identity was not mentioned. And as a result clandestine political parties such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDPT) were established in the 1960s even though they wielded very little power under stringent operating restrictions placed upon them by the Turkish government.⁹ Thus, over time the Kurds grew increasingly disillusioned by the exclusionary tactics adopted by the state and military to keep them from participating in government.

By the 1970s Kurdish dissatisfaction over the government's policies against the Kurdish population significantly increased. To make matters worse, Turkey's economy was on the verge of collapse with spiraling inflation and political stalemate by the end of the 1970s. Thus,

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across Turkey the 1970s ushered in an era of political polarization and increased armed clashes between left and right wing groups. The Kurds contributed to national political polarization by establishing twelve Marxist-Leninist Kurdish separatist groups, with the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) being the most dominant and radical.¹⁰ By 1979 Turkey was on the verge of political anarchy with sharp increases in the number of assassinations and street clashes claiming more than 1,000 civilian lives.¹¹ In 1980 the military was left with no choice but to intervene and restore law and order for a third time in the Republic's history. The military coup of 1980 restored stability to Turkey, while at the same time leaving a political void by outlawing all political parties and establishing martial law. The Kurdish cities and provinces of eastern Turkey were greatly affected by the military coup and subsequent violent crackdown of communist and nationalist activities. In this period, Diyarbakir, the Kurd's cultural and political center, became synonymous with death and torture.¹²

The constitution drafted by the military in 1982 further contributed to the anger and disillusionment of the Kurds by explicitly approving provisions that significantly strengthened cultural and political suppression in the Kurdish provinces of the southeast. In 1983 a similarly controversial law was passed by the military whereby, "It [was] forbidden to express, diffuse or publish opinions in any language other than the official language of states recognized by the Turkish state...The mother tongue of Turkish citizens [was] Turkish."¹³ This culture of violence and repression established at the beginning of the 1980s ultimately provoked violent clashes in 1984 between the military and PKK, headed by its founder Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK acted as the spokesman for the disenfranchised Kurds across the country who desired greater freedoms and a Kurdish national state.

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From 1984 to 1999, Turkey and the PKK fought a bloody internal war that claimed the lives of more than 37,000 civilians, Turkish soldiers, and PKK fighters, ending only when Öcalan was captured by Turkish Special Forces after fleeing his headquarters of operation in Syria. At the pinnacle of the conflict in the mid-1990s, 250,000 Turkish troops were amassed in the southeast and from 1990 to 1997 3,211 villages were evacuated, displacing more than three million civilians to cities within the southeast and western territories.¹⁴ During this period, Turkish and Kurdish nationalism spread fervently across the country. Many Kurds grew tired of being marginalized and repressed by the Turkish government and military, and therefore sought more ways to

fight for secession. From the Turkish perspective, the PKK represented most Kurds and was viewed as terrorist insurgents who sought to undermine state legitimacy.

Fifteen years of internal war led to a new a period of Kurdish migration to the large cities in the west such as Izmir and Istanbul, currently Turkey's largest Kurdish city. The large influx of migrants during this period sparked an unforeseen process of urbanization for the Kurds, introducing them to the forces of modernity and secularism. Moreover, the Kurds were forced to assimilate into Turkey's more secular cities and adopt more modern business practices, ultimately leading to the formation of a new Kurdish middle class.¹⁵ This migration phenomenon is important to note because of the profound effect it has had on the political makeup of the country today. With the increased forced assimilation of the Kurds and intermarriage between Turks and Kurds of the past decade, there is a significant decrease of Kurdish nationalism and separatist sentiment. Overall, continued Kurdish assimilation across Turkey has assisted in the greater inclusion of Kurds into Turkey's democratic institutions.¹⁶

By 1991, there was a thaw in relations between the Kurds and Turkish President Turgut Özal after he publicly recognized his Kurdish descent. Furthermore, Özal played an important role in helping pass legislation to repeal the law that had forbidden the public use of the Kurdish language. Following the national elections in 1991, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel also argued that, "Turkey had to recognize the Kurdish reality and could not continue to pretend that Kurds were Turks who had originally come from Central Asia."¹⁷

During this period, the Kurdish question was also publicly debated to a greater extent than in previous decades by many politicians, intellectuals, and other civil society leaders. Unfortunately, the death of Özal in 1993 ended the dialogue with the Kurds that began under his leadership. The pro-Kurdish political parties, including the Democracy Party (DEP) and its predecessor, the People's Labor Party (HEP), further contributed to a national political stalemate by adopting a radical Kurdish nationalist platform. The platform sparked a strong counter reaction by hard-liners in parliament who ultimately ordered the closure of both political parties and the arrest of their members of parliament.¹⁸ The post-Özal period marked another return to more violence and fighting between the PKK and military that continued until Öcalan's capture in 1999.

Despite a return to violence by the end of the 1990s, the brief period of Özal's presidency is noteworthy in terms of a new dialogue that it provoked in Turkish society regarding its Kurdish population. For the first time in decades the Turkish government and society began to better acknowledge the presence of its distinct Kurdish population. Certainly, the relations remained embittered because of the continued conflict that raged in the southeast, but as Murat Somer notes, there was a greater awareness and opening up of mainstream social discourse about the existence of Turkey's Kurdish population.¹⁹ Indeed, a great ethnic cleavage continued to exist in society because of the war raging in the southeast. However, the fact that a mainstream Turkish daily newspaper like *Hürriyet* was publishing

more articles that referred directly to the Kurdish population and their distinct ethnic identity marked the beginning of a new period of social reconstruction and reconciliation that continues today.²⁰

Further nation-wide surveys have also demonstrated that Kurds no longer categorize themselves as purely Kurdish and, in many cases, affiliate themselves as being Kurdish-Turkish:

Based on nation-wide surveys conducted in 1996, 2002, and 2003-2004, 9.24 percent, 11.35 percent, and 10.63 percent of all respondents, in respective order, declared themselves to be Kurdish: They marked "Kurd" as one of their identities from among a long list of ethnic, national, and religious categories known to exist in Turkey. Among these ethnic Kurds, however, 2.71 percent, 5.76 percent, and 5.20 percent, declared themselves as exclusively Kurdish. The other ethnic Kurds identified with Kurdishness in combination with other identity categories as Sunni-Kurdish and Turkish-Kurdish.²¹

According to this data, the ethnic division between Turks and Kurds appears ambiguous. Moreover, many Kurds seem more assimilated into Turkish society based on the recorded responses and ethnic affiliations documented in this survey. In fact, according to a report published by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) at the climax of fighting in 1995, only 13 percent of those polled desired some form of autonomy and another 13 percent supported the establishment of a separate Kurdish state.²² During this period in the 1980s and early 1990s the government and military often grouped all Kurds into one category of separatists when, in reality, many Kurds opposed the war and the ideology of the PKK. Furthermore, the Centre for European Policy Studies noted in their research that many Kurds bear multiple identities, which makes for a more conducive environment for further governmental reforms."²³

Democratic Reforms and the European Union

Since 1999 Turkey has adopted a program of democratic reform that directly affects its Kurdish population. Certainly, in a five year period since the start of membership talks with the EU, the Turkish government has not been able to completely overcome the ethnic tensions that hinder society after close to two decades of internal war. Further, the effect of several decades of discriminatory policies adopted against the Kurds still remains to a significant extent today. However, the Turkish government

has made important strategic reforms that will ultimately help in better integrating its Kurdish population. Box 1.1 below summarizes some of the reforms undertaken recently by the Turkish government on the Kurdish issue.

The summary outlines many of the reforms implemented by the government in such areas as freedom of expression, the use of the Kurdish language, and other projects initiated for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the war. Despite having implemented some reforms, there are still many stipulations in the new laws that

Box 1.1

Reforms adopted by the Turkish government on the Kurdish issue

- The constitutional amendments of October 2001 removed the restriction on the use of any language prohibited by law in the expression and dissemination of thought from Article 26 of the constitution. Similarly, restrictive language on broadcasting was also removed from Article 28.
- Broadcasting in Kurdish was permitted with the third democratization package in August 2002. The seventh package adopted in July 2003 further amended the broadcasting law to provide for such broadcasting by public and private radio and television stations.
- The law that deals with the teaching of foreign languages was also amended with the third package in August 2002, opening the way for private courses in Kurdish. The seventh package adopted in July 2003 allowed the teaching of such languages in existing private courses without requiring that new courses be created altogether. It also prescribed that the Council of Ministers alone would regulate and decide which languages are to be taught (without having to obtain the approval of the National Security Council).
- The Civil Registry Law was amended in July 2003 to permit parents to name their children in Kurdish.
- In an attempt to foster social peace in the region, parliament adopted a law on 'social reinsertion' in August 2003. The law provides for a partial amnesty and reduction in sentences for persons involved in the activities of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK. The law excludes the leaders of the organisation as well as those who have committed crimes. By December 2003, 524 prisoners out of 2067 applications had been released and about 586 PKK militants have surrendered.
- Implementation of the "Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project" (where the aim is to support the return of those displaced during the conflict to their villages) has continued. According to official sources, 124,218 people were authorised to return to their villages from June 2000 to May 2004. More than 400 villages and hamlets have reportedly been reopened with government assistance.

Source: Senim Aydin and E. Fuat Keyman, "European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy," *EU-Turkey Working Papers from the Centre for European Policy Studies* (No. 2, August 2004), 35.

inhibit the full and open expression of the Kurdish language. For example, the new broadcasting laws that permit Kurdish on television and airwaves are very limited; for television four hours a week is permitted, not exceeding 45 minutes a day, and for radio, five hours per week is allowed, with a maximum of 60 minutes per day.²⁴ Additionally, NGOs and other local representatives have expressed concern over

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freedom of expression from Article 301 in the new Penal Code (formerly Article 159, “Insulting the State and State Institutions”) because it has been used by some judges and lawyers to prosecute and, in some cases, convict individuals, including Kurds, who have spoken out against the state and its policies.²⁵

The public trial of the famous Kurdish politician,

Leyla Zana, became representative of the Kurdish struggle for achieving full freedom of expression. In 1994 Zana was arrested and convicted with three other Kurdish politicians under the old penal code. She was originally arrested for speaking Kurdish during a parliamentary session, which is forbidden under Turkish law. In addition, she was convicted for her direct ties to the PKK. In 2004, however, Zana was released from prison because of the Turkish legislature’s adoption of the new penal code, as well as other judiciary reforms that permitted a retrial of her case.²⁶ Zana’s case is important because it is one of the first publicized cases that demonstrates how Turkey’s newly adopted judicial and legislative reforms are being enforced. Certainly, Turkey must continue to ensure greater freedom of expression for the Kurds. However, the European Commission’s progress report on Turkey in 2005 did note that the amount of prosecutions and convictions in cases regarding freedom of expression had declined.²⁷

Positive reforms have also been made in the area of freedom of association. The new Law of Associations was first adopted in November 2004:

The Law is important in reducing the possibility for state interference in the activities of associations and has already begun to bring a number of practical benefits for associations, thus facilitating the further development of civil society in Turkey.²⁸

Despite some legal stipulations, such civil society groups as the Ankara Kurdish Democracy, Culture, and Solidarity Association and the Kurdish Writer’s Association have been able to operate with greater freedoms than in previous years.²⁹ This small representation of Kurdish civil society groups is an improvement from the past, but the Turkish government must continue permitting the formation of civil society groups as an integral part in its process of democratization.

Regarding torture and ill-treatment allegations against the military and police forces, the 2005 EU report cited a decrease in the number of torture incidences.³⁰ In the last couple of years, the Turkish government has adopted a zero-tolerance policy for human rights offenders,³¹ a significant improvement for a nation cited with previously documented human rights violations. Nevertheless, the 2005 EU report connoted the need for more legislation that will bolster the protection of minorities, including the Kurds, because of continued reports of torture.³² Training programs for the military and judiciary have been established for the gendarmerie, police forces, public prosecutors, and judges, but more training and education programs are necessary to ensure greater protection of human rights.³³

More recently, the Turkish government established human rights boards in all 81 provinces and 849 sub-provinces, comprised of representatives from professional organizations, NGOs, the media, academic institutions, and local government officials. The aim of the boards is to address human rights complaints and direct such

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complaints to a local prosecutor's office. Moreover, the government has initiated a national Human Rights High Council that is chaired by the deputy prime minister and composed of various ministry undersecretaries to further address allegations of human rights violations.³⁴ In addition to human rights councils, Turkey has also ratified six of thirteen protocols from the European Convention on Human Rights:

It abolished the death penalty and adopted measures to promote independence of the judiciary, end torture during police interrogations, and reform the prison system. In addition, Turkey has significantly reduced the scope of its antiterrorism statutes, which had been used to curtail political expression, and it amended the Codes of Criminal and Administrative Procedure. Police powers have been curbed and the administration of justice strengthened, due partly to the dismantling of state security courts.³⁵

Overall, Turkey has made significant improvement in adopting new legislative reform to help in curbing future human rights violations. Such reforms aid in the process of democratization with greater governmental transparency and will ultimately improve the individual rights of Kurds who have previously suffered from ill-treatment of the government after speaking out against its policies. Indeed, more reform and training programs are needed before Turkey can proclaim itself a true guarantor of human rights.

The Turkish government has also recently joined the European Union's Culture 2000 Program as a means to protect cultural rights of its citizens. The program endeavors to promote and preserve cultural rights through more education programs and cross-cultural exchanges, including transnational cooperation between cultural organizations across Europe.³⁶ In the long term, the program will have a direct impact on the Kurds as they seek to further preserve their cultural identity in Turkey. Acknowledgement

and acceptance of Kurdish culture also contributes to the government's improved relations with the Kurds and will help to bolster greater good will, as well as national and international legitimacy for Turkey's democracy.

In addition to the legislative reform and other ratified protocols that have directly affected Kurds, significant advances have been made in the political rhetoric employed by the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan regarding Turkey's Kurdish population. In a monumental speech given by Erdogan in the Kurdish southeastern city of Diyarbakir in August 2005, Erdogan became the first Turkish leader ever to confess that Turkey had mishandled its rebellious Kurds. "Turkey," Erdogan remarked, "needed to face up to its past. More democracy, not more repression, was the answer to the Kurds' long-running grievances."³⁷ Although Erdogan's speech was criticized by many for not including a detailed policy plan of action for the Kurdish provinces of the southeast, the landmark speech nevertheless is important because it signifies a strong warming of relations between the Turkish government and its Kurdish population.³⁸ The Turkish government is working to mend the ethnic tensions in order to further legitimize the process of democratization in Turkey.

As a party that embraces political Islam, the AKP has garnered major support in recent elections from many Kurds across Turkey. In fact, during the 2002 elections more Kurds, especially those in the western part of the country, increasingly supported AKP candidates over the traditional pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party (DEHAP). According to several scholars, "Such a decline is reflective of the intense assimilation taking place among Kurds in western Turkey. As Kurds in

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this part of the country feel the pull of middle class life, Kurdish nationalism loses some of its old appeal.”³⁹ The AKP has succeeded in further uniting its divided society under the influence of Islam in a secular and modern republic.

Although the AKP has made progress in beginning a process of reconciliation with the Kurds, there are many fundamental problems that need to be addressed before Turkey can be fully admitted to the EU. First, the PKK, now considered an international terrorist organization, is still active in the southeast and across the border in northern Iraq. Indeed, the PKK is not nearly as powerful compared to ten years ago because of a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many Kurds and dried up funding from previous international supporters as the Soviet Union, Iran, and Syria.⁴⁰ The PKK, however, will continue to be a hindrance if Turkey desires to adopt further democratic measures and overcome its phobia that *all* Kurds within Turkey desire independence.

Second, unemployment in the southeast is at an all time high—some cities in the southeast have reported up to 60 percent unemployment when the national average is 10 percent.⁴¹ High unemployment has often been cited as a tool used by the PKK to attract young fighters. The EU is correct in its critique of the Erdogan government by stating that the AKP needs to adopt a concrete plan of action to further promote socio-economic development in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of the southeast. The EU and other international organizations, including the United States, are essential in helping to promote international investment and economic growth.

Lastly, the government must continue to assist IDPs who had been forced to flee the internal war of the past two decades. Assisting in the reconstruction and resettlement of IDPs in the southeast will create more good will for the government and help in the overall process of democratization.

All in all, the European Union will play a central role in ensuring that Turkey continues to implement more democratic reforms. And despite a lukewarm report by the European Commission in 2005 on Turkey’s progress in adopting reform during the past year, Erdogan’s

government has vowed to work earnestly in closer unison with the EU and uphold the enforcement of previously adopted reforms.⁴²

Conclusion

As Turkey now prepares for its final accession into the EU, the Turkish government has made a conscious effort in the last few years to pass new legislation that directly affects its Kurdish population. EU officials have expressed concern over Turkey’s efforts to integrate and provide for its Kurdish population. As demonstrated in this analysis, however, Turkey has made significant improvements during the past few years in providing more freedoms for its Kurdish population in the areas of human and cultural rights, and democracy.

Certainly, the Turkish government can do more and must do more to assist its Kurdish population. But democratization for any country is a slow process, and is achieved over a significant period of time. Moreover, democratization can be violent, a violent process that must overcome many obstacles in society and government.

Turkey and its Kurdish population have a long and complex past. If the country is not able to include its Kurdish minority in politics and government, there is very little hope for the formation of a stable and lasting democracy. The Republic’s identity under Atatürk was shaped by the idea of a “Turkish” citizenship that included a “Turkish” language. Moreover, in a post-Atatürk era, the existence of Kurds in Turkey was systemically denied by successive governments and the military. To complicate matters, the Turkish government fought an internal war against many Kurds and the PKK from 1984 to 1999. Thus, from the 1920s until approximately 2000, a majority of Turkish society was influenced by widespread anti-Kurdish rhetoric. Such

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rhetoric has had a residual effect on society today and continues to pose major obstacles for the current government as it proceeds with democratic reforms to align itself with the EU. Nevertheless, with assistance from the EU, Turkey has overcome many obstacles in its attempt to improve relations with its Kurdish population through democracy. An ethnic divide still exists in society between many Turks and Kurds, but, with the adoption of many democratic reforms and the greater assimilation of Kurds into Turkish society, the divide is growing less apparent. Additionally, freedom of expression and freedom of association laws were passed by the Turkish parliament to bolster democratization in Turkey; indeed, such measures are essential for any democracy.

Overall, Turkey has taken action in the last five years to improve its democratic institutions

by including its Kurdish population into government and society. The future of democracy in Turkey and the inclusion of its Kurdish population into society lies at a critical juncture with the start of EU accession talks and must not be overlooked by future governments.

The views and opinions expressed in articles are strictly the author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher School.

¹ Murat Somer, "Resurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds," in *Comparative Political Studies* (Vol. 38, No. 6, August 2005), 592. *There is no clear data and statistics on the exact number of Kurds living in Turkey.*

² *The Economist*, "Survey Turkey," 8 June 1996 in *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium*, Amikan Nachmani (New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 33.

³ Murat Somer, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications," *The Middle East Journal* (Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 2004), 238.

⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, "The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy," in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, eds. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 280.

⁵ Taspinar, 62.

¹⁴ Kirişçi in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 281.

⁷ Taspinar, 65.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁹ McDowall, 39-40.

¹⁰ Taspinar, 94.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 95.

¹² *Ibid.*, 97.

¹³ Taspinar, 96-97.

¹⁴ Arthur Bonner, "Turkey, The European Union and Paradigm Shifts," *Middle East Policy* (Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2005), 60.

¹⁵ Soner Cagaptay and Yasemin Congar, "Local Elections in Turkey: A Landslide Victory for the Incumbent AKP," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* (Policy Watch #852, April 1, 2004), <<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1730>>, Viewed 8 November 2005.

¹⁶ Soner Cagaptay and Emrullah Uslu, "Is the PKK Still a Threat to the United States and Turkey?," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* (Policy Watch #940, January 10, 2005).

¹⁷ Kirişçi in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 287.

¹⁸ Kirişçi in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 287.

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- ²² Kemal Kirişçi, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 193.
- ²³ Aydin and Keyman, 37.
- ²⁴ European Commission, "2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession" (Brussels: 6 October 2004), 39.
- ²⁵ *Open cit.*, European Commission, "Turkey: 2005 Progress Report" (Brussels: 9 November 2005), 25.
- ²⁶ *Agence France Presse*, "Jailed Kurdish politician urges EU to open its doors to Turkey," (International news, January 27, 2004).
- ²⁷ European Commission, "Turkey: 2005 Progress Report" (Brussels: 9 November 2005), 25.
- ²⁸ European Commission, "Turkey: 2005 Progress Report," 27.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.
- ³¹ Commission of the European Communities, "2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession" (Brussels: 6 October 2004), 33.
- ³² European Commission, "Turkey: 2005 Progress Report," 41.
- ³³ Aydin and Keyman, 26.
- ³⁴ Aydin and Keyman, 23.
- ³⁵ David L. Phillips, "Turkey's Dreams of Accession," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2004), <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040901faessay83508/david-l-phillips/turkey-s-dreams-of-accession.html>> Viewed 13 November 2005.
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- ³⁸ For a critique of the speech, see the European Commission "Turkey: 2005 Progress Report."
- ³⁹ Congar and Cagaptay.
- ⁴⁰ Cagaptay and Uslu.
- ⁴¹ Yigal Schleifer, "Turkey's Kurds languish in poverty," *Christian Science Monitor* (August 31, 2005), 6.
- ⁴² *EU Business*, "Turkey vows to stick to EU reforms, defiant on Cyprus," (10 November 2005): <http://www.eubusiness.com/East_Europe/0511101129737.z0baa3a1> Viewed 11 November 2005.